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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Sam Ferrell, etaL vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal.

Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company
Date

Code

User

11/16/2010

SMIS

SBARRERA

Summons Issued

Gregory S. Anderson

NCOC

SBARRERA

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Gregory S. Anderson

NOAP

SBARRERA

Plaintiff: Ferrell, Sam Notice Of Appearance
Jacob S. Wessel

Gregory S. Anderson

NOAP

SBARRERA

Plaintiff: Ferrell, Deva Notice Of Appearance
Jacob S. Wessel

Gregory S. Anderson

SBARRERA

Filing: A All initial civil case filings of any type not Gregory S. Anderson
listed in categories 8-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Wessel, JacobS. (attorney for
Ferrell, Sam) Receipt number: 0053983 Dated:
11/18/2010 Amount $88.00 (Check) For: Ferrell,
Sam (plaintiff)

PETN

SBARRERA

Petition For Confirmation Of Arbitration Award
And Award Of Costs And Fees

12/3/2010

JUDGE

MESSICK

Judge Change (batch process)

1/3/2011

MOTN

SBARRERA

Defendants' Motion To Stay Proceedings

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

SBARRERA

Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion
To Stay

Dane H Watkins Jr

1/5/2011

SBARRERA

Acceptance Of Service 12/21/2010 United
Financial Casualty By Serving John J. Lerma

Dane H Watkins Jr

1/11/2011

SBARRERA

Objection To Motion To Stay

Dane H Watkins Jr

Judge

Gregory S. Anderson

1/13/2011

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/03/2011 09:00
AM) Motion to Stay (telephonic)

Dane H Watkins Jr

1/20/2011

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 02/03/2011 @9:00AM RE:
Motion To Stay Proceedings

Dane H Watkins Jr

LYKE

Withdrawal of Defendants' Motion to Stay
Proceedings

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendants' Motion to Stay Dane H Watkins Jr
(02/03/11 @9:00AM)

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 2/3/2011
Time: 9:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Karen Konvalinka
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Progressive Insurance Company
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: United Financial Casualty Company

Dane H Watkins Jr

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Motion held on 02/03/2011
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Motion to Stay 50 pages

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

LMESSICK

Order for Status Conference

Dane H Watkins Jr

2/2/2011

2/3/2011

2/4/2011

n1
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Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Sam Ferrell, eta!. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal.

Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company
Date

Code

User

2/4/2011

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
05/04/2011 08:30AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

2/17/2011

NOAP

DOOLITTL

Defendant: United Financial Casualty Company
Notice Of Appearance John J. Lerma

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOAP

DOOLITTL

Defendant: Progressive Insurance Company
Notice Of Appearance John J. Lerma

Dane H Watkins Jr

DOOLITTL

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
Dane H Watkins Jr
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Lerma,
John J. (attorney for Progressive Insurance
Company) Receipt number: 0007897 Dated:
2/18/2011 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For:
Progressive Insurance Company (defendant) and
United Financial Casualty Company (defendant)

ANSW

DOOLITTL

Answer to Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration
Award and Award of Costs and Fees

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Motion for Fees and Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees and
Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Support of Motion Dane H Watkins Jr
for Fees and Costs

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/06/2011 09:00
AM) Attorney Fees and Costs

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Fees and Costs Dane H Watkins Jr
(04/06/11 @9:00AM)

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Fees and Costs
(fax)

Dane H Watkins Jr
Dane H Watkins Jr

3/11/2011

3/15/2011

3/24/2011

Judge

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/1/2011

MEMO

SOLIS

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Reply To Defendants'
Response

4/6/2011

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 4/6/2011
Time: 9:01 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Progressive Insurance Company, Attorney:
John Lerma
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: United Financial Casualty Company,
Attorney: John Lerma

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/06/2011
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Attorney Fees and Costs 50 pages

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

SBARRERA

Objection To Affidavit Of Defendants' Counsel

Dane H Watkins Jr

U11/2011

(fax)

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-201 0-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Sam Ferrell, etal. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal.

Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company
Date

Code

User

4/11/2011

AFFD

SBARRERA

Supplemental Affidavit Of Costs And Attorney
Fees (after March 11, 2011)

4/29/2011

MEMO

LMESSICK

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr
Fees and Costs

5/4/2011

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
Dane H Watkins Jr
05/04/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing Helc
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 50 pages

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 5/4/2011
Time: 10:41 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Progressive Insurance Company, Attorney:
John Lerma
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: United Financial Casualty Company,
Attorney: John Lerma

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Motion to Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Award of Costs to Plaintiffs
(fax)

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dane H Watkins Jr
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to
Plaintiffs
(fax)

)/19/2011

HRSC

QUINTANA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/08/2011 10:00
AM) Motion to Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

)/23/2011

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing 06/08/2011 @1 O:OOAM
RE:Motion To Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

5/26/2011

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Telephonic Hearing Re: Defendant's
Dane H Watkins Jr
Motio to Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to
Plaintiffs (06/08/11 @1 O:OOAM)

SOLIS

Defendant's Response In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Dane H Watkins Jr
Motion To Reconsider

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Plaintiffs'
Motion To Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

)/1/2011

RESP

LYKE

Plaintiffs' Response and Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Award of Costs to Plaintiffs

Dane H Watkins Jr

i/3/2011

MEMO

SOLIS

Memorandum In Reply To Defendant's Response Dane H Watkins Jr
To Motion To Reconsider

DOOL!TTL

Defendant's Reply in Support of It's Motion to
Reconsider

5/13/2011

i/27/2011

i/6/2011

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H 'Natkins Jr
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Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Sam Ferrell, eta!. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal.

Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company
Date

Code

User

6/8/2011

DCHH

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/08/2011
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalink
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Motion to Reconsider 50 pages
Lerma to appear by telephone

MINE

LMESSICK

Minute Entry
Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 6/8/2011
Time: 9:54 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick
Tape Number:
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Progressive Insurance Company, Attorney:
John Lerma
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: United Financial Casualty Company,
Attorney: John Lerma

AFFD

LYKE

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and
Attorney Fees

3/15/2011

MEMO

LMESSICK

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Dane H Watkins Jr
Reconsider

7/21/2011

HRSC

LMESSICK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/11/2011 09:00
AM) Confirmation of Arbitration Award

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Motion for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award
and for Prejudgment Interest

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Hearing

8-11-11@ 9:00a.m.

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/5/2011

STIP

LYKE

Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award Dane H Watkins Jr
and Prejudgment Interest

3/12/2011

HRVC

LMESSICK

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
08/11/2011 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated
Confirmation of Arbitration Award

Dane H Watkins Jr

JDMT

LMESSICK

Judgment Order and Decree

Dane H Watkins Jr

CD IS

LMESSICK

Dane H Watkins Jr
Civil Disposition entered for: Progressive
Insurance Company, Defendant; United Financial
Casualty Company, Defendant; Ferrell, Deva,
Plaintiff; Ferrell, Sam, Plaintiff. Filing date:
8/12/2011

STJD

SOLIS

Satisfaction Of Judgment

LYKE

Dane H Watkins Jr
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid
by: Lerma Law Receipt number: 0042077 Dated:
9/12/2011 Amount: $2.00 (Check)

LYKE

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Dane H Watkins Jr
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Lerma Law Receipt number: 0042077 Dated:
9/12/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check)

l/23/2011
)/12/2011

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

00 ~1

Date: 11/16/2011

Seve

Time: 10:24 AM
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Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Sam Ferrell, etal. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal.

Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company
Date

Code

User

Judge

DOOLITTL

Filing: L4- Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr
Supreme Court Paid by: Wessel, Jacob S.
(attorney for Ferrell, Deva) Receipt number:
0043812 Dated: 9/21/2011 Amount $101.00
(Check) For: Ferrell, Deva (plaintiff) and Ferrell,
Sam (plaintiff)

APDC

DOOLITTL

Appeal Filed In District Court to Supreme Court

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Notice of Appeal

Dane H Watkins Jr

BNDC

LMESSICK

Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 44374 Dated
9/23/2011 for 100.00) Deposit on Clerk's Record

Dane H Watkins Jr

STATUS

LMESSICK

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Dane H Watkins Jr

CERTAP

LMESSICK

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Dane H Watkins Jr

10/3/2011

SOLIS

Respondent's Request For Additional Records

Dane H Watkins Jr

10/5/2011

LMESSICK

(SC) Notice of Appeal Filed
Record Due 1/11/12

Dane H Watkins Jr

10/13/2011

LMESSICK

(SC) Clerk's Certificate Filed

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/20/2011

9/23/2011

003

JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. cv-2o1o-

·:tro I

PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD
AND AWARD OF COSTS AND FEES

COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through the undersigned counsel of
record and hereby petition this Court for confirmation of the award obtained by Plaintiffs in
arbitration on November 4, 2010 and for an award of costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 411839, 12-120(3) and 12-121 as follows:
1.

1-

Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Idaho, County of Bonneville.

PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND AWARD OF
COSTS AND FEES

003

2.

Defendant United Financial Casualty Company is an insurance company operating

an insurance business in the State of Idaho and is the company that underwrote the policy for
Progressive Insurance Company.
4.

United "Financial Casualty Company's true name is unknown, therefore Plaintiffs

reserve the right to amend this petition pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1O(a)(4)
to substitute the true name.
5.

Defendant Progressive Insurance Company is an insurance company operating

an insurance business in the State ofldaho, which company issued an uninsured motorist policy to
Plaintiffs.
6.

Progressive Insurance Company's true name is unknown, therefore Plaintiffs

reserve the right to amend this petition pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1O(a)(4)
to substitute the true name.
7.

Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a contract for a commercial uninsured motorist

policy number 02616845-6 (hereinafter "UM Policy"), which contract was in full force and effect
at all times material hereto.
8.

On December 22, 2008, Plaintiffs were traveling in their work vehicle on the way to

work when they were struck from behind by a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist.
9.

In early 2009, Defendant settled with Plaintiffs for their property damage, medical

expenses and general damages for $1,500.00 in the case ofPlaintiffSam Ferrell and $1,700.00 in
the case ofPlaintiffDeva Ferrell.
10.

2-

The parties could not reach an agreement on their claims for lost wages, so Plaintiffs

PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND AWARD OF
COSTS AND FEES
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hired the firm Thomsen Stephens Law Offices PLLC to pursue these claims.
11.

On July 2, 2009, JacobS. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to Curtis

Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due under the
UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as exhibit A.
12.

Defendant subsequently requested additional information.

13.

On December 22, 2009, Jacob S. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs again sent a letter

to Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due
and providing documehts proving the loss. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto
as exhibit B.
14.

In a letter dated January 5, 2010, Defendant tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell and

$862.00 to Deva Ferrell as proposed final settlement of Plaintiffs' lost wages claims, as the amount
justly due under the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as exhibit
C.
15.

On January 22,2010, JacobS. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to

Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department rejecting the offer of settlement and demanding
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached
hereto as exhibit D.
16.

The parties all agreed to arbitration, underwent informal discovery and formal

depositions, and underwent arbitration on November 4, 2010 before a panel of three arbitrators
chosen pursuant to the UM Policy.
17.

3-

The panel of arbitrators issued an arbitration award on November 4, 2010 awarding

PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND AWARD OF
COSTS AND FEES
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Plaintiff Sam Ferrell $3,990.80 and awarding Plaintiff Deva Ferrell $5,134.44, which were the
mounts justly due under the policy within the meaning ofldaho Code § 41-183 9. A true and correct
copy of the Arbitration Award dated November 4, 2010 is attached hereto as exhibit E.
18.

This court has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award entered in this matter

pursuant to the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901 et seq., specifically Idaho Code
§§ 7-911, and 7-917.
19.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-918, venue is proper because the arbitration agreement

provides that arbitration shall be held in the county of the residence of the insured (Bonneville
County) and arbitration was held in Bonneville County.
20.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees and costs as the

prevailing party in arbitration pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 41-1839, 12-120(3) and 12-121 in such
amounts to be proven at trial.
21.

Plaintiffs are entitled to pre-judgment interest on the Arbitration Award at the rate

of 12% per annum from the date of the accident ofDecember 22,2008 until the date of confirmation
of the Arbitration Award pursuant to Idaho Code §28-22-1 04, in an amount to be proven at trial.
22.

To the date of filing this petition, Plaintiffs have expended $1,081.92 in costs and

$12,3 77.50 in attorneys fees in the pursuit of this action.
23.

Plaintiffs will expend additional moneys in costs and attorneys fees in the future to

pursue this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell pray for the following relief from the Court:
1.

4-

For judgement, order and decree confirming the Arbitration Award entered by the

PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND AWARD OF
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arbitrators on November 4, 2010;
2.

For an order declaring Plaintiffs the prevailing party in arbitration pursuant to Idaho

Code§ 41-1839;
3.

For an award of past costs and attorneys fees in the amount of$13,459.42 and

ongoing costs and fees in an amount to be proven at trial;
4.

For an award of pre-judgment interest in an amount to be proven at trial; and

5.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this J_1_ day ofNovember, 2010.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C.

B~~~
b S. Wessel, Esq.
JSW
7083\003 Petition
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PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND A WARD OF
COSTS AND FEES
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THOMSEN
LAW

l

STEPHENS

OFFICES

Alan C. Stephens*
Curt R. Thomsen (Chai/Lr Office)
James D. Holman**
*Also Member of Wyoming Bar
**Also Member of Nebraska Bar

J. Michael Wheiler
Michael J. Whyte
T. Jason Wood
JacobS. Wessel
Richard Friess

July 2, 2009
CURTIS NEILL
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS DEPARTMENT
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY STE 100
MERIDIAN ID 83642-9327

RE:

Insured:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claim No.:

Dave Ferrell
02616845-6
December 22, 2008
08-5146644

Insured:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claim No.:

Samuel Ferrell
02616845-6
December 22, 2008
08-5146644

Dear Mr. Neill:
This firm represents Dave and Sam Ferrell in the collection of an uninsured motorist claim under
their commercial auto policy for their company, Ferrell Brother's Construction, Policy No.
02616845-6. I am writing to request payment of all monies due and owing under said policy. My
clients acknowledge that you have paid part of the monies due, but have not paid all of the benefits
due under the policy.
Sam Ferrell hereby demands $7,000.00 for his lost wages which is the amount justly due under the
policy. Dave Ferrell hereby demands $10,000.00 for his lost wages due to the accident which is the
amount justly due under the policy. Please pay these amounts within 30 days to my office.
If you need any additional information reasonably necessary to evaluate these claims, please notify
me immediately.

JSW/jd\7083\Progressive

cc:

Sam and Dave Ferrell
2635 Channing Way • Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 • (208) 522-1230 • Fax (208) 522-1277
112 S. 7th St. • P.O. Bo.~ 600 • Challis, Idaho 83226 • (208) 879-6655 • Fax (208) 879-6672
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OFFICES

Alan C. Stephens*
Curt R. Thomsen (Challis Office}
James D. Holman**
*Also Member of Wyoming Bar
**Also Member of Nebraska Bar

J. Michael Wheiler
Michael J. Whyte
T. Jason Wood
JacobS. Wessel
Richard Friess

December 22, 2009

CURTIS NEILL
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS DEPARTMENT
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY STE 100
MERIDIAN ID 83642-9327

RE:

Insured:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claim No.:

Dave Ferrell
02616845-6
December 22, 2008
08-5146644

Insured:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claim No.:

Samuel Ferrell
02616845-6
December 22, 2008
08-5146644

Dear Mr. Neill:
This firm represents Dave and Sam Ferrell in the collection of an uninsured motorist claim under
their commercial auto policy for their company, Ferrell Brother's Construction, Policy No.
02616845-6. Pursuant to our recent telephone conversation, attached are the doctunents that you
requested verifying the amount of money the Ferrell brother's lost because of this accident.

In December, 2008, Dave and Sam Ferrell did work for which they were paid $24,315.75. The
payment for this work was received in January, 2009 although they did the work in December, 2008.
This work was done in a month when the weather was similar to January, February and March, 2009
when the Ferrells were unable to work due to the injuries they received in the accident. The Ferrells
were out of work from the date of the accident until they were released by their doctor to go back to
work in mid-February in the case of Sam and in late March in the case ofDave as his injuries were
worse. (See the attached doctor's letters, Exhibit J.)
The Ferrells usually make a net profit of about half of the gross receipts after the cost of materials
and wages for the men that they hire are subtracted. (See Exhibit H) As you can see, although they
invoiced $59,186.75 (Exhibit A, F, and G) inthemonthsofDecember,2008 and April, 2009. From
January, 2009 until April, 2009, they were not able to do any work. This is despite the fact that they
would have had the opportunity to do numerous jobs had they been physically able to do them. (See
the attached estimates for jobs from January to April, 2009, Exhibits B, C, D, and E.) In Januazy,
2009, they had the opportunity to do $38,549.00 worth ofwork that they were not able to do because
of their injuries. (Exhibit B) In February, 2009, they had the opportunity to do $24,218.00 worth of
work that they were not able to do because of their injuries. (Exhibit C) In March, 2009, they had

2635 Channing Way • Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 • (208) 522·1230 • Fax (208) 522-1277
liZ S. 7th St. • P. 0. Box 600 • Challis, Idaho 83226 • (208) 879-6655 • Fax (208) 879-6672
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December 22, 2009
Page2

the opportunity to do $122,549.00 worth of work that they were not able to do because of their
injuries. (Exhibit D) In April, 2009, they had the opportunity to do $38,536.00 worth of work that
they were not able to do because of their injuries. (Exhibit E) Exhibit I is a copy of Schedule K of
th tax returns for 2007 and 2008 for Ferrell Bros. Construction, LLC.
As you can see, the amount that my clients have asked for is well below the amount that they are
rightfully due. They therefore demand settlement in the amount of$25,000.00, which includes the
original $17,000.00 claimed, plus fees. If you do not provide the money within 14 days, we will file
a claim in arbitration seeking much more money based upon the documents proving this claim which
are attached to this letter. We will also seek attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 411839 because you did not tender the money rightfully due within thirty days of my original letter
demanding payment.

If you need any additional information reasonably necessary to evaluate these claims, please notifY
me immediately.
Yours very truly,

JSW/jd\7083\Progressive

cc:

Sam and Dave Ferrell
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PROGRESSIVE ClAIMS
2264 S BONITO WAY
SUITE 100
MERIDIAN, ID 83642

PROGREIIIVE.
Underwritten By:
United Financial Casualty Company

THOMSEN STEPHENS lAW OFFICES
JACOB S WESSEL

daim Number: 08-5146644
Loss Date:
December 22, 2008
DOOJment Date: January 5, 2010
Page 1 of 1

2635 CHANNING WAY

IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404

claims.progressive.com
Track the status and details of your daim,
e-mail your representative or report a
new claim.

Claim Information
This letter is in regard to the Uninsured Motorist claim for DEVA FERRELL You have submitted new information dated
December 22, 2009 and it has been fully reviewed.
We have been compliant with code 41-1839 as we had previously advanced the amount justly due to the policy holder
(documentation enclosed) within 30 days of receipt of proof of loss. The code specifies that information or proof of loss
must be furnished and payment made within 30 days of receipt of same. Simply sending a letter demanding payment but
not providing any new documentation as you did on July 2, 2009 does not justify proof of loss.
It is not until December 22, 2009 that we have received new information regarding loss of earnings.
We have now evaluated the claim based on this new information that you have submitted and would like to extend an
offer of $2,562 (Two Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Two Dollars***) for full and final settlement of the Uninsured Motorist
claim for DEVA FERRELL
Since we have already sent S1, 700 to the policy holder, the balance of $862 is enclosed. Please note that all medical
expenses were paid under the Medpay provision of the policy.
There are still several questions surrounding the loss of earnings claim. The client was not given prescribed time off
beyond December 26, 2008. The impact to the vehicle as well as the documented injury diagnoses and subsequent
minimal treatment do not seem to correlate with missing time beyond December 26, 2008 (which has been considered in
this offer).
It is not clear what the client's job duties entail or why the work could not have been hired out in lieu of completely
missing an opportunity for a new job.
Wage loss claimed for 2009 has not been verified beyond estimates of what the client may have had for work.
In our conversation with the client's accountant, Kirby Forbush, on May 5, 2009, we confirmed that each partner's
personal income is most accurately reflected in the figure shown in Part Ill, Line 1 of tax form "Schedule K." Using the
2007 and 2008 forms, it appears the client earned personal income of $44,449 and $32,307, respectively. It is not clear
why the client's personal earnings would have increased markedly in the first quarter of 2009, especially in light of the
perceived state of the economy in terms of the construction industry.
Moreover, it is not clear why the client missed any work in 2009 based on the injury, impact, and doctor's
recommendations.
Please contact me to further discuss the claim. You can see how the questions as outlined above remain an obstacle in
our evaluation of the claim; however, we would like to continue to negotiate this claim for our policy holder.
CURTIS NEILL
Claims Department
1-208-895-2426
1-800-PROGRESSIVE (1-800-77 6-4 737)
Fax: 1-208-895-2407
CNeiii2@Progressive.com
Form ZS87 XX (01/08) -ID
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Dollars
PAY EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE AND 00/100
CDS

In Payment Of

CODE

UMBI - AMT JUSTLY DUE AND OWlNG
Payable through

05PCL

National City Bank
Ai;H:LAND.
·

o:Fi!'o

1-877-44.8•9544

.

, .
United'Financial Casualty Company

sAMUEL :FEiumLL. A siNGLE ADULT MAtE, AND******************
THOMSEN STEJ?HENS LAW OflF!CES, ONLY*********!*************l"~*
2635 cHANNING wAY
IDAHO FALLS'' ID 83404

Pay
To

VOID IF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 6 MONTHS AFTER DATE OF ISSUE

Policy e
02616845 -009

Insured

-•''

FERRELL BRO THER

..

Claim#

Claimant

085146644

FERRELL,DEVA

_,,

''

\'-'-

_,,'

Date

t~uecl

1/ 512010 ::;=:<.i

Date of Loss
12/4712008

'

Area Cpde
965
I

State Cqde
ID

--

56-38'

1~;att.
umber

.:41?~.1-~6628
Office Issy~d At -1 PAC

MT-MTEFH-BRN.•·.·

~,.

-

...

Dollars $ *****,*,**8()2.00
PAY EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY TWO AND 00/100
In Payment Of

UMBI -· AMT JUSTLY DUE AND OWlNG
Payable through

N(ltiortal City Bank
ASI:jLANI), .,OHIO

Pay.
To

05PCL

l-877-448c9544

; ·, .
.
.
·;·;:.;,:United .:Financial Casualty Company
DEVA FERRELL AND JANELLFERRELL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS********
HUSBAND AND, WIFE AND*!************•************************ THOMSEN:_ STEPHENs' LAw officEs, oNtY**********************~***
2635 CHANNING WAY
--,
,_ --- IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

BY

~
·

A~E
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Claim Payment Detail

Page 1 of 1

Claim Payment Detail ( 08-5146644)
Payment I n f o r m a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
Number:
461082954
$1,700.00
Total Amount:
EFT Trace Number:
Paid To:
DEVA FERRELL AND JANELL FERRELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS******
HUSBAND AND WIFE, ONLY*"'*
Payee Address:
2919 BROWNSTONE CIRCLE
AMMON, ID 83406 USA
In Payment Of:
UMBI - AMT JUSTLY DUE AND OWING
Vendor I n f o r m a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
1099 Required:

No

Vendor Name:
Vendor Type:

Reviewed S u m m a r y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Issuing Rep:
Issue Date:
Last Updated Rep:

CEN0004
Q4...20-09
CEN0004

Approved By:
Review Date:
Reviewed By:

Loss

COS Code:
Bank Code:
State:
Area Code:

Bank Information
Type:
Stop Reason:
Stop Date:
Cleared:

05-03-09

05-PCL
AS2
ID
761

Exposure Detail: U M - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Party Name:
Exposure:
Payment Type:
Workers Comp
Type:

FERRELL, DEVA
UM
PARTIAL PAYMENT

Amount Paid:
Deductible Taken:
Medical:
Wage:

$1,700.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

013
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PROGRESSIVE ClAIMS
2264 S BONITO WAY
SUITE 100
MERIDIAN, ID 83642

PROGREIIIVE~
Underwritten By:
United Financial casualty Company

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES
JACOB S WESSEL

Claim Number: 08-5146644
loss Date:
December 22, 2008
D001ment Date: January 5, 2010
Page 1 of 1

2635 CHANNING WAY
IDAHO FAU5, ID 83404

claims.progressive.com
Track the status and details of your daim,
e-mail your representative or report a
newdaim.

Claim Information
This letter is in regard to the Uninsured Motorist claim for SAMUEL FERRELL You have submitted new information dated
December 22, 2009 and it has been fully reviewed.
We have been compliant with code 41-1839 as we had previously advanced the amount justly due to the policy holder
(documentation enclosed) within 30 days of receipt of proof of loss. The code specifies that information or proof of loss
must be furnished and payment made within 30 days of receipt of same. Simply sending a letter demanding payment but
not providing any new documentation as you did on July 2, 2009 does not justify proof of loss.
It is not until December 22, 2009 that we have received new information regarding loss of earnings.
We have now evaluated the claim based on this new information that you have submitted and would like to extend an
offer of $2,355 (Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Five Dollars) for full and final settlement of the Uninsured Motorist
claim for SAMUEL FERRELL
Since we have already sent $1,500 to the policy holder, the balance of $855 is enclosed. Please note that aII medical
expenses were paid under the Medpay provision of the policy.
There are still several questions surrounding the loss of earnings claim, and I refer you to the other letter of this same date
regarding the client's brother, as the same concerns apply.
Please contact me to further discuss the claim. You can see how the questions as outlined remain an obstacle in our
evaluation of the claim; however, we would like to continue to negotiate this claim for our policy holder.
CURTIS NEILL
Claims Department
1-208-895-2426
1-800-PROGRESSIVE {1-800-776-4737)
Fax: 1-208-895-2407
CNeiii2@Progressive.com
Form Z587 XX (01/08) • 10
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Claim Payment Detail
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Claim Payment Detail ( 08-5146644)
Payment I n f o r m a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Number:
461082956
Total Amount:
EFT Trace Number:
Paid To:
SAMUEL FERRELL, A SINGLE ADULT MALE, ONLY*****************
Payee Address:
4167 BRACKEN AVE
AMMON, ID 83406 USA
In Payment Of:
UMBI - AMT JUSTLY DUE AND OWING

$1,500.00

Vendor I n f o r m a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
1099 Required:

No

Vendor Name:
Vendor Type:

Reviewed S u m m a r y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
Issuing Rep:
Issue Date:
Last Updated Rep:

CEN0004
04--20-09
CEN0004

Approved By:
Review Date:
Reviewed By:

Bank I n f o r m a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Type:
Stop Reason:
Stop Date:
Cleared:

Loss

04--30-09

CDS Code:
Bank Code:
State:
Area Code:

05-PCL
AS2
ID
761

Exposure Detail: U M - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
Party Name:
Exposure:
Payment Type:
Workers Comp
Type:

FERRELL, SAMUEL
UM
PARTIAL PAYMENT

Amount Paid:
Deductible Taken:
Medical:
Wage:

$1 ,500.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

·t n
0 .L'"
http://claimspaymentsweb/ALPHNCLAIMSP AYMENTSWEB/default.aspx?page=Clai...

01/05/2010

THOMSEN
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I

STEPHENS

OFFICES

Alan C. Stephens*
Curt.R. Thomsen (Challis OJJke)
James D. Holman**
*Also Member of Wyoming Bar
**Also Member of Nebraska Bar

J. Michael Wheiler
Michael J. Whyte
T. Jason Wood
JacobS. Wessel
Richard Friess

January 22, 2010
CURTIS NEILL
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS DEPARTMENT
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY STE 100
MERIDIAN ID 83642-9327

RE:

Insured:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claim No.:

02616845-6
December 22, 2008
08-5146644

Dave Ferrell

Insured:
Policy No.:
Date of Loss:
Claim No.:

02616845-6
December 22, 2008
08-5146644

Samuel Ferrell

Dear Mr. Neill:
Based upon your most recent letter, it appears that we have reached an impasse in our settlement
negotiations. We, therefore, demand arbitration pursuant to my clients' insurance policies. Please
have your attorney contact me so that we can discuss nomination of arbitrators.
If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact me.

JSW/jd
7083\Progressive

cc:

Sam and Dave Ferrell
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)
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)
)

InRe:

The Arbit~tion of Deva Ferrell and
Sam Fcrrcll,

P.002

AWARD DECISION

)

v,

Progressive

Jnsurc~.nce

)
)
)

Company.

This matter having come on for arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010, the undersigned
arbitrators hereby make the following award: (1) wage loss for Deva Ferrell in the ru.nount of

$5,143.44; and, (2) wage loss for Sam Ferrell in the amount of$3,990.80. No lawsuit has been filed,
but this award is final.

Dated--=../...;../_,_/_z::,_....__/-==o2-o__,;'-'o"----

//1A

Datod

Vl

('·-t/tu

----"--..!o.---'"'-----

~

,A{A'(?

MJCHAEL R.

McB~

020
TOTAL P.002
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 8287
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697

0

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 10-7051

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS

vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lenna Law
Office, P.A., and move this court for an order staying the proceedings in the above-entitled action
pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8) and Idaho Code 7-902(d). The requested stay should be granted on the

Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings- I

021

grounds and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Stay filed simultaneously herewith.
DATED this

::JO day ofDecember 2010.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __:fQday of December 2010, I caused a true and
conect copy of the foregoing document to be served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid upon the
following person(s):
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings- 2
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Samuel Ferrell

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV 10-7051

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STAY

Defendants.

COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lerma Law
Office, P.A., and submit this Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Stay. As
explained herein, the Motion should be granted so that the existing Arbitration Panel can
consider and determine an appropriate award of attorneys' fees and legal costs, if any.

Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 1

023

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties participated in an arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010. Both parties
were represented by counsel and were given full opportunity to present evidence, make
arguments, and request relief. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Arbitration Panel issued an
A ward Decision.
At the arbitration hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs requested that the Arbitration Panel
consider and determine appropriate attorneys' fees and recovery of legal costs. Defendants'
counsel agreed to submit such issues to the Panel. At that time, the Panel indicated that such
issues should be addressed by the Panel at a later date. Accordingly, the Panel postponed full
consideration and delayed any decision regarding fees and costs.
Defendants request that the Panel now be allowed to complete its consideration and
provide a decision as to fees and costs.
II.

ARGUMENT

Rule 12(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may bring a
defensive motion if there is "another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause." I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). Given the parties' decision to proceed via arbitration, and given the
existing Arbitration Panel, there is in fact another action pending between these same parties for
the same cause. Accordingly, Defendants assert such defense and request that the Court stay any
further action in this forum until the Arbitration Panel affinnatively rules on the issue of
attorneys' fees and legal costs. Pending a ruling on this Motion, the Defendants reserve any
other defenses or objections to the Plaintiffs' filing.
Defendants also rely on Idaho Code§ 7-902:

"?
..... 1.
U
Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 2

Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration
shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor
has been made under this section or, if the issue is severable, the
stay may be with respect thereto only.
I.C. § 7-902(d). See also Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 147,
15 P .3d 1153 (2000) (stays and submissions via § 7 -902( d) are within the discretion of the trial
court).
Once again, Defendants respectfully request that this Court stay the present proceedings
so as to allow the Arbitration Panel a full opportunity to consider and decide the appropriate fees
and costs.
A.

The Parties Agreed at the Arbitration to Submit the Issue of Attorneys' Fees and Costs to
the Arbitration Panel
At the November 4, 2010 arbitration hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs requested that the

Panel determine appropriate attorneys' fees and legal costs. Defendants' counsel concurred with
submission of such issues to the Panel, but objected to submission pre-award. As such, the issue
of fees and costs is within the authority delegated to the Arbitration Panel by the parties.
The Panel accepted such authority and agreed that it could make such determinations.
However, the Panel declined to consider such issues that same day. The pmiies should now be
allowed to return to the Arbitration Panel, as previously agreed to, submit full documentation,
and explain the requests for fees and costs, and any objection thereto.

Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 3

B.

The Arbitration Panel is the Finder of Fact Most Familiar with the Parties' Evidence.
Arguments and Prevailing Status
At the arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010, all parties were represented by counsel

and were given full opportunity to present their evidence and make their arguments. The
Arbitration Panel considered such, acted as the finder of fact, and accordingly issued an Award
Decision.
Based on its existing knowledge of relevant facts and the parties' claims and defenses,
the Arbitration Panel is well positioned to accurately detennine appropriate attorneys' fees and
costs. This Court should give the Panel the oppmiunity to make such detennination. Again, this
accords with the parties' previous request, it is within the power delegated to the Panel, and it
defers to the finder of fact that is familiar with all evidence and the respective legal arguments.

III.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Defendants' Motion to Stay, and should allow the constituted
Arbitration Panel to determine appropriate attorneys' fees and legal costs. Such will be a
judicious use of the Court's time and will allow the arbitrators to resolve all issues submitted to
the Panel.
DATED this QOday ofDecember 2010
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Stay 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_20 day of December 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the
following manner:
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

027
Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 5
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II

JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY

COMES NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and
hereby object to the Defendant's motion to stay on the following grounds:
I.

The parties are not in agreement as to whether the arbitration panel decided not to

decide on the issue of attorney fees or whether the panel decided to take up that issue at a later date.
2.

1-

Plaintiffs have asked the arbitrators to amend their decision, clarifying the decision

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY

023

in regards to attorney fees, costs, and interest.
3.

As soon as the amended arbitration award is issued it will be clear whether a stay is

appropriate at this time.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray the Order of this court denying Defendant's Motion to
Stay Proceedings.
DATED this£ day of January, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C.

2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the

day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY to be served upon the following
persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States
mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set
forth below.
JOHN L. LERMA, ESQ.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
3045 E. COPPER POINT DRIVE
PO BOX 190719
BOISE, ID 83719

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

By:

PLLC

~vS~~

robS. Wessel, Esq.
JSW
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#226 P.003/006

2/2011 16.48

From:208 288 0697

Lr

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3386
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND D EVA FERRELL,
Case No. CV 10-7051

Plaintiffs,

WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

vs.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lerma Law
Office, P.A, and hereby withdraw their Motion to Stay Proceedings, filed on January 3, 2011.
DATED

this~~. day of February 2011.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A

Vv'ithdra\va1 of Defendants

RECEIVE:

j

~v1otion

N0.0880

to Stay Proceedings - 1

02/02/2011/WED 03:51PM

0 .)J,..i
l)

2/2011 16:48

From:208 288 0697

#226 P.004/006

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thedday of February 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by Facsimile Transmission upon the following
person(s):
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, lD 83404
John

'

VYeffil"{

!/

[,

Withdrawal of Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings - 2

RECEIVE:

N0.0880

02/02/2011/WED 03:51PM

,. ., ')
0 j~

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL and DEY A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV I 0-7051

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD AND
AWARD OF COSTS AND FEES

Defendants.

COME NOW the captioned Defendants, UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY and PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, by and through LERMA LAW
OFFICE, P.A., to answer and respond to the Plaintiffs' Petition.
The captioned Defendant PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY is not properly
named as a defendant inasmuch as it is not the entity that issued or underwrote the policy at
Answer To Petition for Confirmation of
Arbitration Award and Award of Costs and Fees- 1

') ')
0 ..JJ

Issue. At the appropriate time, the caption should be corrected and Progressive Insurance
Company fonnally dismissed as a named party. For purposes of this Answer to Petition,
however, the captioned Defendants have aligned interests and will be jointly responding.

FIRST DEFENSE
Because captioned Defendant Progressive Insurance Company is not properly named as a
defendant, inasmuch as it did not issue or underwrite the applicable policy, Plaintiffs are
precluded from obtaining any award confirmation or judgment against Progressive Insurance
Company.

SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Petition, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state a claim
against Defendants upon which relief can be granted.

THIRD DEFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation contained m Plaintiffs' Petition, unless
expressly and specifically hereinafter admitted.
1.

With regard to Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each

and every allegation contained therein.
2.

Plaintiffs' Petition does not contain a Paragraph 3.

3.

With regard to Paragraph 4 in Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny that United

Financial Casualty Company's true name is unknown. Accordingly, Defendants deny any right
to substitute a different name or designation.

To the extent not explicitly admitted herein,

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 4.
4.

With regard to Paragraph 5 in Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny that

Answer To Petition for Confirmation of
Arbitration Award and Award of Costs and Fees- 2
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Progressive Insurance Company issued the uninsured motorist policy to the Plaintiffs. As such,
Progressive Insurance Company is not a properly named defendant. To the extent not explicitly
admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 5.
5.

With regard to Paragraph 6 in Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny that

Progressive Insurance Company's true name is unknown.

Furthermore, because Progressive

Insurance Company did not issue the policy to the Plaintiffs, Defendants deny that Progressive
Insurance Company is a properly named defendant or that there is any need to substitute a
different name or designation. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the
allegations contained in Paragraph 6.
6.

With regard to Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each

and every allegation contained therein.
7.

With regard to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that the

referenced claims were resolved and that the respective payments were tendered to the Plaintiffs.
To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in
Paragraph 9.
8.

With regard to Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that

Plaintiffs retained Thomsen Stephens Law Offices. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein,
Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 10.
9.

With regard to Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that Mr.

Wessel sent a July 2, 2009 letter, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached to
Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. To the extent
not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 11.

Answer To Petition for Confirmation of
Arbitration Award and Award of Costs and Fees
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10.

With regard to Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each and

every allegation contained therein.
11.

With regard to Paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that Mr.

Wessel sent a December 22, 2009 letter, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached
to Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. To the extent
not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 13.
12.

With regard to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that they

sent a January 5, 2010 letter, that they tendered the referenced amounts to the Plaintiffs as
undisputed claim amounts, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached to the
Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. To the extent
not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 14.
13.

With regard to Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that Mr.

Wessel sent a January 22, 2010 letter, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached to
Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. Defendants
deny that the letter rejected the payment amounts previously tendered to the Plaintiffs. To the
extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 15.
14.

With regard to Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each and

every allegation contained therein.
15.

With regard to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that the

arbitration panel issued an Award Decision on November 4, 2010, that such awarded the
referenced amounts to the respective Plaintiffs, and that a true and correct copy of the Award
Decision is attached to Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants asse11 that the Award Decision speaks for

Answer To Petition for Confirmation of
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itself. Defendants deny that there was any determination pertaining to Idaho Code§ 41-1839.
To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in
Paragraph 17.
16.

With regard to Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that this

Court has jurisdiction and that the Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code § 7-901 et seq., is the
applicable and controlling statute. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny
the allegations contained in said Paragraph 18.
17.

With regard to Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that venue

in Bonneville County is appropriate.
18.

With regard to Paragraphs 20 and 21 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny each

and every allegation contained therein.
19.

With regard to Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained
therein, and therefore deny the same.
20.

With regard to Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained
therein, and therefore deny the same.
FOURTH DEFENSE
On or about November 16, 2010, Defendants tendered payment to the Plaintiffs,
representing amounts respectively awarded via the Award Decision (with amounts previously
tendered subtracted, and with calculated pre-award interest added). As such, the award has been
satisfied and any request for confirmation is moot.

Answer To Petition for Confirmation of
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FIFTH DEFENSE
To the extent any relief requested by the Plaintiffs exceeds the parameters of Idaho Code
§ 7-913, such relief is precluded.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs pursuant to applicable Idaho law as it
then existed.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the amounts previously tendered to
the respective Plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment as follows:
1.

That PlaintifJs' Petition be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiffs take

nothing thereunder;
2.

That Defendants be awarded costs and disbursements necessarily incurred m

defending this action, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

.....-DATED this/.> day of February 2011.

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P .A.

Answer To Petition for Confirmation of
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by facsimile transmission upon the following
person(s):
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
FAX: (208) 522-1277
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
V.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
(Idaho Code§ 41-1839, IRCP 54(d)(l))

Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 54( d)( 1), moves the court for an award of attorney fees and costs and represents to
the court as follows:

1-

MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS (Idaho Code§ 41-1839, IRCP 54(d)(l))

1.

The arbitration panel entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the 41h day of

November, 2010 in the amounts of$3,990.80 for Sam and $5,143.44 for Deva; these amounts were
more than Defendant tendered to defendants after receiving proof of loss.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839

and costs pursuant to I.R. C.P. Rule 54(d)(l ).
3.
4.

The amount claimed is $$21,453.76.
This petition is supported by the Affidavit of JacobS. Wessel and the Memorandum

in Support filed herewith.
DATED this _ II day of March, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

r;La

'7, ?~

cobS. Wessel, Esq.

2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ---4-- day ofFebruary, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS (Idaho Code§ 41-1839, IRCP 54) to
be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN LERMA
[X] Mail
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
[ ] Hand Delivery
3045 E COOPER POINT DR.
[ ] Facsimile@
MERIDIAN ID 83642
PO BOX 190719
BOISE, ID 83719

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By~~~
S. Wessel, Esq.
J

JSW
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
j wessel @thomsenstephensl aw .com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
Case No. CV-2010-7051
)
)
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FEES AND COSTS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and hereby
submit the following memorandum in support of their motion for award of attorney fees and costs.

1-
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an uninsured motorist claim pursuant to a UM policy. The parties underwent
arbitration in November, 2010, and Plaintiffs are now seeking an award of costs and attorneys fees
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l).
On December 22, 2009 Plaintiffs sent Defendant a letter with proof of lost income relating
to their UM claim requesting $7,000.00 for Sam Ferrell and $10,000.00 for Deva Ferrell.
Defendants tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell and $862.00 to Deva Ferrell on January 5, 2010.
Without filing a lawsuit, Plaintiffs demanded arbitration pursuant to the UM policy on January 22,
2010.

Since that time, two things have happened to alter the Idaho law of attorney fees in

arbitration. First, the Idaho Supreme Court decided The Greasespot, Inc. v. Hanes, 2010 Slip
Opinion No. 10 (February 1, 2010) which held that attorney fees in arbitration were unavailable
under Idaho law. Second, effective July, 2010 and in direct reaction to the Greasespot opinion, the
Idaho legislature amended Idaho Code § 41-183 9 to overrule The Greasespot and to reinstate the law
as set forth in Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991).

Emery and its progeny held that section 41-1839, Idaho Code applied to require attorney fees
incurred in arbitration proceedings to recover amounts justly due, but not paid by the insurance
company.
On November 4, 2010, the parties underwent arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators.
The arbitrators awarded Plaintiffs more than the amount tendered by the Defendant insurance
company. The arbitrators declined to decide the issues of costs and fees in arbitration in deference
to this Court. Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorneys fees and costs in the arbitration and in this
lawsuit pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l).
2-
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fees and Costs are available under Idaho Code§ 41-1839:
The statute "contains two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an award of attorney
fees: (1) the insured must provide a proof ofloss as required by the insurance policy; and (2)
the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within thirty days after receipt of the proof
ofloss." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614,
617-18 (2007).

Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho 2010).

III.

Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Idaho, County of Bonneville. Petition,

1.
admitted

UNDISPUTED FACTS

in~

2.

~

1,

1 ofDefendant's Answer.
Defendant United Financial Casualty Company is an insurance company operating

an insurance business in the State of Idaho and is the company that underwrote the policy for
Progressive Insurance Company. Petition,
3.

~

1, admitted

in~

1 of Defendant's Answer.

The Defendant United Financial Casualty Company, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance

Company is the correct defendant in this action as opposed to Progressive Insurance Company.
Admitted in~ 3-5 of Defendant's Answer.
4.

Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a contract for a commercial uninsured motorist

policy number 02616845-6 (hereinafter "UM Policy"), which contract was in full force and effect
at all times material hereto.
5.

Petition,~

7, admitted

in~

6 of Defendant's Answer.

On December 22, 2008, Plaintiffs were traveling in their work vehicle on the way to

work when they were struck from behind by a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist.
8, admitted
6.
3-

in~

Petition,~

6 ofDefendant's Answer.

In early 2009, Defendant settled with Plaintiffs for their property damage, medical
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expenses and general damages for $1,500.00 in the case ofPlaintiffSam Ferrell and $1,700.00 in
the case ofPlaintiffDeva Ferrell.
7.

Petition,~

9, admitted

in~

7 of Defendant's Answer.

The parties could not reach an agreement on their claims for lost wages, so Plaintiffs

hired the firm Thomsen Stephens Law Offices PLLC to pursue these claims. Petition,

~

10,

admitted in ~ 8 of Defendant's Answer.
8.

On July 2, 2009, Jacob S. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to Curtis

Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due under the
UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter was attached to Plaintiffs' Petition as exhibit A.

Petition,

~

9.
in

~

11, admitted

in~

9 of Defendant's Answer..

Defendant subsequently requested additional information. Petition,

~

12, admitted

10 of Defendant's Answer.
10.

On December 22, 2009, Jacob S. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs again sent a letter

to Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due
and providing documents proving the loss. A true and correct copy of this letter was attached to
Plaintiffs' Petition as exhibit B. Petition,
11.

~

13, admitted in~ 11 of Defendant's Answer.

In a letter dated January 5, 2010, Defendant tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell and

$862.00 to Deva Ferrell as proposed final settlement ofPlaintiffs' lost wages claims, as the amount
justly due under the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter was attached to Plaintiffs'
Petition as exhibit C.
12.

4-

Petition,~

14, admitted

in~

12 of Defendant's Answer.

On January 22, 2010, JacobS. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to
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Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department rejecting the offer of settlement and demanding
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter was
attached to Plaintiffs' Petition as exhibit D.
13.

Petition,~

15, admitted in~ 13 ofDefendant's Answer.

The parties all agreed to arbitration, underwent informal discovery and formal

depositions, and underwent arbitration on November 4, 2010 before a panel of three arbitrators
chosen pursuant to the UM Policy.
14.

Petition,~

16, admitted

in~

14 of Defendant's Answer.

The panel of arbitrators issued an arbitration award on November4, 2010 awarding

Plaintiff Sam Ferrell $3,990.80 and awarding Plaintiff Deva Ferrell $5, 134.44, which were the
amounts justly due under the policy. A true and correct copy of the Arbitration Award dated
November 4, 2010 was attached to Plaintifis' Petition as exhibit E.

Petition,~

17, admitted in~

15 ofDefendant's Answer.
15.

This court has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award entered in this matter

pursuant to the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901 et seq., specifically Idaho Code
§§ 7-911, and 7-917.

Petition,~

18, admitted

in~

16 ofDefendant's Answer.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-918, venue is proper because the arbitration agreement

16.

provides that arbitration shall be held in the county of the residence of the insured (Bonneville
County) and arbitration was held in Bonneville County. Petition,

~

19, admitted in

~

17 of

Defendant's Answer.
17.

Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable 'attorney

fees and costs as the prevailing party in arbitration pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 41-183 9. Defendant's
Answer,

5-

~

18.
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IV.
1.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Petitioners are entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41
1839 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l).
A.

The plain language of Idaho Code § 41-1839 as amended effective July,
2010, provides for an award of fees and costs in arbitration.

Idaho Code§ 41-1839 is entitled "Allowance of attorney's fees in suits against or in arbitration
with insurers. It provides as follows:
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or
indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to
pay to the person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy, certificate or
contract, shall in any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or
in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay
such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action
or arbitration.
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 (2010) (Emphasis added to show the 2010 amendments.)
There is no longer an argument that the amended statute does not provide for attorney's fees
in arbitration.
B.

The purpose ofthe amendment ofldaho Code§ 41-1839 was to provide for
an award of fees in arbitration.

The Idaho Legislature intended the amendment to Idaho Code § 41-1839 to apply to cases
such as this where an award was granted in arbitration. In its statement of purpose in passing this
amendment, the legislature stated as follows:
Idaho law requires insurance companies to treat their insureds fairly. To prevent insurance
companies from unreasonably delaying payment on claims by their insureds, they are
required under section 41-1839, Idaho Code, to pay losses justly due to insureds within 30
days after proof ofloss has been submitted. In the event the amount justly due is not paid and
an action for payment required, the section provides that the insured shall also recover
attorney fees.

6-
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Almost all insurance contracts require arbitration to resolve a dispute between the insurance
company and its insured. In 1991, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Emery v. United Pacific
Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991), that section 41-1839, Idaho Code
applied to require attorney fees incurred in arbitration proceedings to recover amounts justly
due, but not paid by the insurance company. The Idaho Supreme Court recently changed the
law in The Greasespot, Inc. v. Hanes, 2010 Slip Opinion No. 10 (February 1, 2010)reversing
the Emery decision in a case in which section 41-1839, Idaho Code was not directly at issue.

This bill restores the law as it has been interpreted and applied since 1991. Without this
change, insurance companies are able to sidestep the requirement of prompt payment of
amounts justly due contained in section 41-183 9, Idaho Code, by the contractual requirement
that disputes be resolved through arbitration rather than in court. The attorney fee provision
at issue only applies to claims by first party insureds (direct customers) ofthe insurance
company, and not to third party claimants who have claims against insureds.
Statement of Purpose, RS 19849, online at
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislationJ20 1O/H0593 SOP .pdf. (Attached hereto.)

C.

The case law from Emery in 1991 until Greasespot provides for an award
of fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41 1839 when a case is filed in
arbitration.

In Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P .2d 442 (1991 ), the
driver of a vehicle insured by Unite Pacific Insurance Company was rear-ended by an uninsured
motorist. Emery, the driver, carried an uninsured motorist policy. Emery filed suit and United
Pacific demanded arbitration. Emery received an award in arbitration and filed a motion with the
court to confirm the arbitration award, for prejudgment interest, and for attorneys fees pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Emery, 120 Idaho at 246, 815 P.2d at 444. On summary judgment, the
trial court ruled pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839 that United Pacific was obligated to pay Emery's
attorney fees incurred during the entire litigation process, including the arbitration proceedings.
Id. United Pacific admitted that Emery was entitled to fees in the litigation, but appealed,

reasoning that if a party to a contract, including an insurance contract, invokes the arbitration
7-
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clause, attorney fees incurred during the arbitration proceeding are not recoverable. I d. United
Pacific further argued, citing Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665
P.2d 1046 (1983), that with regard to LC. § 7-910, it is beyond the scope of an arbitrator's powers
to award attorney fees to one of the parties absent a contractual agreement to do so. In response,
the Idaho Supreme Court made the following rulings:
1.

"[T]he general rule of arbitration proceedings is that the parties must bear equally

all expenses of arbitration except those expenses of witnesses which are to be paid by the party
producing such witnesses. However, as provided in the American Arbitration Rules, the parties
may agree to modifY this rule in any manner that they choose. " Emery, 120 Idaho at 24 7, 815
P.2d at 445.
2.

"[T]he provisions ofi.C. § 41-1839 become part ofthe insurance contract to the

same effect as though incorporated therein. Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho
456,406 P.2d 129 (1965)." Emery, 120 Idaho at 247, 815 P.2d at 445.
3.

"Where the insured is required and compelled to file a lawsuit by reason of an

insurer's refusal to pay in order to recover under her insurance contract, we hold it is implicit in
I.C. § 41-1839 that the court shall adjudge a reasonable award of attorney fees against the
insurer." Emery, 120 Idaho at 247, 815 P.2d at 445.
4.

"[T]he attorney fee authorized by I. C. § 41-1839 is not a penalty, but an additional

sum rendered as just compensation. Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293, 404 P .2d 634
(1965)." Emery, 120 Idaho at 247, 815 P.2d at 445.
After 1991 and up until The Greasespot was decided in February, 2010, the Idaho
Supreme court decided multiple cases citing Emery and following the above principles. See
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Moore v. Omincare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005); Barbee v. WMA, Sees., Inc., 143
Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (Idaho 2006); Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 927, 980 P.2d
1014, 1999 Ida. LEXIS 52 (1999).
In passing the amendments to Idaho Code § 41-1839 the Idaho legislature intended for the
courts to follow Emery's holdings and line of cases.
D.

Public Policy Requires Awards of Fees in Arbitration.

In its statement of the purpose for the amendment to Idaho Code§ 41-1839, the Idaho
legislature articulated the flaw in not allowing fees in arbitration. "Without this change,
insurance companies are able to sidestep the requirement of prompt payment of amounts justly
due contained in section 41-183 9, Idaho Code, by the contractual requirement that disputes be
resolved through arbitration rather than in court." Statement of Purpose, RS 19849. Without the
change, Idaho Code§ 41-1839 would be rendered meaningless because all insurance companies
would not be penalized for refusing to promptly pay legitimate claims and requiring all insureds
to undergo an expensive and slow arbitration process before being compensated under their
policy.
E.

Petitioners are the prevailing party.

In Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P .2d 107 (1999) the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full amount requested in order to be
awarded attorney's fees, but only a verdict for an amount greater than that tendered by the
insurer. !d.; see also Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293, 404 P.2d 634 (1965) (Where
the assured recovered less than he claimed, but the insurer had made no tender of the amount
found due, the assured was entitled to attorney fees.).
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It is undisputed that Plaintiffs sent two letters citing Idaho Code § 41-183 9 and

submitting proof ofloss and demanded $17,000.00.

"As defined by this Court, a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured
provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). It must also mention
a specific sum so that a tender can be made, Associates Discount Corp. of Idaho v.
Yosemite Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 249,257, 526 P.2d 854, 862 (1973), or provide the basis for
calculating the amount ofthe claimed loss, Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9,
14, 43 P.3d 768, 773 (2002) (demand for payment of existing mortgage sufficient even
though amount owing on the mortgage was not mentioned).

Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho 2010).

The Defendant obviously had enough information from the documents sent with the proof
ofloss to determine its liability because two weeks later, Defendant tendered just over $1, 700.00.
At the arbitration, Plaintiffs were awarded over $9,000.00. This became the amount justly due.
See Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988), overruled on other grounds

in Greenough v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). Plaintiffs were
awarded an amount greater than what was tendered by Defendant and are therefore the prevailing
party and entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule
54(d)(l).

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs pray the order of this Court granting their motion for
attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9 and I.R. C.P. 54(d)(l ).
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DATED this lL day ofMarch, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _lL day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy ofthe foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN LERMA
[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
3045 E COOPER POINT DR.
[ ] Facsimile@
MERIDIAN ID 83642
PO BOX 190719
BOISE, ID 83719

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

By:

Q~5.c~

Jac

S. Wessel, Esq.

JSW
7083\0 I I Memo Fees and Costs
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSNE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

AFFIDAVIT OF JACOB S. WESSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
FEES AND COSTS

)
) ss.
)

JacobS. Wessel, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
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I.
Affiant is a member of the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices which served as
counsel for Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell in the above entitled action.

II.
This affidavit is made on personal knowledge of affiant, except to the extent of allegations
made on information and belief.

III.
Affiant has reviewed the time and cost records ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices maintained
on the above matter, and represents that the following items of cost and expense were expended and
incurred in the above entitled action and mediation:
1.

2.

Costs as a matter of right:

a.

Court filing fees

$88.00

b.

Copying fees (1,637x$.10)

$163.70

c.

Expert Witness fee (Hunsaker)

$240.00

d.

Cost of Three Deposition Transcripts

$681.28

Discretionary Costs:
a.

Arbitrators' fees

$2,390.78

These discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred pursuant
to the uninsured motorist policy. If these costs are not awarded, plaintiffs will not be made whole
for defendant's refusal to pay the claim in a timely manner.
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IV.

Thomsen Stephens Law Offices has expended approximately 28.90 hours in the defense of
the above entitled action as follows:
1.

JacobS. Wessel

96.4 hours at $175.00 an hour

2.

T. Jason Wood

5.1 hours at $200.00 an hour

The sum of$17,890.00 is a reasonable attorneys fee for services ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices
provided to Sam and Deva Ferrell to enforce the uninsured motorist policy herein.
V.

The total costs and attorneys fees incurred in the defense of the above entitled action are
$21,453.76.
VI.
A true and correct copy of our record of billings in this matter is attached hereto as exhibit
"A."

VII.
Attorneys fees and costs should be awarded for the reasons they were the prevailing party
in the arbitration and pursuant to the authority cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum in support of
attorneys fees and costs filed herewith.
VIII.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), all items of cost, and expenses, including any attorneys fees
set forth in this memorandum, are to the best of your affiants knowledge and belief, correct, are
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claimed in compliance with said rule, and were reasonably and necessarily expended and
incurred in the above entitled action.
DATED this

day ofMarch, 2011.

Jacob . Wessel, Esq.

tit

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to upon oath before me thisJL: day ofMarch, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ----J+_ day of March, 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JACOBS. WESSEL IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS to be served upon the following persons at the addresses
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN LERMA
[X] Mail
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
[ ] Hand Delivery
3045 E COOPER POINT DR.
[ ] Facsimile@
MERIDIAN ID 83642
PO BOX 190719
BOISE, ID 83719

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

~~,L~.(
J ob .

essel, Esq.

JSW
7083\012 Affidavit of costs and fees
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 522-1230- FAX: (208) 522-1277

Tax ID #20-0493858

Sam & Deva Ferrell
P. 0. Box 1347
Idaho Falls ID 83406

ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

Page: 1
03/11/2011
7083-000C
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
05/21/2009
JSW

Conference with Ferrell brothers, letter, contingency fee
agreement,

0.90

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.10

Review insurance policy and arbitration agreement and call Mr.
Forbush

0.70

06/11/2009
JSW

Telephone conference with Kirby Forbush and review file

0.20

07/01/2009
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.10

Letter to Mr. Neill demanding payment

0.30

07/02/2009
JSW

Review and revise letter to Mr. Neill

0.20

08/11/2009
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.10

Telephone conference with Curtin Neal and Dave re problems
with our claim

0.60

Telephone conference with Dave, research police reports

0.50

06/01/2009
JSW
06/05/2009
JSW

JSW

09/17/2009
JSW

09/21/2009
JSW

n6n.....,
,"-'.

Sam & Deva Ferrell
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
09/22/2009
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave re police report and letter to
police requesting same

0.20

Telephone conferences with Dave, Sam, and Mr. Phipps

0.30

Telephone conference with Dave and Paul Phipps to try to
reschedule the interview

0.20

Telephone conference with Paul and Dave and attend
telephone interview

0.50

10/21/2009
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave and review file.

0.40

12/08/2009
JSW

Conference with Dave Ferrell to go over work records

0.50

12/09/2009
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave re more documents

0.10

12/22/2009
JSW

Review file and draft letter to Mr. Neil with attachments

1.80

Telephone conference with Mr. Neill re progress on our demand

0.20

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.20

Telephone conference with Dave re filing a claim in arbitration,
letter to Mr. Neil demanding arbitration

0.20

Draft/ revise letter to insurance adjuster re arbitration

0.30

Telephone conference with Mike McBride re being our
arbitrator, letter to opposing counsel nominating McBride as
arbitrator

0.40

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.10

09/24/2009
JSW
09/28/2009
JSW

09/29/2009
JSW

JSW
12/29/2009
JSW
01/19/2010
JSW

02/02/2010
JSW
02/11/2010
JSW

03/22/2010
JSW
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
03/31/2010
JSW

Review policy, call with John Lerna and talk with AI, letter to
Mike McBride re arbitration

1.00

Telephone conference with Lerna's office and Dave Ferrell re
depositions

0.30

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.10

Telephone conference with Mr. Forebush and email documents
to him re his deposition

0.40

04/28/2010
JSW

Appearance at depositions

7.70

05/28/2010
JSW

Draft memo re Forbush deposition

0.50

Telephone conference with Mr. Forbush re documents to bring
to his deposition

0.30

07/13/2010
JSW

Telephone conference with Forebush redeposition date

0.20

07/26/2010
JSW

Prepare records in response to Progressive's request

1.00

07/27/2010
JSW

Review and revise documents to send to Lerma

0.30

07/30/2010
JSW

Appearance at Forebush deposition

4.00

Telephone conference with Dave re getting me the requested
documents

0.20

Telephone conference with Mike McBride re arbitration

0.20

Telephone conference with Dave re getting me the requested
documents and prepare for arbitration

1.10

04/13/2010
JSW

04/14/2010
JSW
04/20/2010
JSW

06/04/2010
JSW

08/30/2010
JSW

08/31/2010
JSW
09/16/2010
JSW
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
09/17/2010
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave, and McBride and prepare for
arbitration

1.00

Prepare for arbitration hearing, calls with Sam and Dave, call
with arbitrator Mr. Larsen

1.80

Prepare for arbitration, calls with Lerma, meet with Dave, calls
with McBrde

1.50

Telephone conference with Mike McBride re putting off
arbitration hearing

0.10

10/13/2010
JSW

Prepare for November arbitration hearing

0.70

10/14/2010
JSW

Prepare for arbitration

1.50

Telephone conference with John Lerma re documents he still
needs, review documents

0.50

Telephone conference with Deva Ferrell regarding evidence to
present at arbitration

0.50

Prepare for arbitration by reviewing Deva's medical records and
reviewing tax documents for Deva and Sam

2.50

Telephone conference with Deva regarding a possible
settlement offer.

0.10

Conference with Jake re: Grease Spot, new statute, and and
award of fees (.2)(.3); research same (.5)

1.00

09/20/2010
JSW

09/21/2010
JSW

09/22/2010
JSW

10/25/2010
JSW

10/29/2010
JSW

11/01/2010
JSW

11/02/2010
JSW

11/03/2010
TJW

JSW

Prepare exhibits for arbitration, draft arbitration brief including
opening and closing arguments and exam questions for Deva,
Sam and Dr. Hunsaker, calls with Mr. Lerma, Deva and
Hunsaker regarding arbitration procedure.

12.30

11/04/2010
JSW

Conference with Deva and Sam Ferrell (2) and attend

vrl6 J')

Sam & Deva Ferrell
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STATEMENT NO:
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent- Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
arbitration (6), Meet with Arbitrator McBride, call clients re
award, research fees under Idaho Code 41-1839 (1.5)

9.50

Research fees in arbitration since Grease Spot was legislatively
overruled in the amendments to Idaho Code 41-1839

2.50

confw/ Jake re: atty fees (.2);(.2); review statute (.2); post query
on ITLA list-serve (.2); receipt/review responses (.2)(.2)(.2);
email same to jake (.2)(.2)

1.80

11/09/2010
JSW

Draft petition to confirm arbitration award and for attorney fees

2.60

11/10/2010
TJW

review/edit complaint (.3); conf w/ Jake re: same (.2)

0.50

Review and revise petition to confirm arbitration award and for
costs and fees.

0.80

Post query on list serve re: progressive (.2); search ITLA list
serve for IC 41-18391egislative history (.3); receipt/review
progressive responses (.2}(.2); conf w/ Jake re: same {.2)

1.10

Review and revise petition to include the proper name for the
parties and a claim for prejudgment interest

1.40

11/16/2010
TJW

review/edit complaint (.3); conf w/ Jake re: same (.2); again (.2)

0.70

11/19/2010
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave resettlement check

0.10

Review and revise petition, prepare exhibits to the petition,
conference with TJW re petition, and draft summons

1.80

Letter to Lerma re satisfaction of award document and interest

0.20

Draft acceptance of service

0.10

Telephone conference with Dave and calculate disbursement
amount and letter to clients

0.30

JSW

11/08/2010
TJW

11/12/2010
JSW

11/15/2010
TJW

JSW

11/23/2010
JSW

JSW
11/24/2010
JSW
11/29/2010
JSW
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Sam & Deva Ferrell
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
11/30/2010
JSW

Telephone conference with Lerma re the amount of interest,
review Lerma's letter re same, call with Dave re disbursement
of the check

0.40

Review the legislative history of 41-1839, letter to Lerma re
interest

1.30

Letter to Lerma re post-judgment interest, calculate
disbursement amounts and letter to clients re same

1.00

12/21/2010
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave re update

0.10

12/30/2010
JSW

Draft motion for judgment on the pleadings

1.00

01/03/2011
JSW

Draft memo in support of judgment on the pleadings

2.00

Review and revise memorandum re judgment on the pleadings,
review Lerma's motion to stay, talk issues over with Mike

1.20

Draft objection to motion to stay and letter to arbitrators re
clarification of their award, included research and argument re
attorney fees in arbitration

2.80

Draft objection to stay and letter to arbitration panel with 5
exhibits

1.20

Review and revise arbitration letter and objection to motion to
stay

0.30

Telephone conference with Dave reletter to arbitrators and time
frame for conclusion

0.20

Research and telephone calls with opposing counsel Lerma and
arbitrator Larsen re whether the arbitrators can be forced to
decide on attorney fees and the jurisdiction of the court to
decide these issues

2.80

12/01/2010
JSW

12/02/2010
JSW

01/04/2011
JSW

01/05/2011
JSW

01/08/2011
JSW

01/11/2011
JSW

01/12/2011
JSW

02/02/2011
JSW
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
02/04/2011
JSW

Prepare fee calculation and attend status conference, call with
Dave re status of the case

0.60

Research history of 41-1839 for memo for judgment on the
pleadings and calculate interest, research the correct date to
calculate interest from in a uninsured motorist claim, letter to
Lerma re settlement of the interest issue

1.50

02/07/2011
JSW

Review and revise memorandum re judgment on the pleadings

0.50

02/09/2011
JSW

Research and draft memorandum re attorneys fees and costs

1.40

Letter to Lerma re getting and answer and interest, call with
Ierma re same

0.40

Draft and revise memorandum in support of motion for fees and
costs

0.50

02/17/2011
JSW

Research Lodestar rule cases on motions for fees

1.00

02/28/2011
JSW

Telephone conference with Deva re update on fees

0.20

Review and revise Memorandum in support of motion for fees
and costs by inserting citations for undisputed facts and
researching law re prevailing party (2.8), letter to Lerma re
reminder about our offer to settle the interest issue (.2)

3.00

Review and revise Memorandum in support of motion for fees
and costs inserting introduction and public policy arguments.

2.40

Draft affidavit of Jacob Wessel in support of motion for fees and
costs after reviewing rule 54 and law of nondiscretionary costs
(1 ), review billings for corrections and accuracy (.5)

1.50

Review and revise memorandum in support of motion for fees
and costs to cite the Emery case and supporting authority.

0.90

02/05/2011
JSW

02/14/2011
JSW

02/15/2011
JSW

03/01/2011
JSW

03/02/2011
JSW

03/10/2011
JSW

JSW

FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

101.50

17,890.00

nsf'
:.... \...

j

Sam & Deva Ferrell
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

Page:8
03/11/2011
7083-000C

3

SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 0/Loss: 12/22/08

TIMEKEEPER
T. Jason Wood
Jacob S. Wessel

RECAPITULATION
HOURS
5.10
96.40

HOURLY RATE
$200.00
175.00

TOTAL
$1,020.00
16,870:00

EXPENSES
11/03/2010
11/16/2010

Photocopies (at 10 cents ea.): 1,565 copies of exhibits for arbitration
Photocopies (at 10 cents ea.):

156.50
7.20

TOTAL EXPENSES

163.70
ADVANCES

05/10/2010
08/16/2010
11/04/2010
11/17/2010
11/23/2010
12/02/2010
03/11/2011

459.90
221.38
240.00

Check to T& T Reporting for deposition transcripts of Sam and Deva
Deposition transcript of Kirby Forbush
Expert witness fee - check to Nate Hunsaker
Court fees - Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Award
of Fees and Costs
Check to McBride and Roberts for arbitration fee
Check to Cooper & Larsen for one-half mediation cost
Check to Cooper & Larsen for one-half mediation cost (additional)

88.00
1,305.00
954.50
131.28

TOTAL ADVANCES

3,400.06

TOTAL CURRENT

21,453.76

BALANCE DUE

$21,453.76

Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product privileged information. DO NOT
DISCLOSE. Billings are due and payable 30 days from the date of this billing. Unpaid
billings accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

.
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB # 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB # 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendant
United Financial Casualty Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL and DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2010-7051

vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d/b/a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FEES
AND COSTS

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, and responds in
opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs. The motion should be denied because at
the time the arbitration process was initiated by the Plaintiffs, there was no statutory or other
provision for granting attorney's fees in the absence of a previously filed civil action pending in
an Idaho court. Since the Plaintiffs chose to pursue arbitration, they have no basis to
subsequently come before the Court to obtain their arbitration-related attorney's fees.

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Fees and Costs- Page 1

RECEIVE:

N0.2864
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BRIEF STATEMENT OF
RELEVAI"T FACTS

The facts relevant to the Plaintiffs' present motion are simple and straightforward.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs sent a demand for arbitration on January 22, 2010. The parties then
began the arbitration process: They conducted certain discovery, selected arbitrators, and
proceeded to an arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010. During discovery, preparation for
arbitration, and at the arbitration hearing, the Plaintiffs demanded payments from the Defendant
totaling $50,000 (alleged lost wages and lost business income).
At the November 4, 2010 hearing, the arbitrators awarded the Plaintiffs a total of
$9,134.24 ($5,143.44 and $3,990.80). Importantly, the arbitration panel included in their
decision the following finding of fact: "No lawsuit has been filed, but this award is finaL" See
Award Decision (attached to Plaintiffs' Petition for Confirmation filed with this Court in
November 2010).
2010 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT
TO IDAHO CODE§ 41-1839

At the time Plaintiffs initiated arbitration, Idaho Code§ 41-1839 provided as follows:
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SUITS AGAINST
INSURERS. (1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or
contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or
nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy,
certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in
any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this
state for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or
contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Fees and Costs
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I. C. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis added) (effective until July 1, 20 I 0). As Plaintiffs note in their
briefing, the statute was subsequently amended, and the revised statute became effective on July
1, 2010. As amended, the statute provides:
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN SUITS AGAINST
OR IN ARBITRATION WITH INSURERS. (1) Any insurer
issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which
shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days after proof ofloss has been
furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay
to the person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such
policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought
against the insurer in any court in this state or in any arbitration for
recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay
such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as
attorney's fees in such action or arbitration.
I.C. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis provided to reflect the added language) (effective as of July 1,
2010).
This amendment to§ 41-1839 provides a new cause of action: Whereas attorney's fees
were previously available only via a civil lawsuit ("suit" or "action" according to the statute), the
amendment extended potential attorney fee recovery to include arbitration proceedings.

THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S GREASE SPOT
DECISION IS CONTROLLING FOR ARBITRATION
THAT WAS INITIATED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 2010
Plaintiffs' motion must be resolved in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P .3d 525 (20 10). Grease Spot
interprets Idaho Code § 41-1839 as the statute existed at the time the parties commenced
arbitration. As such, it represents the controlling law that is pertinent to the Plaintiffs' present
motion.
In Grease Spot, the Supreme Court was asked to award attorney's fees incurred via
arbitration. The party seeking fees argued for such based on I.C. § 12-120 and on I.C.
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§ 41-1839. In denying fees related to arbitration, the Court noted that both statutory provisions
required a "civil action." In explicitly discussing § 41-1839, Grease Spot states as follows:
[T]he plain text of I.C. § 41-1839 is at odds with this Court's prior
readings of the statute. Section 41-1839 only permits insureds to
collect attorney fees incurred in a civil "action" to recover under an
insurance policy. When a court compels arbitration, it often stays
litigation as to all parties, regardless of whether they are to
participate in the arbitration, to allow these corollary proceedings
to be completed. An arbitration is not part of a civil action, but
rather a proceeding separate and apart from litigation based on a
contract between the parties. Further, there is no language
indicating that § 41-1839 is meant to imply a provision for
arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy. Emery was
therefore manifestly incorrect in holding to the contrary. To the
extent that Emery implied into insurance policies a provision
granting insureds arbitration attorney fees, it is expressly
overruled.
226 P.3d at 528 (emphasis added; the full Emery citation is Emery v, United Pac. Ins. Co., 120
Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991 )). Accordingly, no fees related to arbitration were awarded in

Grease Spot (a portion of the fees incurred in the civil lawsuit prior to the arbitration proceeding
were allowed by the Court). As mentioned above, the decision also went on to preclude award
of arbitration-related attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120. See 226 P.3d at 528.
In Grease Spot, the Supreme Court had to distinguish between "litigation" attorney's fees
and "arbitration" attorney's fees. This Court does not have that issue because no litigation was
initiated until after the arbitration award. As such, all prior fees are precluded via the Grease

Spot ruling.
As noted, there was a subsequent change to I. C. § 41-1839: Several months after the

Grease Spot decision, a revised statute became effective (as of July 1, 201 0). However, the
arbitration between the present parties and the question of attorney's fees stem from the statute
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as it existed when arbitration commenced. Accordingly, this Court should follow the

Grease Spot precedent and should deny the Plaintiffs' motion for fees.
UNLESS THE LEGISLATURE EXPLICITLY
PROVIDES, AMENDMENTS TO THE
IDAHO CODE ARE NOT RETROACTIVE
Based on Grease Spot and the two different versions of LC. § 41-1839, it is evident that
the 2010 amendment to the statute provides a new cause of action: Prior to July 1, 2010,
attorney's fees were only available in the event of civil litigation; but after July 1, 2010,
attorney's fees were extended to include arbitration proceedings (as the Supreme Court
acknowledges in Grease Spot, it is just enforcing the obvious then-existing statutory language
and it is admitting that previous assumptions were unwarranted). Given the new cause of action
granted by the Legislature, it is imperative to determine how such pertains to the parties'
arbitration and hence how it affects the Plaintiffs' present motion.
In Idaho, statutes and amendments to the Idaho Code are not retroactive unless the
Legislature explicitly specifies retroactivity. According to the Code's general "construction of
statutes" provision:
No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.
LC. § 73-101.
The Idaho Supreme Court has strictly applied§ 73-101:
Idaho Code § 73-101 provides, "No part of these compiled laws is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (Emphasis added (by
the Supreme Court].) As this Court stated in Gailey v. Jerome
County, 113 Idaho 430,432,745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987), "Thus,
in Idaho, a statute is not applied retroactively unless there is 'clear
legislative intent to that effect.' In the absence of an express
declaration of legislative intent that a statute apply retroactively, it
will not be so applied." (Internal citations omitted [by the
Supreme Court].) In Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley,

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs'
Motwn for Fees and Costs- Page 5

RECEIVE:

N0.2864

n'].
/)
!,..,
,_

03/24/2011/THU 02:04PM

From:208 288 0697

12011 15:01

#271 P.OOS/015

92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968), this Court addressed whether
the legislature had expressly declared a statute to be applied
retroactively. The enactment provided, "This act shall be in full
force and effect from and after June 1, 1963." Ch. 269, § 5, 1963
Idaho Sess. Laws 685, 689. In holding that the legislature had not
expressly declared the act to be retroactive, this Court stated, "The
legislature, in setting the effective date of the new statute,
demonstrated an intent that it not be given retrospective effect." 92
Idaho at 504, 445 P.2d at 725.
State ex rel. Wasden v. Diacel Chemica/Industries, Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 105, I 06 P.3d 428, 431
(2005) (bracketed [] language added to clarify formatting provided by the decision itself).
The Unity Light & Power case referenced in Diace! is also pertinent. Therein, the court
explains:
Burley filed its answer and counterclaim on February 16, 1962,
and therein sought by its third cause of action to exercise the right
of eminent domain by condemnation of Unity's property. Even
though this case came on for trial in December 1963, subsequent to
the declared effective date of S.L. 1963, Ch. 269 (June 1, 1963),
Burley's right to exercise the power of eminent domain properly
should have been adjudicated in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of the filing of its answer and crossclaim. The reason
for this conclusion is that unless a contrary intention clearly
appears therein, a statute will not be given retrospective effect.
Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 265, 200 P. 1088, 35 A.L.R. 200
(1923). I. C. § 73-10 l.
92 Idaho at 503-04,445 P.2d at 724-25 (emphasis added; the decision then provides the
statement quoted above in Diacel). Pursuant to Unity Light & Power and Diacel, the Plaintiffs'
motion must be determined by the statute as it existed at the time arbitration was initiated.
A review of other laws where retroactivity is "expressly so declared" shows that the
underlying legislative bills reference an "emergency," and specify that the new law is "effective
immediately" or "effective retroactively." A good example of this is found in Section 6 of
Senate Bill 1422, Chapter 326 of the 2010 session laws: "An emergency existing therefor, which
emergency is hereby declared to exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and
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after passage and approval, and retroactively to January 1, 201 0; Section 2 of this act shall be in
full force and effect on and after January 1, 201 I; and Sections 3, 4 and 5 shall be in full force
and effect on and after July 1, 201 0." Clearly, this would seem to comply with both the statute
and case law precedent.
The bill which amended I.C. § 41-1839, however, did not state or imply that it was to be
given retroactive or immediate effect. And Plaintiffs acknowledge in their briefing that the
revised statute did not become effective until July 1, 2010. Given the fact that the 2010 statutory
amendment provides a new cause of action (as evidenced by the Supreme Court's discussion in

Grease Spot, and by a comparison of the before and after versions of§ 41-1839), it is clear that
Plaintiffs did not have a claim for arbitration-related attorney's fees at the time they initiated
arbitration.
By July 1, 2010, when the statutory amendment became effective, the parties had been
engaged in the arbitration-preparation process for over five months. Accordingly, without
retroactivity being specified by the Legislature, the new statutory cause of action has no
relevance to the parties' arbitration or to the present motion. Plaintiffs are left with the law as it
existed when they initiated arbitration, and Defendant cannot be penalized for a statutory change
that came into effect in the middle ofthe arbitration process. In accordance with I.C. § 73-101,
I. C. § 41-1839 (as it then existed), Diacel, Unity Light & Power, and Grease Spot, this Court
should deny the Plaintiffs' motion.

PLAINTIFFS' RELIANCE ON LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY IS UNHELPFUL TO ITS MOTION
Plaintiffs' reference and reliance on the legislative history for the 201 0 changes to I. C.
§ 41-1839 is misguided. The legislative history is meaningful only because it reinforces the

conclusion that the changes to the statute were not in fact "controlling law" at the time that the
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parties commenced arbitration. Again, Plaintiffs are left with the statute as it then existed-they
are not entitled to benefit from a statutory modification that became effective several months
later. If the Idaho Legislature wanted to impose retroactivity, it would have stated such in the
bill and likely in the legislative history.

THE CASES CITED BY THE PLAINTIFF
DEPEND ON A LAWSUIT BEING FILED TO
SUSTAIN AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
In light of the Grease Spot decision, and the non-retroactive and hence inapplicable
amendment to§ 41-1839, the Plaintiffs' reliance on Eme1y v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho
244, 815 P.2d 442 (I 99 I) is misguided and inapposite. However, in an effort to fully address the
Plaintiffs' arguments, it is here pointed out that not even Emery or its related cases can provide
support for the Plaintiffs' motion. By way of explanation, Defendant respectfully asks the Court
to consider the following:
As explained above, the arbitrators' Award Decision included the following finding of
fact: "No lawsuit has been filed, but this award is final." This specific statement has relevance
and should be given deference by this Court. The relevance is evident because Emery and the
other pre-Grease Spot decisions always required that a lawsuit be filed before arbitration-related
attorney's fees could be recovered via the then-existing I.C. § 41-1839. Therefore, "No lawsuit
has been filed" means that Emery and similar cases are inapplicable and would not provide for an
award of attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs' motion incorrectly suggests that attorney's fees incun·ed solely via arbitration
would be recoverable under Emery. In Emery, however, the plaintiff had filed suit, the litigation
was then formally stayed by the court, and the arbitration was allowed to proceed (Plaintiffs'

075
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description of Emery is in accord-see page 7 of Plaintiffs Memorandum). In this context of
suit being filed and the parties then proceeding with arbitration, the decision states:
Where the insured is required and compelled to file a lawsuit by
reason of an insurer's refusal to pay in order to recover under her
insurance contract, we hold it is implicit in l.C. § 41-1839 that the
court shall adjudge a reasonable award of attorney fees against the
msurer.
120 Idaho 244,247, 815 P.2d 442,445 (emphasis added; note that Plaintiffs cite this exact same
language in their discussion of Emery). This language is noteworthy because§ 41-1839, at that
time, referred to a "suit" or civil action. See also Eme1y at footnote no. 3, where the court
specifies that fees under § 41-183 9 are limited "to those instances where 1) the insured has
provided a proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; 2) the insurance company fails to
pay an amount justly due under the policy within 30 days of such proof of loss; and 3) the
insured thereafter is compelled to bring suit to recover for his loss." 120 Idaho at 247 (emphasis
added).
Because the Plaintiffs in this proceeding did not bring suit prior to proceeding with
arbitration, the decision in Emery does not provide for an award of fees. And again, this was
understood by the arbitration panel, which included the explicit statement that "No lawsuit had
been filed."
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court's statements in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and

Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P .3d 1221 (20 I 0) do not provide for attorney's fees absent a
lawsuit being filed. In Weinstein, the court's description of the facts and procedural status make
it clear that suit was filed and that the requested fees were incurred during litigation. 233 P.3d at

1250 (in fact, it does not appear that arbitration was involved in Weinstein and the discussion of
§ 41-1839 focuses on the sufficiency of the proof of loss). Accordingly, the Weinstein language

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Fees and Costs- Page 9

RECEIVE:

N0.2864

03/24/2011/THU 02:04PM

#271 P.012/015

12011 15'02

.From:208 288 0697

quoted by the Plaintiffs as the applicable "Standard of Review" is incorrectly focused and is not
controlling.
It is also noted that Weinstein comes only four months after Grease Spot. This is,
therefore, after § 41- I 83 9 was modified by the Legislature, but prior to the amendment becoming
effective. Clearly the Court would have been aware of the revised statute, yet Weinstein makes
no suggestion that Grease Spot's ruling is impaired.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY
AND THE REQUESTED FEES ARE UNREASONABLE
At arbitration, Plaintiffs sought damages in an amount totaling $50,000. Yet the
arbitrators' final award totaled $9,134.24--a small fraction ofwhat was requested. Further, as
discussed above, the arbitrators added a statement in their Award Decision indicating finality. In
addition to the significant hurdles raised by the arbitrators' Award Decision (foreclosing fees via

Enwy), the then-existing § 4 I -1839, the Grease Spot decision, § 73-10 I' s retroactive restriction,
and the other cases and arguments referenced above, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are the
prevailing party so as to obtain fees or costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Given Plaintiffs'
significant claims and the arbitrators' dramatic reduction via the Award Decision, it is clear that
Plaintiffs did not substantially prevail and as such they are not the prevailing party in accord with
the Civil Rule.
Civil Rule 54(d)(l)(B) states:
In determining which pariy to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties."
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) (emphasis added).
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There are numerous Idaho cases where courts have determined that a plaintiff was not the
prevailing party when the plaintiff obtained reduced or limited recovery, was only partially
successful, or achieved mixed success (i.e., both parties prevailing to some extent). See for
example: Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 761 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiffs and defendant
both prevailed on some claims, so judge's decision that there was no overall prevailing party was
not an abuse of discretion); Harris v. State Ex Ref. Kempthorne, 14 7 Idaho 401, 21 0 P .3d 86
(2009) (plaintiffs and defendants both partially successful, so plaintiffs were not deemed the
prevailing party and did not obtain attorney's fees); Farm Credit Bank v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565,
836 P.2d 511 (1992) (when court concluded that both parties prevailed in part and did not prevail
in part, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that neither party prevailed for
purposes of awarding costs); and Adams v. Krueger, 124Idaho 74,856 P.2d 864 (1993)
(plaintiffs not deemed prevailing party when they were found to be 49% negligent). The

Slaathaug case cited by Plaintiffs relies on § 41-1839, meaning that recovery would be precluded
per Grease Spot and the then-existing statutory language; see Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., I 32
Idaho 705, 711, 979 P .2d I 07 (1999).
In this case, the Court should consider "the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Here, Plaintiffs'
significant claims were eliminated and/or substantially reduced, and their final recovery was less
than 20% of what they had requested (Plaintiffs' claims in the amount of $50,000; the
arbitrators' award was limited to $9,134.24). As such, Plaintiffs' claims were largely rejected.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party for purposes of the Civil Rule, and hence are
fu1ther barred from recovering per their motion.
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The actual amount of requested fees and costs also appears to be excessive (fees and
costs in the amount of $21 ,453.76-more than double the arbitrators' final award). It is noted
that Plaintiffs initial Petition for Confirmation, filed with this Court to commence this
proceeding, lists total costs and attorney's fees in the amount of$13,459.42

(see~

3 of the prayer

for relief). This means that Plaintiffs have now increased this claim by nearly $8,000. This
increase is never explained and does not appear to coincide with the actual billing records
provided with Plaintiffs' motion.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs should be denied for each of the following reasons:
( l) the new cause of action stemming from amended I. C. § 41-1839 is unavailable given the
timing of Plaintiffs' arbitration demand; (2) the Grease Spot decision unequivocally determines
that attorney's fees are unavailable via arbitration; (3) the arbitrator's Award Decision specified
that no suit had been filed; (4) even under Emery, arbitration-related attorney's fees required an
existing lawsuit; (5) there is no indicated exception to the limitation on retroactivity; (6) the
legislative history is unhelpful; (7) the Plaintiffs did not substantially prevail and hence are not
the prevailing party for I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) purposes; and (8) the requested fees are excessive.
This Court should deny Plaintiffs motion in accordance with the statutes and case
authority cited herein.

DATED this ,-0?fday of March 2011.

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on th~~J:Jiday of March 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by facsimile transmission upon the following
person(s):
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
FAX: (208) 522-1277
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE

COMES NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and
submits the following memorandum in reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for Fees and Costs
as follows:
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether this Court applies the law as it existed on January 22, 2010 when Plaintiffs
demanded arbitration or the law at the time the arbitration was held in November, 2010 or the law
as it existed at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint or the law now, the result is the same,
Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys fees for all work done either in arbitration or in this
litigation. In the history of Idaho law, there were only four months when fees in arbitration were
not recoverable. That was from February until July, 2010 when The Greasespot was in effect. Now
that I.C. 41-1839 has been amended, and The Greasespot has been legislatively overturned, the
amendments to I.C. 41-1839 are retroactive because attorneys fees statutes are procedural or
remedial. Defendant's attempts at cherry-picking case law and defendant's claims that cases before
the amendment have no effect are unconvincing and not in accordance with Idaho law.
II.

2-

APPLICABLE LAW

1.

The statute "contains two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an award of
attorney fees: (1) the insured must provide a proof of loss as required by the
insurance policy; and (2) the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within
thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins.
Co., 143 Idaho 743,746-47, 152 P.3d 614,617-18 (2007).
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho
2010).

2.

In Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P.2d 107 (1999) the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full amount
requested in order to be awarded attorney's fees, but only a verdict for an amount
greater than that tendered by the insurer.

3.

Statutes authorizing discretionary awards of attorney fees generally are held to be
remedial or procedural; consequently they are given retroactive effect. Myers v.
Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988).

4.

In suit against architects against State Building Authority for breach of contract that
provided for architectural and certain other services, 12-120(3) clearly could be
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applied to award attorney fees against the Authority because such action involved a
contract for services as well as a commercial transaction; further, the fact that the
provisions of 12-120(3) regarding contracts relating to services were not added to the
section until its 198 amendment and the definition of party did not include the state
or political subdivisions thereof until the 1987 amendment of the section, did not
prohibit application of such section, since the suit was filed after the passage of either
of these amendments, as the proper function is upon the time of the filing, not the
time the cause of action arose. Batt v. Idaho State Bldg Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 835
P.2d 1282 (1992).
5.

"The whole purpose of arbitration is to substitute a less expensive and less formal
method of settling differences between parties for normal court litigation." Loomis,
Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 108 ( 1982), citing City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd
Wright Foundation, [20 Wis.2d 361], 122 N.W.2d 409, 421 (Wis.1963). See also
Pettinaro Constr. Co., Inc. v. Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d 957
(Del.Ch.1979); Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., [21
Md.App. 307], 320 A.2d 558 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1974), affd on other grounds, [274
Md. 307], 334 A.2d 526 (Md.1975); Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of
Minnesota, [266 Minn. 284], 123 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1963).

6.

The Court should look to the law as it existed at the time of filing of the lawsuit. See
Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968);
Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235,629 P.2d 127.

III.

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

In its response brief, Defendant makes the following arguments:
1.

Defendant argues that the statement on the Arbitration award that, "[n]o lawsuit has
been filed, but this award is final" precludes an award of fees.

This argument is disingenuous. After Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit, Defendant filed a
motion to stay the proceedings, alleging that the arbitration panel wanted to decide the issue of fees
at a later time. After a conference call with the head arbitrator, we all agreed that the court would
decide the issue of fees, and that the arbitrators chose not to decide that issue. We then had a status
conference with the court in which Defendant withdrew his motion because the arbitration panel
chose to not address the issue of fees.
3-
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2.

Defendant argues that the timing of demand for arbitration requires the Court to deny
fees in arbitration.
When Plaintiffs initiatedarbitrationonJanuary 22,2010, the statute (I. C. 41-1839) itself was
ambiguous about whether it allowed fees in arbitration. The statute had, however, been interpreted
in Emery and all other cases following Emery to allow for fees in arbitration. Emery was overturned
in The Greasespot after we demanded arbitration. Therefore, at the time Plaintiffs demanded
arbitration, the law was that fees in arbitration were available pursuant to I.C. 41-1839.
Defendant now argues that The Greasespot controls for arbitration initiated prior to July 1,
2010. It is important to remember that this was only the law for part ofFebruary, March, April, May,
and June of2010. Before that, fees in arbitration were available. Therefore, Defendant's best and
only plausible argument is that for those four months, Plaintiffs should not get fees. This argument
also fails for two reasons: First, the law this Court must look to is the law as it was when the lawsuit
was filed, and second because the amendment to LC. 18-4139 is retroactive.
3.

Defendant argues that I. C. 18-413 9 is not retroactive.

Defendants cite State Ex Rel Wasden (a case involving the amendment to a substantive
statute) to support the contention that Amendments to the code are not retroactive unless specifically
provided in the section. While this argument is true pursuant to I. C. 73-1 01, the case law shows that
this law only applies to substantive statutes. A statute providing for an award of attorney fees is a
procedural or remedial statute, so it is retroactive. See Myers and Batt
Under Unity Light and Power, we use the law as it existed when the lawsuit or answer was
filed, so we use the statute at the time the arbitration was initiated. Therefore, the amended statute
that clearly provides for attorneys fees in arbitration, and independent of a lawsuit.

4-
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4.

Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after arbitration, they are not
entitled to fees.

First, this argument is wholly unsupported. The Emery decisions and all other decisions do
not hold that a lawsuit must be filed before arbitration-related attorneys fees could be recovered.
While most of the decisions factually happened that way, there is no law stating that this is a
requirement. Second, Plaintiffs did file a lawsuit in this, they just did it after arbitration. Nothing
in any case requires a suit before arbitrating. Finally, arbitration is specifically designed to avoid the
costs of litigation if at all possible. See Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106 (1982)
In addition, Weinstien, the case that puts forth the standard for fees under LC. 41-1839,
supports the fact that filing a lawsuit before arbitration is not one of the requirements.
5.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees because they are not
the prevailing party.

First, under I.C. 41-1839, there is no requirement that the insured prevail in order to get an
award of fees. All that is required is that the Plaintiffs receive more than what was tendered by the
insurance company. There is no prevailing party analysis required. It is undisputed that defendant
tendered less than Plaintiffs recovered, so they are entitled to fees pursuant to I.C. 41-1839.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(B) does require a Plaintiff to prevail in order to get
costs (not fees). Plaintiffs are entitled to fees because they did prevail. In this case plaintiffs
requested to be compensated for their lost income, and defendant sought to pay nothing. Plaintiffs
recovered more than half of what they sought. The demand letters attached to our petition show that
plaintiffs sought $17,000.00 initially and then $17,000.00 plus fees. Plaintiffs recovered more than
half of what they sought. It is important to remember that Defendants prevailed on no claims. All
of the cases cited by Defendants in support of no prevailing party involved claims by both parties
5-
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where each party won on some claims, were based upon statutes that required the high standard of
proving a frivolous defense, or a finding of partial fault on the part of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs are

clearly the prevailing party pursuant I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(B) and are entitled to an award of costs.
6.

Lastly Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' requested fees appear to be excessive.

Defendant has made no specific objections to the fees despite all billing records being
attached to an affidavit. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to all fees requested pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule
54.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs pray the order of this Court granting their motion for
attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l).
DATED this

day of April, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

~~~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the_(_ day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE
to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.

JOHN LERMA
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
3045 E COOPER POINT DR.
MERIDIAN ID 83642
PO BOX 190719
BOISE, ID 83719

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

JSW
7083\014 Reply briefre Fees
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From:208 288 0697

12011 08:52

#281 P.002/011

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3386
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
EI Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 10-7051
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS'
COUNSEL

vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

I, John J. Lerma, having been first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state:
1.

I an1 the attorney of record for the Defendants, in the above-entitled matter, and, as

such, I am familiar with facts and circumstances surrounding this matter.
Affidavit Of Defendants' Counsel- Page 1
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The statements contained herein are made of my own personal knowledge and are

true and correct to the best of my belief and information.
3.
portion

Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of the relevant
of

Progressive

Insurance

Pohcy

number

02616845-9

(specifically,

the

Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement).

DATED t h i s £ day of April2011.

-

.........,,,
,....'' -.;. LUKe ' •#.

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this .......-C-0
_ _ day of April 2011.

,,,,

,.. ~~..........
...... C> ••
••

i l
: :
:. :•

''1.

~

'tARt'\ ~

-·-

~()

:

Notary Publi or the State of Idaho
Residing at /?& /s e
Idaho
My Commission expires: It- 2(- 2-CJI.?

.. c. •: :..:
~
.. \•• p upo\;~ ••.lo
'~.;; :
~
...
••• """'-$
...,'••,,,..,
J')' ••••••••
<:;)~"'.:> ....
'l'E

or\
.............
,, . . ...

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of April 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) via facsimile:
Jacob Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
FAX: (208) 522-1277

Affidavit Of Defendants' Counsel - Page 2
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HARTWELL CORP
PO BOX 51019
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405

Policy number: 02616845·9

Named insured

Underwritten by:
United Financial Casualty Company
October 17, 2008
Polley Period: Oct 16, 2008 Apr 16.2009
Page 1 of 3

FERRELL BROTHERS CONST
PO BOX 1347
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403

progressiveagent.com
Online Service

Commercial Auto
Insurance Coverage Summary
This is your Renewal
Declarations Page

Make payments, check billing anivity. print
policy documents, or check: the status of a
claim.

208-522-5656
HARTWELL CORP
Con!acl your agent for personalized serviCe

800-444-4487
for customer service if your agent is
unavailable or to report a claim.

Your coverage began on October 16, 2008 at 12:01 a.m. This policy expires on April16, 2009 at 12:01 a.m.
This coverage summary replaces your prior one. Your insurance policy and any policy endorsements contain a full explanation of
your coverage. The policy limits shown for an auto may not be combined with the limits for the same coverage on another auto,
unless the policy contract allows the stacking of limits. The policy contract is form 6912 (03/05). The contract is modified by forms
Z435 (12/06}, Z228 (07/05), 285210 (04/05). 4757 (03/05), 485210 (04/05), 488110 (04/05), 1890 (02/05) and 1891 (09/04).

The named insured organization type is a corporation.

Outline of coverage
limits

Description

Deductible

Premium

Liability To Others
.BodilylnJ~~ an~ Propertx.O.a.r11a~e..Li_a~ili~y.

$1,000,000 combined single limtt

Untnsured Motorist

·····~ 1:!?oo;oo.o:e~¥ p~rs~~t$i.~~?o·. o~o ~ach.~c~i~e:nt ..... ·.

~~de:tns~r~d. ~?torist
Me.dic~l .Payments

... Jl! ~0.~! ~~o. ~a<:h pers.on/$1:0~~·.0?~ .~ach..ac.cid~nt.. .
$.5~~~. ~a.ch. perso.n,., .....

Comprehensive
See Auto Coverage Schedule

F·~~~ And rheit with ·c~;n!);~~d ii(Jd,iion~ 1c0.Je;a9e ·
... Se~ .Aut? C?~~rag~. s.ch~~ul~. _
Collis1on
See .Auto Coverage Schedule
Hired Auto liability To Other.;
.Bodil~ InJury. ~nd P,rop~~y yamage _Ua~ili~Y,.
Employer Nonowned Auto Liability To Others
Bod1ly Injury and Property Damage liability

Lirnit.of liability less.~e.d~ctibi~

''"'""""'

40

.... Lirn!t ?f. lia~lli~y.l~ss.?~~uctib.l~ .
1.699
.Limit .of lia~liity.l~.ss ?e.ductth,l~

55
. .$.1 :~?.O:?OO c.of11b1n,ed sing.le lirn.it....
33

$1.000,000 combined single limit
......... " ' ' " ' ' " " " ' '
...... ..

...................
,., ....... ,...
.
!()tal. 6 ".'~~t~policY. .P.r~ltli~ll1.. .
D1sco~nt lf,pa!d i.n .full... . .. .
.............. .
Total 6 month policy premium if paid in full
'"'

120
120
70
367

$4,140

. . ' ' . ' . ' ' ' . ..

-200
$3,940

Number of Employees (0- 10)

~

Continued
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Policy number: 02616845·9
FERRELL BROTHERS CONST
Page 2 of 3

Rated drivers
SAMUEL FERRELL
2. DEVA FERRELL

3. JEFFREY SEIBER

Auto coverage schedule
2005 Ford F350 Super Duty
VIN: 1FDWW31 P25EC22698

liability
Premium

liabd!~ ....

Physical Damage
Premium
2

Bl
....UM
' ....... '.

Stated Amount:

Garaging Zip Code:

UIMBI

r,1~d Pay

$421

$30

$30

$19

Camp
DedtJ(tible

Comp
Premium

Collision
Deductible

Collisioo
Premium

$250

$99

$500

$407

li~bdiry ..

Physical Damage
Premium

Deductible

FTKAC
Premium

Collision
Deductible

Collision
Premium

$250

$40

$500

$189

100

Auto Total
.......
$1,006

Garaging Zip Code:

liability
Premium

Radius

...

Stated Amount:

2006 Wells Cargo Trailer
VIN 1WC200N2464059635

$30,000
83440

$12,000
83440

Radius:

100

$60

3.

Liability
Premium
Physical Damage
Premium
4.

liability
Premium
Physical Damage
Premium

FTK!\C

$289

2007 Chevrolet KlSOOhd Silvera

Stated Amount:

VIN

Garaging Zip Code:

1GCHK23D57F150765

Auto Total

.. , , , . , ........

$44,000
83440

Radius:

100

~ability ...

UM Bl

UIMBI

$385

$30

$30

$17

Camp
Deductible

Comp
Premium

Collision
Deductible

Colli>ion
Premium

Auto TotBI

$250

$119

$500

$505

$1,086

.. ~~~P.~Y.

Stated Amount:

2001 Chevrolet KlSOOhd Silvera
VIN 1GCHK29UX7E199540
liJbili!y

UM81

UIMBI
.. ,.

$385

$30

$30

Camp
Deductible
........

Comp
Premium

$250

$80

Garaging Zip Code:

100

$17

Collision

Collision
Premium

$500

Radius:

. .~edP~y

...Deductrble
.. , .
,.,

$25,000
83440

$3"23 ...

Auto Total

$865

till
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Policy number: 02616845·9
FERRELL BROTHERS CONST
Page 3 of 3
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Stated Amount:
Garaging Zip Code:

2005 Chevrolet K3SOO Silverado
VIN:

liability
Premium
Physical Damage
Premium

1GCHK39U55E328254

$20,000
83440

Radius:

-~ed_P~.

Uabiliry.

UM Bi

UiM Bi

$385

$30

$30

$17

Comp

Deductible

Comp
Premium

Collis1on
Deducuble

CoDision
Premium

$250

$69

$500

$275

Auto TQ{ai

..... .,.,_,,,".

$806

Premium discount
Policy

02616845-9

Renewal

Loss Payee information
Loss Payee

Auto 1

Loss Payee

Auto 2

3.

Loss Payee

Auto 3

4

Loss Payee

Auto 4

5.

Loss Payee

BANK OF AMERICA
PO BOX 45224 JACKSONVILLE. FL 32203
2005 Ford F350 Super Duty (1 FDWW31P25EC22698)

..........................

.. _.,

'"·····

. . ' .. ' .. . .

.. .

............................. , .. " ' " " ' ' " " ' " ' " '
BANK OF COMMERCE
PO BOX 1887 IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403
2007 Chevrolet K2500hd Silvera ( 1GCHK23D57F1 50765)
..................... .,.
......
.. ... ,,. ......
BANK OF COMMERCE
PO BOX 175 RIGBY, 10 83442
2007 Chevrolet K2500hd Silvera (1GCHK29UX7E199540)

.....

.,

. . . . .. '

.' ' ' ' '

.

.. .. . . ' ' . . . .

Secretary

Form 6489 10 (05AJ6!

N0.3297

' '

. ...

BANK OF COMMERCE
463 RIGBY LAKE DR RIGBY, ID 83442
2005 Chevrolet K3500 Silverado (1GCHK39U55E328254)

Company officers

RECEIVE:

"'"'''

BANK OF COMMERCE
P 0. BOX 1887 IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403
2006 Wells Cargo Trailer (1WC200N2464059635)

. .... .

'
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UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT
Except as specifically modified in this endorsement, all provisions of the Commercial
Auto Policy apply.
We agree with you that the insurance provided under your Commercial Auto Policy, and
related endorsements, is modified as follows:

lt~SURING

AGREEMENT- UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, we will pay for damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an
insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto
because of bodily injury:
1. sustained by an insured;
2. caused by an accident; and
3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured auto.

INSURING AGREEMENT- UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for Underinsured Motorist
Coverage, we will pay for damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an
insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured
auto because of bodily injury:
I. sustained by an insured;
2. caused by an accident; and
3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an underinsured auto.

We will pay under this endorsement only after the limits of liability under all applicable
bodily injury liability bonds and policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments
or settlements.
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
When used in this endorsement; whether in the singular, plural, or possessive:
l. "lnsured" means:
a. if the named insured shown on the Declarations Page is a natural person:
(i)
you or a relative;
(ii) any person occupying your insured auto or a temporary substitute auto;

and
(iii) any person who is entitled to recowr damages covered by this endorsement
because of bodily injury sustained by a person described in (i) or (ii) above;
or
b. if the named insured shown on the Declarations Page is a corporation,
partnership, organization or any other entity that is not a nattral person:

nqJ0
v
~-
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(1)

2.

3.

4.

5.

any person occupying your insured auto or a temporary substitute auto;
and
(ii) any person who is entitled to recover damages covered by this endorsement
because of bodily injury sustained by a person described in (i) above.
"Non-owned auto" means any auto that is not owned by you or furnished for your
regular use and, if the named insured is a natural person, not owned by or furnished
for the regular use of the named insured's spouse or relative.
"Owned" means the person or organization:
a. holds legal title to the vehicle;
b. has legal possession of the vehicle that is subject to a written security agreement
with an original term of six (6) months or more; or
c. has legal possession of the vehicle that is leased to that person or organization
w1der a written agreement for a continuous period of six (6) months or more.
"Owner" means the person or organization who, with respect to a vehicle:
a. holds legal title to the vehicle;
b. has legal possession of the vehicle that is subject to a writ ten security agreement
with an original term of six (6) months or more; or
c. has legal possession of the vehicle that is leased to that person or organization
under a written agreement for a continuous period of six (6) months or more.
"Underinsured auto" means an auto or trailer of any type to which a bodily injury
liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident, but the sum of all
applicable limits of liability for bodily injury is less than the coverage limit for
Underinsured Motorist Coverage shown on the Dec1arations Page.
An "underinsured auto" does not include any motorized auto or equipment:
a. owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of you or, if the named
insured is a natural person, a relative;
b. owned by any governmental unit or agency;
c. designed mainly for use off public roads, while not on public roads;
d. while being used as a residence or premises;
e. shown on the Declarations Page of this policy;
f not required to be registered as a motor vehicle; or
g. that is an uninsured auto.

6. "Uninsured auto" means an auto or trailer of any type:
a. to which no bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the
accident;
b. to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the
accident, but the bonding or insuring company:
(i)
denies coverage; or
(ii) is or becomes insolvent;
c. to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the
accident, but its limit of liability for bodily injury is less than the minimum limit
of liability for bodily injury specified by the financial responsibility law of the
state in which the insured auto is principally garaged; or
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d. that is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and
which strikes:
(i)
an insured auto or temporary substitute auto; or
(ii) if the named insured is a natural person:
(a)you or a relative; or
(b) a motor vehicle that you or a relative are occupying,
provided that the insured, or someone on his or her behalf, reports the accident to
the police or civil authority within twenty-four (24) hours or as soon as practicable
after the accident.
An "uninsured auto" does not include any motorized auto or equipment:
a. owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of you or, if the named
insured is a natural person, a relative;
b. owned or operated by a self.. insurer under any applicable vehicle law, except a
self- insurer that is or becomes insolvent;
c. owned by any governmental unit or agency;
d. designed mainly for use off public roads, while not on public roads;
e. while being used as a residence or premises;
f shown on the Declarations Page of this policy;
g. not required to be registered as a motor vehicle; or
h. that is an underinsured auto.

EXCLUSIONS- READ THE FOLLOWING EXCLUSIONS CAREFULLY. IF AN
EXCLUSION APPLIES, COVERAGE WILL NOT BE AJ:<~FORDED UNDER THIS
ENDORSEMENT.
l. Coverage under this endorsement is not provided for bodily injury sustained by any
person while using or occupying:
a. an insured auto without the express or implied permission of you or, if the named
insured is a natural person, a relative;
b. a non-owned auto without the express or implied permission of the owner; or
c. a auto or device of any type designed to be operated on the public roads that is
owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of you or, if the nan1ed
insured is a natural person, a relative, other than an insured auto or temporary
substitute auto.
2. Coverage under this endorsement will not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any
insurer or self- insurer under any of the following or similar laws:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.

LIMITS OF LIABILITY
Regardless of the number of premiums paid, or the number of insured autos or trailers
shown on the Declarations Page, or the number of policies issued by us, or the number
of vehicles or insureds involved in an accident, or the number of claims or lawsuits
arising out of an accident, we will pay no more than the Limit of Liability shown for
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage on the Declarations Page.
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If the Declarations Page shows that "combined single limit" or "CSL" applies, the
amount shown is the most we will pay for the total of all damages resulting from any one
accident. However, without changing this total "each accident" limit of liability, we will
comply with any law that requires us to provide any separate limits.
If your Declarations Page shows a split limit:
I. the amount shown for "each person" is the most we will pay for all damages due to a
bodily injury to one person; and
2. subject to the "each person" limit, the amount shown for "each accident" is the most
we will pay for all damages due to bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in
any one accident.
The "each person" limit of liability includes the total of all claims made for bodily injury
to an insured and all claims of others derived from such bodily injury, including, but not
limited to, emotional injury or mental anguish resulting from the bodily injury of another
or from witnessing the bodily injury to another, loss of society, loss of companionship,
loss of services, loss of consortium, and wrongful death.
The Limits of Liability under this endorsement shall be reduced by all sums:
1. paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of any persons or organizations that
may be legally responsible, including, but not limited to, all sums paid under Part I ~
Liability To Others;
2. paid or payable under any applicable Medical Payments Coverage Endorsement; and
3. paid, payable, or that should apply, because of bodily injury under any of the
following or similar laws:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.
Any payment made to a person under this endorsement shall reduce any amount that the
person is entitled to recover under Part I- Liability To Others.
No one will be entitled to duplicate payments for the same elements of damages.
Any judgment or settlement for damages against an operator or owner of an uninsured
auto or underinsured auto that arises out of a lawsuit brought without our written
consent is not binding on us.

OTHER INSURANCE
When the named insured is a natural person, if there is other applicable uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage, we will pay only our share of the damages. Our share
is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all available coverage
limits. However, any insurance we provide shall be excess over any other uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage, except for bodily injury to you or a relative when
occupying an insured auto.
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When the named insured is a corporation, partnership, organization or any other entity
that is not a natural person, if there is other applicable uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage, we will pay only our share of the damages. Our share is the proportion that
our limit of liability bears to the total of all available coverage limits. However, any
insurance we provide for the occupant of an insured auto shall be excess over any other
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.
We will not pay for any damages that would duplicate any payment made for damages
under other insurance.
ARBITRATION
If we and an insured cannot agree on:
1. the legal liability of the operator or ownerof an uninsured auto or underinsured
auto; or
2. the amount of the damages sustained by the insured;
this will be determined by arbitration if we or the insured make a written demand for
arbitration prior to the expiration of the bodily ii~ury statute of limitations in the state in
which the accident occurred.

If a written demand for arbitration is made, each party shall select an arbitrator. The two
arbitrators will select a third. If the two arbitrators cannot agree on a third arbitrator
within thirty (30) days, then on joint application by the insured and us, the third
arbitrator will be appointed by a court having jurisdiction.
Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any other expenses it incurs.
The costs and ~es of the third arbitrator will be shared equally.
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the
insured resides. Local rules of procedure and evidence will apply.

A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding with respect to a
determination of:
1. the legal liability of the operator or owner of an uninsured auto or underinsm·ed
auto; and
2. the amount of the damages sustained by the insured
The arbitrators shall have no authority to award an amount in excess of the limit of
liability. The decision of the arbitrators is binding only if the amount of the award does
not exceed the minimum limit of liability specified by the financial responsibility laws of
the state listed on your application as your residence. If the award of the arbitrators is in
an amount which exceeds this minimum limit, either party may demand the right to a
trial. This demand must be made in writing within sixty (60) days of the arbitrators'
decision. If the demand is not made within sixty (60) days, the amount of damages
agreed to by the arbitrators will be binding.
ALL OTHER TERMS, LIMITS AND PROVISIONS OF THE POLrcY REMAIN UNCHANGED.
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
V.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

OBJECTION TO
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL

COMES NOW, plaintiffs, by and through counsel of record, and hereby objects to the
admission of the Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel dated April 6, 2011 for the following reasons:
Although plaintiffs have no objection to the Court reviewing the contract, the plaintiffs object
to its admission for the purpose of excluding costs and attorney fees set forth in plaintiffs' affidavit
of costs and fees. As plaintiffs argued in the hearing on April 6, 2011, defendant has waived any
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objection to items in plaintiffs' affidavit of costs and attorney fees because it failed to object in a
timely manner as is required pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(6). Rule
54(d)(6) provides that any party may object to the claimed costs of another party set forth in a
memorandum of costs by filing and serving on the adverse party a motion to allow part or all of such
costs within 14 days of service of the memorandum of costs. While defendant did file an objection
to costs and attorney fees, defendant did not point to any cost or attorney fees set forth in plaintiffs'
affidavit of costs and attorney fees that were objectionable. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not have a
chance to prepare a response to any such objections at the hearing on April 6, 2011. The defendant
is required to be specific in his objections to costs and fees. See Wefco, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 111
Idaho 55, 720 P.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 112 Idaho 555, 733 P.2d 776
(1987)(Where the defendant appealed the declaratory judgment that costs and fees be awarded to the
plaintiff, challenging not the amount of the assessments, but rather the authority of the Court to
award fees, the defendant properly preserved the question of awarding costs and fees for appeal, but
did not reserve an objection to any particular amount.)
WHEREFORE, the defendant did not timely object to any specific costs or fee or amounts
thereof, and still has no done so, plaintiffs pray the order of this Court denying defendant any right
to do so based upon the Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel filed April 6, 2011.
DATED this

JL day of April, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By~~ud
cobS. Wessel, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the

day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL to be served
upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document
in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting

by facsimile as set forth below.
MARIANNE CASE
JOHN LERMA
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY SUITE 100
MERIDIAN ID 83642

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

PLLC

By:

JSW/jd
7083\015 obj aff def counsel
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,

v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -2010-7051

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(after March 11, 2011)

)
) ss.
)

JacobS. Wessel, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I.

Affiant is a member of the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices which served as
counsel for Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell in the above entitled action.
II.

This affidavit is made on personal knowledge of affiant, except to the extent of allegations
made on information and belief.
1-
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III.

Affiant has reviewed the time and cost records ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices maintained
on the above matter after the filing of their original affidavit of costs and fees of March 11, 2011,
and represents that the following items of cost and expense were expended and incurred in the above
entitled action and arbitration after March 11, 2011:
In addition to the costs and fees totaling $21,453.76 as set forth in Plaintiffs' March
11, 2011 affidavit of costs and fees, since March 11, 2011 Thomsen Stephens Law Offices has
expended approximatelyl7.9 hours in the defense of the above entitled action as follows:
JacobS. Wessel

17.9 hours at $175.00 an hour= $3,132.50

The sum of$3,132.50 is a reasonable attorneys fee for the services of Thomsen Stephens
Law Offices provided to Sam and Deva Ferrell to enforce the uninsured motorist policy after March
11, 2011.
IV.
With the additional sums set forth in this affidavit, the total costs and attorneys fees incurred
in the defense of the above entitled action are $24,586.26.
V.

A true and correct copy of our record of billings from March 11, 2011 until the present in this
matter is attached hereto as exhibit "A."
VI.
Attorneys fees and costs should be awarded for the reasons cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum
in support of attorneys fees and costs filed March 11, 20 11.
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VII.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), all items of cost, and expenses, including any attorneys fees
set forth in this memorandum, are to the best of your affiant's knowledge and belief, correct, are
claimed in compliance with said rule, and were reasonably and necessarily expended and incurred
in the above entitled action.
DATED this jS_ day of April, 2011.

(

~

I~~<:~~

Jb~el, Esq.

J

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to upon oath before me tru//

day of April, 2011.

0~

~.iccflo
o~yStaeofl
o
Residing ~;...<>..;:IL-'_:_:.~~-"'7'+---r-";>---cr=--r----My CommissiOil ~-/0
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SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the
day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT FOR COST AND ATTORNEY FEES to be
served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
MARIANNE CASE
JOHN LERMA
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY SUITE 100
MERIDIAN ID 83642

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:~~L
A

cobS. Wessel, Esq.

JSW/jd
7083\016 supp aff costs fees
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 522-1230- FAX: (208) 522-1277
Tax ID #20-0493858

Sam & Deva Ferrell
P. 0. Box 1347
Idaho Falls 10 83406

ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

Page: 1
04/11/2011
7083-000C
4

SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 0/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
03/28/2011
JSW

03/29/2011
JSW

03/30/2011
JSW

03/31/2011
JSW
04/01/2011
JSW

04/05/2011
JSW

04/06/2011
JSW

04/08/2011
JSW

Review Defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion for costs and
attorney fees (.5), research retrospective application of law (1.4)

1.90

Begin draft of brief in reply to defendant's response to our
motion for costs and fees.

3.40

Review and revise draft of plaintiffs reply to defendants
response brief re fees and costs

2.90

Review and revise reply brief re costs and fees.

2.10

Complete draft of brief in reply to defendant's response to our
motion for fees and costs

2.80

Prepare argument for hearing on motion for costs and attorneys
fees.

0.90

Appearance at hearing on motion for costs and attorneys fees,
travel to and from Bonneville County courthouse to argue said
motion.

1.90

Draft objection to defendant's affidavit attaching the insurance
contract after researching specific objections to costs and

"'!

...:..

I

.,)

Page:2
04/11/2011
7083-000C

Sam & Deva Ferrell
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

4

SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS

04/11/2011
JSW

fees(.8), start draft of supplemental affidavit re costs and
attorneys fees.

1.30

Review and revise objection to defendant's affidavit with
insurance contract, draft and finalize supplemental affidavit re
costs and attorneys fees.

0.70

FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

TIMEKEEPER
Jacob S. Wessel

RECAPITULATION
HOURS
17.90

3,132.50

17.90

HOURLY RATE
$175.00

TOTAL
$3,132.50

TOTAL CURRENT

3,132.50

PREVIOUS BALANCE

$21,453.76

BALANCE DUE

$24,586.26

Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product privileged information. DO NOT
DISCLOSE. Billings are due and payable 30 days from the date of this billing. Unpaid
billings accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

..

~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVIii;E.f, i_ 9 -! I! : 26
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2010-7051

)
)

vs.

)
)

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FEES AND
COSTS

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sam and Deva Ferrell (hereafter, "Ferrells") are brothers who operate a construction
business together. On December 22, 2008, Ferrells were driving to work when they were struck
from behind by an uninsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Ferrells had purchased an uninsured
motorist insurance policy (hereafter, "Policy") from Progressive Insurance Company (hereafter,
"Progressive").
In early 2009, Progressive settled with Ferrells for their property damage, medical
expenses, and general damages. Sam Ferrell received $1,500.00, and Deva Ferrell received
$1,700.00.
The parties could not reach an agreement on Ferrells' claim for lost wages. On July 2,
2009, and December 22, 2009, Ferrells sent demand letters to Progressive's claims department
demanding payment for all lost wages justly due under the Policy and providing documentation
of the loss. Ferrells' December 22, 2009 demand letter requested $7,000.00 for Sam Ferrell and
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$10,000.00 for Deva Ferrell. On January 5, 2010, Progressive tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell
and $862.00 to Deva Ferrell.
On January 22, 2010, Ferrells demanded arbitration pursuant to the Policy.
On November 4, 2010, the parties underwent arbitration before a panel ofthree
arbitrators. The arbitrators awarded $3,990.80 to Sam Ferrell and $5,134.44 to Deva Ferrell.
On November 16, 2010, Ferrells filed a Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award
and Award of Costs and Fees.
On March 11,2011, Ferrells filed a Motion for Fees and Costs. On March 24, 2011,
Progressive filed Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs. On April 1,
2011, Ferrells filed Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Response. This Court
heard oral argument regarding the matter on April 6, 2011.

II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

An award of attorney's fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb
v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 526, 148 P.3d 1267, 1272 (2006). The amount of attorney's fees and

costs awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, Ill P.3d
110, 120 (2005).

III.

DISCUSSION

Ferrells claim they are entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 411839 and Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Progressive asserts that Ferrells are not entitled to attorney's fees because the current
version of§ 41-1839, which became effective July 1, 2010, does not apply retrospectively, and
under the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of pre-amended § 41-1839, Ferrells are not
entitled to attorney's fees for arbitration.
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The following timeline of events is helpful in understanding this Court's analysis:
• January 22, 2010: Ferrells demanded arbitration
• February 1, 2010: Idaho Supreme Court issued Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho
582,226 P.3d 525 (2010), which overturned Emery v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 120 Idaho
244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991) and changed the court's interpretation of§ 41-1839.
• July 1, 2010: Idaho Legislature amended§ 41-1839 to overturn Grease Spot.
• November 4, 2010: Ferrells and Progressive engaged in arbitration.
This Court will first address the manner in which § 41-1839(1) should be applied in this
case. Second, this Court will discuss the costs and fees, if any, which Ferrells are entitled to
recover.
A.

Section 41-1839

Prior to the Idaho Legislature amending§ 41-1839 in 2010, subsection (1) ofthe statute
provided as follows:
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery under
the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.
I. C. § 41-1839(1) (effective until July 1, 201 0). Section 41-1839(1) now provides as

follows:
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or in any
arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay
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such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in
such action or arbitration.
I. C. § 41-183 9( 1) (emphasis added).
1. Retrospective Application

The parties dispute whether the current § 41-183 9( 1) can be applied retrospectively.
In Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated the following with regard to retrospective application of amended statutes:
Unless a contrary legislative intent appears on the face of a statute,
retrospective application is disfavored. I. C. § 73-101. See also University of Utah
Hospital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 (1982). An application is
deemed retrospective if it affects substantive rights. City of Garden City v. City of
Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983). Among the rights characterized as
substantive are those which are "contractual or vested" in nature. Id. at 515, 660
P.2d at 1358. Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy
contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed
to substantive. Id. They may be applied retrospectively.
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing
discretionary awards of attorney fees, such statutes generally are held to be
remedial or procedural. Consequently, they are given retroactive effect. See, e.g.,
Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d
107 (1988) (applying I.C. § 61-617A); Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d
1276 (1978) (applying I.C. § 12-121). Presumably, any amendment to such
statutes also would receive retrospective effect.
However, we think a different analysis is required for I.C. § 12-120.
Unlike I.C. §§ 12-121 and 61-617A, I.C. § 12-120 provides for a mandatory, not
discretionary, award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in commercial
litigation. The automatic nature of an award under I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in
effect, an adjunct to the underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It
establishes an entitlement. In this respect, an award under the statute is closely
akin to other "contractual or vested" rights contained in the agreement itself.
Although the award right is "remedial" in the semantic sense that it relates to a
remedy, the same could be said of contract provisions relating to damages or other
relief in the event of default.
Accordingly, we think that the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120, which
enlarged the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee awards, is more
accurately classified as substantive than as merely remedial or procedural.
Consequently, the 1986 amendment should not be given retroactive effect.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 4

Id. at 87, 753 P.2d at 298.

In an Addendum on Petitions for Rehearing in Howard v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health
Service, Inc., 114 Idaho 485,757 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals stated the

following regarding its decision in Myers:
We also noted in Myers that a mandatory fee-shifting statute produces a
harsh result for the non-prevailing party whose claim or defense is meritorious but
unsuccessful. Such a result can be deemed fair only if the operation of the statute
is known in advance and the parties are able to guide their litigation decisions
accordingly. See DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288,293,678 P.2d 80,
85 (Ct.App.1984 ). We concluded in Myers that "a retrospective application of the
1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120 would distort this decision-making process. It
would profoundly alter-after the fact-the costs and benefits of submitting a
meritorious (albeit disputed) claim to the courts for resolution." 114 Idaho at 87,
753 P.2d at 298.
Id. at 493-94, 757 P.2d at 1212-13.

The court of appeals discussed Myers again in Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1989). The court stated,

In Myers, we drew a line against application of I.C. § 12-120(3) to suits
filed prior to the 1986 amendment because the parties in such cases had no
opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before
deciding to litigate. That is not so here. Although the insurance policy was issued
prior to the 1986 amendment, the application of the attorney fee provision was
triggered only by the commencement of litigation after the amendment had
become effective. Thus, unlike the parties in Myers, the parties in this case were
aware of the attorney fee risk when they chose to litigate. Moreover, we note that
our Supreme Court has adopted the risk-weighing rationale of Myers. See Griggs
v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989). We conclude that an attorney fee
award was authorized by I.C. § 12-120(3) in this case.
Id. at695-96, 778P.2dat817-18.
Myers and its progeny acknowledge that statutes authorizing awards of attorney's fees are

remedial in nature, but because § 12-120 "more closely resembles a substantive right than a
merely procedural right," the courts declined to apply§ 12-120 retrospectively.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the attorney fee provision of§ 41-1839 is "not a
penalty but is an additional sum rendered as compensation when the insured is entitled to recover
under the insurance policy, 'to prevent the sum therein provided from being diminished by
expenditures for the services of an attorney .... "' Martin v. State Farm A1ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138
Idaho 244,61 P.3d 601 (2002). "[T]he provisions ofl.C. § 41-1839 become part of the
insurance contract to the same effect as though incorporated therein." Pendlebury v. Western
Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456,406 P.2d 129 (1965). Section 41-1839(1) states the insurer
"shall" pay attorney's fees if certain conditions are met. Thus, the right to collect attorney's fees
under § 41-183 9(1) is analogous to other vested rights in the underlying contract. Section 411839(1) is similar to§ 12-120 in that it mandates an attorney fee award rather than simply
authorizing a discretionary award.
This Court concludes the entitlement to a mandatory award under § 41-1839(1) resembles
a substantive right. However, both the old and the new version of§ 41-1839(1) have that
characteristic. The 2010 amendment to § 41-1839(1) expanded the breadth of the statute,
making the mandatory award of attorney's fees more broadly available. 1 The amendment did not
change the right to collect attorney's fees from discretionary to mandatory. As a result, this
Court believes it is appropriate to consider whether retrospective application would be proper if
"the operation ofthe statute [was] known in advance and the parties [were] able to guide their
litigation decisions accordingly." Cf Howard, at 493-94, 757 P.2d at 1212-13. In other words, if
Progressive had the "opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before
deciding to [arbitrate]," then retrospective application of§ 41-1839 may be proper. Cf Eriksen,
116 Idaho at 695-96, 778 P.2d at 817-18.
1
The 201 0 amendment certainly broadened the scope of§ 41-1839( 1) as interpreted in Grease Spot. However,
whether the amendment broadened the scope of§ 41-1839(1) as interpreted in Emory-or simply restored the
statute to the Emory era status-is subject to dispute.
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2. Effect of Suit not being Filed Prior to Arbitration
The parties dispute whether § 41-1839, prior to being amended, required non-prevailing
insurers to pay attorney's fees incurred in arbitration if no lawsuit was filed prior to arbitrating
the claim. In Martin, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that a prior lawsuit was unnecessary,
stating:
Before a plaintiff may recover attorney fees under the statute, it must be
shown that: (1) the insured has provided proof ofloss as required by the insurance
policy; and (2) the insurance company failed to pay an amount justly due under
the policy within thirty days of such proof of loss. This Court recently read into
the scheme a third requirement, that the insurer's failure to pay must compel the
insured to bring suit against the insurer in order to recover for the loss. Anderson
v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755, 758, 947 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1997). Upon
further consideration in light of the facts of this case, we withdraw that condition.
The concept of compulsion to file an action is not included in the statute and is
beyond the provisions established by the legislature for the recovery of attorney
fees in the relationship between the insured and an insurer. Because there is no
requirement in the statute that the plaintiff be "compelled" to bring an action, our
opinion stating otherwise in Anderson is inconsistent with the statute and is
disapproved.

Martin, 138 Idaho at 247, 61 P.3d at 604. However, in Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143
Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006) the court addressed the issue more directly while analyzing
whether a party could seek attorney's fees under I. C. § 30-1446 through an award confirmation
proceeding when no lawsuit was filed prior to arbitration. The court stated,
1. Award confirmation proceedings

The district court determined attorney fees for ISA violations could not be
awarded in confirmation proceedings absent an underlying action before the
court. Idaho Code section 30-1446 addresses the civil liability of an ISA violator
as follows:
Any person who [violates certain ISA provisions] is liable to the person
buying the security from him, who shall be entitled to sue either at law or in
equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of payment, costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the
tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security ....
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. . . . Clearly, the term "sue," like the term "action," requires the "filing of a
complaint with the court, which may be denominated as a complaint, petition or
application." LR.C.P. 3. Granted, an award confirmation occurs "upon application
of a party." I.C. § 7-911. Nevertheless, not all applications before a court qualify
as an "action" entitling the claimant to pursue an attorney fee award. Wolfe v.
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 (1996) ("An
application seeking the confirmation of an arbitration award is not an action in
court to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839."). The plain and obvious
meaning of the term "sue" contemplates some type of adversarial proceeding
beyond a mere motion to confirm an arbitration award. We agree with the district
court that an award confirmation proceeding is not the appropriate vehicle for
awarding attorney fees under the ISA.
2. Subsequent suit
As indicated above, I.C. § 30-1446(1) provides for a suit to recover
consideration paid, "together with interest ... , costs, and reasonable attorneys'
fees .... " The issue of whether this statute supports a suit solely for attorney fees
filed after an arbitration award assigning damages has been fully paid is a matter
of first impression for Idaho courts. For guidance, the parties refer this Court to
many cases involving I.C. § 41-1839, a somewhat analogous statute that allows a
claimant to recover attorney fees under certain circumstances in suits against
insurers. See Emery v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991);
Wolfe, 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168; Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); American Foreign Ins. Co. v.
Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). While the Bentleys argue these
cases indicate a party may bring a separate lawsuit after arbitration simply to
recover attorney fees, we are not persuaded. The common thread flowing through
these cases is that attorney fees were awarded where the insured was involved in a
lawsuit before he or she received the amount justly due-their damages-from the
insurance company. Here, WMA timely paid the arbitration award. The Bentleys
were not involved in a lawsuit before they received their damages from WMA.
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply by analogy,
the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees.
Furthermore, a fair reading of LC. § 30-1446 indicates there is no
independent cause of action for attorney fees. Under the statute, a claimant is
entitled to sue for consideration paid, together with interest, costs and fees. There
is no basis for simply filing a lawsuit to collect attorney fees when the principal
amount claimed has been fully paid and resolved in another proceeding. The
statute only addresses an award of fees in a suit filed with the court for an ISA
violation.
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!d. at 394-95, 146 P.3d 660-61 (emphasis added). Although the court was not interpreting§ 411839 in Barbee, the court indicated that attorney's fees incurred in arbitration could not be
awarded under § 41-1839 if a lawsuit had not been filed prior to arbitration.
1. Conclusion

Ferrells did not file a lawsuit prior to arbitrating their claim. Even if this Court ignores
Grease Spot, under the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation ofpre-amended § 41-1839 as stated

in Barbee, Progressive would not have been subject to the mandatory fee provision of§ 41-1839
for fees incurred in arbitration. As a result, it would be improper for this Court to conclude
Progressive had a fair opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before
deciding to arbitrate.
This Court concludes retrospective application of the amendments to § 41-1839 is
improper in this case.
B.

Costs and Fees
1. Attorney's Fees

Having concluded the amendments to§ 41-1839 do not apply retrospectively, this Court
must determine whether Ferrells are entitled to attorney's fees under the pre-amended statute.
In the analysis above, this Court concluded§ 41-1839, prior to being amended, did not
provide for an award of attorney's fees incurred in arbitration if no lawsuit was filed prior to
arbitration. Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Barbee that an award
confirmation proceeding or subsequent suit seeking fees is not the type of"action" contemplated
by the pre-amended § 41-183 9 and cannot serve as a vehicle for seeking attorney's fees when no
suit had been filed prior to arbitration.
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Ferrells are not entitled to attorney's fees under § 41-183 9. Ferrells have not sought fees
under any other statute or theory and their motion for fees must be denied.
2. Costs

Ferrells seek $1,172.98 is costs as a matter ofright and $2,390.78 in discretionary costs.
Progressive asserts Ferrells are not entitled to costs because they are not the prevailing
party.
a. Prevailing Party

I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l)(A) states "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing
party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) defines the
prevailing party as follows:
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the
resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
In determining which party has prevailed, the Supreme Court of Idaho has held success in
a case should be viewed "from an overall standpoint." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). Specifically the Court

held:
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.
!d.
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Ferre lis demand letter to Progressive asked for a total of $17,000 in lost wages.
Progressive believed the amount due under the Policy for lost wages was $1,717.00-the amount
tendered in response to Ferrells' demand letter. The arbitrators determined the amount justly due
under the Policy was $9,125.24.
The arbitration award is substantially larger than what Progressive initially tendered.
Having considered the arbitration award in relation to the overall relief sought by Ferrells, this
Court finds that Ferrells are the prevailing party because they prevailed on the issue of whether
the amount due under the Policy was more than the amount tendered by Progressive. Certain
costs should be awarded to Ferrells as the prevailing party.

b. Costs
Ferrells filed their Motion for Fees and Costs on March 11, 2011.
On March 24, 2011, Progressive filed its Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and
Costs. In its brief, Progressive argued that the fees claimed by Ferrells were excessive and that
Ferrells were not the prevailing party. However, Progressive did not object to any of the costs
claimed by Ferrells. 2
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(6) states,
Any party may object to the claimed costs of another party set forth in a
memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to
disallow part or all of such costs within fourteen (14) days of service of the
memorandum of cost. Such motion shall not stay execution on the judgment,
exclusive of costs, and shall be heard and determined by the court as other
motions under these rules. Failure to timely object to the items in the
memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs
claimed.

2

At the hearing before this Court on April6, 2011, Progressive objected to some of the costs claimed by Ferrells,
but such objection was neither timely nor made in proper form.
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Progressive's failure to object, within fourteen days of March 11,2011, to the items in
Ferrells' memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections Progressive has to those
costs.
As the prevailing party and absent a proper objection, Ferrells are awarded costs totaling
$3,563.76.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Ferrells are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
Ferrells are entitled to recover costs in the amount of $3,563.76.

IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this ~C\ day of April 2011.

'JR.

District Judge
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
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FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendant
Progressive Insurance Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL and DEY A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
rNSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV 10-7051

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S
A WARD OF COSTS TO
PLAINTIFFS
Oral Argument Requested

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Progressive Insurance Company, by and through its attorneys
of record, and moves this Court for an order to reconsider that portion of the Court's April 29, 2011
Memorandum Decision and Order which awarded costs to the Plaintiffs. This motion is brought in
accordance with Civil Rules 7(b )(1) and 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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This Motion is supported by a separately filed Memorandum, and by a previously
submitted Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel (which includes relevant portions of the parties'
insurance agreement).
DATED

/ ( day ofMay 2011.

this~

LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
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Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
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3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
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Attorneys for Defendant
Progressive Insurance Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL and DEV A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV 10-7051
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S
A WARD OF COSTS TO
PLAINTIFFS

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Progressive Insurance Company, by and through its attorneys
of record, and submits this Memorandum in support of the separately filed Motion to Reconsider
the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs.
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The motion should be granted because (i) the Court declined to address Defendant's
previously asserted arguments pertaining to costs; (ii) Defendant did in fact object and hence did
not waive its objection to the requested costs; (iii) an award of costs is precluded by the parties'
contractual provision that provided for arbitration; and (iv) the requested costs are precluded
under the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA'') and under Idaho case law which interprets and
applies the U AA.
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its previous ruling and
determine that no costs are appropriately awarded to the Plaintiffs in this proceeding.

A. DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO ALL COSTS AND DID NOT WAIVE ANY
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMED COSTS
Defendant's initial objection argued that Plaintiffs were entitled to no attorney's fees and
no arbitration or litigation costs. The very first line of Defendant's previous briefing specifies
that Defendant "responds in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs." See
Defendant's March 24, 2011 Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs at page 1. In
addition, Defendant's counsel made this same, explicit argument at the previously conducted
hearing. Because Defendant objected to all costs, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to
make specific arguments pertaining to a portion of those claimed costs.
Accordingly, there was no waiver on the part of Defendant: An objection was timely
made wherein Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs were not entitled to any costs. Furthermore,
there was no waiver because the arbitration cost issue is not appropriately resolved by reference
to Civil Rule 54. Defendant respectfully suggests that the Plaintiffs' reliance on I.R.C.P.
54(d)(6) is misguided for reasons discussed below pertaining to the parties' specific agreement to
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arbitrate, the Uniform Arbitration Act which takes precedence over general civil litigation costshifting provisions, and recent, relevant case Jaw. Based on each and all of these reasons, the
Court should reconsider its discussion of waiver and conclude that the Defendant's have
maintained a valid objection to the requested costs.
B. THE ISSUE OF COSTS IS GOVERNED BY THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE
As the Court is aware, the Plaintiffs made the initial decision to pursue their UIM claims
via arbitration. Clearly, the arbitration was initiated, proceeded, and controlled by the parties'
contractual insurance agreement (specifically, by the "ARBITRATION" provision found in the
"lJNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT"). For
example, the arbitration was initiated by the Plaintiffs via a written demand, each party selected
an arbitrator, the two arbitrators then selected a third arbitrator, and the arbitration was held in
the county where the insureds reside.
Defendant's counsel has previously provided the relevant portion of the insurance policy.
See Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel submitted prior to the April 6, 2011 hearing. Accordingly,
this document was before the Court, and Plaintiffs counsel did not object to it being considered
or relied on. Further, at the request of Defendant's Counsel during the hearing, the Court stated
that it would consider the submitted policy on this issue.
According to the Arbitration provision, costs are to be treated as follows:
Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator
will be shared equally.
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See "UNINSURED!UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT" under
heading "ARBITRATION'' (emphasis added; document is attached to the previously submitted
Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel; the pages of the Endorsement are not numbered, but the
Arbitration provision can be found on the very last page).
Defendant respectfully suggests that this Court is obligated to defer to the plain and
unambiguous language of the arbitration provision. Accordingly, this Court should determine
that Plaintiffs must pay "the costs and fees of its arbitrator," "any other expenses it incurs," and
share equally in the "costs and fees of the third arbitrator"" Shifting such costs away from the
Plaintiffs would be contrary to the parties' pre-arbitration understanding and would be an unfair
surprise to Defendant. Once again, the Court's reliance on Civil Rule 54 is suggested to be
incorrect.
C. THE UNIFORl\'1 ARBITRATION ACT AND CONTROLLING IDAHO CASE
LAW REQUIRES THAT COSTS BE ADDRESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE

Idaho has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (see I.C. §§ 7-901 through 7-922). This is
the applicable and controlling statute which pertains to most arbitrations. The UAA provides
support for and deference to the present parties' arbitration agreement:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
I.C. § 7-901 (emphasis added; note: the validity and applicability of the insurance contract or the
specific arbitration provision have never been questioned or challenged in any way-rather both
parties have proceeded in accordance with such)"
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs- 4
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As pertaining to fees and costs, the UAA specifies:
Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration,
shall be paid as provided in the award.
I.C. § 7-910 (emphasis added). In the present matter, the issue of the arbitrators' "expenses and
fees, together with other expenses" is "otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate" (as
explained in the preceding section). Hence, once again, this Court should defer to such
contractual provisions.
Idaho courts have consistently enforced the UAA' s deference to an arbitration agreement.
For example, in Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922, 188 P.3d 864 (2008), the court determined as
follows:
Courts possess very limited authority to review arbitration awards
under Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act. I.C. §§ 7-901-922;
Mumfordv. Miller, 143 Idaho99, 100, 137P.3d 1021,1022
(2006). The arbitrator's decision is binding on the reviewing court
both as to questions of law and fact. Driver v. Sf Corp., 13 9 Idaho
423, 426, 80 P.3d I 024, 1027 (2003). Even where a reviewing
court might consider some of the arbitrator's rulings on questions
of law to be error, the arbitrator's decision is nevertheless binding
on the reviewing court. I d. An inquiry by a district court is limited
to an examination of the award to discern if any of the grounds for
relief stated in the Uniform Arbitration Act exist. !d
188 P3d at 866 (underlined emphasis added). The present issue of costs would be similarly
controlled by the underlying arbitration award and the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The
arbitration panel did not provide an award of costs. Such was precluded by the explicit language
in the arbitration agreement. And it would now be inappropriate for this Court to shift such costs
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to the Defendant because such is not provided for in the UAA, in the award, or in the parties'
agreement.
Relatedly, in Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P .3d 141 (2005), the court
stated:
It is beyond the scope of an arbitrator's authority to award attorney
fees unless there is a contractual agreement for such an award. I. C.
§ 7-910; Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,246, 815 P.2d
442, 444 (1991); Bingham County Comm 'n [v. Interstate Elec.
Corp.], 105 Idaho [36] at 42, 665 P .2d [ 1046] at 1052; Storrer v.
Kier Constr. Corp., 129 Idaho 745, 746, 932 P.2d 373, 374 (Ct.
App. 1997).
118 P.3d at 148-49 (underlined emphasis added). Again, the relevant issue is the required court
deference to the contractual arbitration provision.
And in Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582,226 P.3d 524 (2010), the court cited
I. C. § 7-91 0 and then specified:

This Court has repeatedly interpreted this provision [I. C. § 7-91 0] to
prohibit courts from modifYing arbitration awards to provide for
attorney fees. E.g. Barbee v. WMA Sec.. Inc., 143 Idaho 391,396,
146 P.3d 657, 662 (2006); Wolje v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho
398,404,913 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1996).
226 P.3d at 527 (footnote 2). Similarly, the cost shift from Plaintiffs to Defendant would be
precluded because such is unavailable via the UAA and because such is precluded by the parties'
arbitration agreement.

Grease Spot also stated: "The UAA is to be interpreted 'to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.' LC. § 7-921." ld. at 529. In this context, the cou1i favorably cites
decisions from other states wherein it is clear that the UAA, with its provisions specific to
arbitration, must take precedence over other, more general litigation cost-shifting provisions.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs- 6
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For example, the Grease Spot court references Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. WE.S Canst. Co., 180
Ariz. 148,882 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1994) (en bane) (which, according to the Idaho court stands
for the proposition that "a general fee-shifting statute did not control over the specific UAA
provision"), and Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 334 N.J. Super. 149, 756
A.2d 1096, 1102 (Law Div. 2000) (which, again according to the Idaho court holds "that a
general rule requiring the court to award costs to the prevailing party does not apply to
arbitration").
Under the UAA and controlling case law, this Court should defer to the cost provision
contained in the parties' arbitration agreement. That provision provides:
Each partv will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator
will be shared equally.
As required, Defendant has already paid one-half of the third arbitrator's costs and fees.
Accordingly, Defendant has no other expenses that it should be obligated to pay. Pursuant to the
quoted arbitration provision, this Court should leave each party with their own incuned costs and
expenses. Accordingly, this Court should reverse its previous ruling wherein such costs were
shifted from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant.

D. CONCLUSION
This Court should reconsider its previous ruling which shifted the Plaintiffs' arbitration
costs to the Defendant. That decision should be changed for the following reasons: (a) Defendants
did not waive any objection because they opposed all fees and costs requested by the Plaintiffs; (b)
the parties' arbitration occurred pursuant to a contractual provision that precluded the requested
shifting of costs; (c) the Uniform Arbitration Act instructs the Court to comply with the
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs- 7
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underlying arbitration agreement; and (d) recent and controlling case law demonstrates that
Plaintiffs are not entitled to shift such costs to the Defendant This Court should defer to the
parties' arbitration agreement, follow the UAA, and conform its ruling to valid case precedent.
DATED this

_d day of May 2011.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV-2010-7051

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and move
this Court pursuant to Rule 11, IRCP to reconsider those portions of its Memorandum Decision and
Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs of April29, 2011 in which the Court denied Plaintiffs motion
for attorney fees. The Court made two errors, either of which, if corrected, would entitle Plaintiffs
to an award of their attorney fees.
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1.

The District Court should have applied the law as it existed at the time the Complaint
and the Answer in the above captioned case was filed.

The Court should have looked to the law as it existed at the time of filing of the lawsuit. See

Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968); Overman v.
Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 629 P.2d 127.

In fact, the Defendant in its briefing on the issues of

attorneys fees and costs cited and highlighted the following passage from State ex Rel Wasden v.

Diacel Chemical Industries, Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 (2005) in which the Diacel court
referenced Unity:

"Burley's right to exercise the power of eminent domain should have been

adjudicated in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the filing of its answer and
counterclaim." 92 Idaho at 503-04, 445 P.2d at 724-25. (Emphasis added by Defendant United
Financial in its Objection to Motion for Fees and Costs.)

Plaintiffs filed the Petition for

Confirmation of Arbitration Award and for Costs and Attorneys fees in this matter on November 18,
2010. Defendant filed its Answer on February 15, 2011. Both of these dates are after the
amendment ofldaho Code §41-1839(1) in which the legislature is clear that a plaintiff may recover
attorney fees in arbitration.
Inexplicably, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs the
Court herein never addressed the law as it existed at the time the Petition was filed and at the time
the Answer was filed.

After stating what the current statute provides, the Court immediately

discussed retrospective application ofldaho Code §41-1839(1) to decide that the statute could not
be applied retrospectively. In doing this the Court also refused to apply the statute prospectively.
This was error, and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its decision not to apply
the law as it existed at the time the Petition and Answer were filed herein.

2-
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Not applying the law as it existed at the time the parties chose to involve the courts presents
a difficult choice for courts. If not the law at the time of filing, what past law should the Court
apply? Would it be correct to apply the law as it existed when each individual fee was incurred?
Would it be correct to apply the law as it existed when attorneys got involved and fees began
incurring? Would it be correct to apply the law as it existed when the arbitration actually happened?
Would it be correct to apply that law as it existed when both parties agreed to arbitrate? We do not
know which of these is correct because the only guidance the Idaho Supreme Court has given us is
that the courts should apply the law as it exists at the time of the filing of the Petition and at the time
of the filing of the Answer. See Diacel and Unity.
2.

In deciding whether the statute requires filing a law suit before the arbitration, this
Court should have relied on the Martin case and not on the Barbee case.

Idaho law provides that a plaintiff is not required to file a lawsuit before arbitration in order
to recover attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839. The Court correctly cited Martin v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Isn. Co., for the holding that "[t]he concept of compulsion to file an action

is not included in the statute and is beyond the provisions established by the legislature for the
recovery of attorney fees in the relationship between the insured and the insurer. Because there is
no requirement in the statute that the plaintiffbe 'compelled' to bring an action, our opinion stating
otherwise in Anderson is inconsistent with the statute and is disapproved." Martin, 138 Idaho 244,
247, 61 P3d. 601, 657 (2002). Martin has never been overruled. Martin expressly overruled
Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755, 947 P.2d 1003 which was a case that relied only upon
Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 for the proposition that

3-
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compelling the insured to bring suit against the insurer was a requirement under Idaho Code §411839. Id
Martin is the most similar case to the present one that exists in Idaho. In Martin, the insured

was involved in an automobile accident and sued the other driver. After the driver's insurance
company became insolvent, he notified his own insurance that he was seeking the $1 00,000.00 limits
under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. Before filing a lawsuit, by June, 1997, the
parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute and selected three arbitrators. Two years later, in June,

1999, Martin filed a lawsuit and arbitrated the matter. Martin then filed a motion for costs and
attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839 because the Defendant State Farm offered and payed
substantially less than the sum awarded by the arbitrators. The District Court found that the suit was
not necessary since the arbitration award had been paid in full and the suit was not brought for
recovery under the terms of the policy and thus denied Martin any award of fees. Martin, 13 8 Idaho
at 245-6. On appeal, the Defendant State Farm argued that since the parties demanded arbitration
and selected arbitrators and only two years later did Martin file a lawsuit, Martin was not entitled to
an award of fees under Idaho Code §41-1839. Defendant relied on Anderson (Anderson relied on
Wolfe for the proposition that §41-1839 required a plaintiff to be compelled to filed suit.) The Idaho

Supreme Court rejected Defendant's arguments on appeal and found that there are only two
requirements for recovery under §41-1839; "it must be shown that: (1) the insured has provided
proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; and (2) the insurance company failed to pay an
amount justly due under the policy within thirty days of such proof of loss. I d There is no other
requirement. In order to find that Martin is not the law in Idaho, this Court is forced to find that
Martin has been overruled. Martin has never been overruled, and so this Court's finding that Barbee
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v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006) applies to the present case was error,
and Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reconsider that finding.
While it is true that Barbee was decide after Martin, Barbee does not overrule Martin.

Barbee was a case under the Idaho Securities Act (ISA), Idaho Code § 30-1446, as it existed prior
to the Act being amended in2004. 143 Idaho at392, 146 P.3d at 658. In Barbee, the Plaintiffs sued
their securities broker-dealer and broker for the purchase of unsuitable investments. Their contract
had an arbitration provision, and the parties arbitrated the dispute pursuant to that provision. The
plaintiffs prevailed in part at arbitration, but the arbitration award expressly stated, "Each party shall
bear its own arbitration costs, including attorneys' fees." Plaintiffs subsequently filed two lawsuits;
one for confirmation of the arbitration award and for the court to modify the award with respect to
attorney fees under the ISA, and a second lawsuit simply for attorneys fees under the ISA, Idaho
Code§ 30-1446 as it existed prior to the Act being amended in 2004.
In deciding to deny attorney fees, the Barbee court relied on the language of the ISA, which
prior to 2004 stated as follows:
Any person who [violates certain ISA provisions] is liable to the person buying the security
from him, who shall be entitled to sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration
paid for the security, together with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
payment, costs and attorneys fees, less the amount of any income received on the security.

Barbee, 143 Idaho at395, 146 P.3d at 661(emphasis on sue in the original).
It is important to remember two things when applying Barbee to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 cases.

First, the Barbee court was construing the ISA statute, and putting emphasis on the word "sue." The
word sue is not in§ 41-1839 either before or after it was amended. Second, the legislature has since
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amended the ISA, and the word "sue" is no longer a part of the ISA statute either, so it is doubtful
that Barbee is even current law under ISA.
The Barbee court then went on to discuss the award confirmation proceeding and decided
not to amend the arbitration award to allow for attorneys fees because of the word "sue" in the ISA
statute. In support of this, Barbee cited only one case: Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho
398,405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 (1996). Anderson, which was expressly overruled by Martin, also
only relied on this same passage from Wolfe to require that suit be compelled under § 41-1839 in
order for plaintiff to recover attorneys fees. This exact logic was expressly overruled by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Martin.
The Idaho Supreme Court showed in Martin how it expressly overrules prior case law by
stating that Anderson was overruled. lfthe Idaho Supreme Court had wanted to expressly overrule
its finding in Martin and in essence resurrect Anderson, it would have done so by express language.
It did not, and so it was error for this Court to rely upon Barbee in its holding that the Ferrells are

not entitled to attorneys' fees because they did not file suit before arbitration.
The second portion of Barbee that tl1is Court cites is regarding Barbee's second lawsuit in
which plaintiffs only requested attorneys fees under the ISA, Idaho Code§ 30-1446 as it existed
prior to the Act being amended in 2004. Regarding the subsequent lawsuit, the Barbee court held
only this, "to the extent cases interpreting Idaho Code§ 41-1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys are
not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." Barbee, 143 Idaho at395, 146 P.3d at
66.

Besides the fact that the court in Barbee is construing an entirely different and not longer

existing statute, the Ferrells did not file a separate lawsuit solely for attorneys fees, so this holding
does not apply.
6-
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If an appeal is needed because this Court will not reconsider this decision, the Defendant
will have to ask the Supreme Court to overrule Diacel and Unity, to retrospectively overrule Martin,
to retrospectively rely on Barbee, which would resurrect Anderson and would resurrect the old ISA
statute, and to ignore the current version ofldaho Code § 41-183 9 and the legislature's clear intent
to allow attorney fees in arbitration. This is an unlikely result, and the necessity of such an appeal
would be a waste of both parties' time and money as well as judicial resources.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request, based upon the foregoing, that this Court
reconsider those portions of its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs
of April29, 2011 in which the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees.
DATED this~ day of May, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the~ day of May, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the
correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
[X] Mail
JOHN LERMA
[ ] Hand Delivery
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
3045 E COOPER POINT DR.
[ ] Facsimile@
MERIDIAN ID 83642
PO BOX 190719
BOISE, ID 83719
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By~~~
JacobS. Wessel, Esq.
JSW
7083\017 Mo Reconsider
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendant
Progressive Insurance Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

SAM FERRELL and DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV I 0-7051
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, and responds in
opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs make two arguments in their motion.
Neither argument is sufficient to justify a reversal ofthe Court's previous decision pertaining to
attorney fees. Furthennore, the motion fails because Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees

Defendant's Response in Opposition to
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via a request to confirm an arbitration award, and because Defendant's prompt payment of the
award makes this proceeding moot. Accordingly, this Court should deny the Plaintiff's motion
to reconsider.

A. PLAINTIFFS MISCONSTRUE UNITY LIGHT & POWER AND DIACEL
CHEMICAL
Plaintiffs' motion disregards the factual case contexts when it pulls language from Unity

Light & Power v. Burley and State ex Rel Wasden v. Diacel Chemical Industries. Plaintiffs
attempt to use limited language from these cases to argue that this Court should apply I.C. § 411839 as such existed in November 2010 (i.e., after the arbitration when Plaintiffs filed a request
with this Court to confinn the award). Significantly however, neither Unity Light & Power, nor

Diacel Chemical involved arbitration. See 99 Idaho 499, 501 ("Unity instituted the present
action .... "; text search shows no reference to arbitration); 141 Idaho 102, 104 ("On January 6,
2003, the State filed this action .... ";text search shows no reference to arbitration).
Because there was no arbitration in these cases, when the Supreme Court made
pronouncements about what was controlling law, it did so in the context of state court litigation
being the only forum and proceeding. Hence the statements from the Supreme Court that the law
as it existed when the proceeding commenced was controlling (i.e, when litigation was filed in
those cases).
It is an immense stretch of the statements and rationale found in Unity Light & Power and

in Diacel Chemical for the Plaintiffs to now argue that their own initiation of arbitration, and
indeed the whole arbitration process, should be disregarded in considering the controlling law. If
courts accepted such rationale, it would create considerable confusion and preclude a defendant
from understanding what law would ultimately control a pending dispute (for example, in the
present case controlling law would depend on whether suit was filed before or after arbitration).

Defendant's Response in Opposition to
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This Court appropriately considered and applied the rulings of Unity Light & Power and
Diacel Chemical. Those decisions stand for the principle that the law existing at the
commencement of an action should be controlling throughout the course of the proceeding.
Defendant agrees and again asserts that the applicable time frame is when arbitration was
initiated.
Plaintiffs' motion also cites Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 629 P.2d 127 (1980).
Overman is a divorce/child custody case. Defendant's counsel is unable to determine the
relevance or why such case is being cited. According to the Overman court:
The question presented by this appeal is a narrow one, i.e., whether
the district court, on the non-custodial parent's motion to modify
the child custody decree, erred in entering an order granting
temporary custody of the minor children to the non-custodial
parent upon a properly supported ex parte motion pending a full
hearing, to be held within ten days.
102 Idaho at 237. Defendant's counsel has not found language in Overman that seems to pertain
to the present matter (there is no page-specific reference in the cite included in Plaintiffs'
briefing). Accordingly, Defendant's counsel does not believe that Overman has applicability or
that such supports Plaintiffs' motion.

B. AS THE COURT EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN ITS PREVIOUS DECISION,
MARTIN DOES NOT REPRESENT CURRENT OR CONTROLLING LAW
In its existing ruling, this Court provided a valid and thorough analysis of Martin v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 PAd 601 (2002) and Barbee v. WMA Securities,
Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006). The Court properly recognized that Barbee was the
more recent precedent, that it more directly analyzed the applicable issues, and that it was
controlling for purposes of the Court's decision.
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Plaintiffs apparently like the language in Martin and do not like the language in Barbee.
So Plaintiffs request that this Court rely on the older, less on-point, and non-controlling case
language. To make such argument, the Plaintiffs assert that Martin has never been fom1ally
overruled.
Once again, this Court appropriately addressed such issues in its previous decision. But
as a partial recap in response to the Plaintiffs' present motion, it is noted that Barbee does
explicitly reference Martin and refutes the Plaintiffs' reliance on such. According to Barbee:
The issue of whether this statute supports a suit solely for attorney
fees filed after an arbitration award assigning damages has been
fully paid is a matter of first impression for Idaho courts. For
guidance, the parties refer this Court to many cases involving I. C.
§ 41-1839, a somewhat analogous statute that allows a claimant to
recover attorney fees under certain circumstances in suits against
insurers. See Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,815 P.2d
442 (1991); Wolfe [v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.], 128 Idaho 398,913
P.2d 1168 [1996]; Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); American Foreign Ins.
Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). While the
Bentleys [plaintiffs] argue these cases indicate a party may bring a
separate lawsuit after arbitration simply to recover attorney fees,
we are not persuaded. The common thread flowing through these
cases is that attorney fees were awarded where the insured was
involved in a lawsuit before he or she received the amount justly
due-their damages-from the insurance company. Here, WMA
timely paid the arbitration award. The Bentleys were not involved
in a lawsuit before they received their damages from WMA.
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply
by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit
solely for attorney fees.
Furthennore, a fair reading ofl.C. § 60-1446 indicates there is no
independent cause of action for attorney fees. Under the statute, a
claimant is entitled to sue for consideration paid, together with
interest, costs and fees. There is no basis for simply filing a
lawsuit to collect attorney fees when the principal amount claimed
has been fully paid and resolved in another proceeding.

Defendant's Response in Opposition to
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146 P.3d at 661 (italics in original; underlined emphasis added; bracketed language added to
complete citations and to identify party status).
Stated simply, the Barbee court recognized that Emery, Wo(fe, Martin, and American

Foreign Insurance together indicate that a previous lawsuit to pursue the underlying claim for
damages was a critical requirement for a subsequent request for attorney fees. !d. And since the
insurer in Barbee "timely paid the arbitration award," the plaintiffs were "not entitled to file a
separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." !d. In the present case, unlike in Barbee, the cases
"interpreting I. C. § 41-1839" need not be applied "by analogy"-rather direct application of
those cases based on the same statutory provision is appropriate. Id.
The Plaintiffs' motion arguments are flawed: While there may not be an express
statement that says "Martin is hereby overruled," that pmiion of Martin that is now relied on by
the Plaintiffs has been discussed and refuted by a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court ruling.
Accordingly, it is not good law, it is not binding, and it demonstrates that this Court was correct
in its initial ruling.
In addition to Barbee, the Grease Spot decision went even fu1iher in its rejection of the
Plaintiffs' Martin-based arguments. See Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d
524 (201 0). This Court previously found it unnecessary to address Grease Spot at any length
(Page 9 of the Memorandum Decision: "Even if this Court ignores Grease Spot, under the Idaho
Supreme Court's interpretation ofpre-amended § 41-1839 as stated in Barbee, Progressive
would not have been subject to the mandatory fee provision of§ 41-1839 for fees incurred in
arbitration."). Nevertheless, it is evident that Grease Spot reinforces the conclusion that the
referenced language from Martin cannot be relied on.
As previously cited by the Defendant, Grease Spot states as follows:
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[T]he plain text ofl.C. § 41-1839 is at odds with this Court's prior
readings of the statute. Section 41-1839 only permits insureds to
collect attorney fees incurred in a civil "action" to recover under an
insurance policy. When a court compels arbitration, it often stays
litigation as to all parties, regardless of whether they are to
participate in the arbitration, to allow these corollary proceedings
to be completed. An arbitration is not part of a civil action, but
rather a proceeding separate and apart fi·om litigation based on a
contract between the parties. Further, there is no language
indicating that§ 41-1839 is meant to imply a provision for
arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy. Emery was
therefore manifestly incorrect in holding to the contrary. To the
extent that Emery implied into insurance policies a provision
granting insureds arbitration attorney fees, it is expressly
overruled.
226 P.3d at 528 (see also Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,405, 913 P.2d 1168,
11 75 (1996) ("before an insured can recover attorney fees under the statute [I.C. § 41-1839], an
action in comi must be brought to recover under the terms of the insurance policy")). Simply
stated, even if Martin survived Barbee, the Supreme Court's unequivocal statements in Grease

Spot demonstrate that Martin is not controlling law.
Once again, this Court got it right in analyzing Martin and Barbee, and in recognizing
that Barbee is more recent, addresses the issue more directly, and is the relevant and controlling
precedent. This Comi should sustain its previous ruling on the issue of attorney fees.

C. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION CONCEDES MOST OF
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
As indicated initially in this response, Plaintiffs make only two arguments in support of
their motion for reconsideration. It is therefore wo1ih noting that most of the Court's existing
ruling is left uncontested. For example, Plaintiffs do not now challenge the Comi's rulings
regarding statutory retroactivity (and specifically how such pertains to I.C. § 41-1839). Clearly
this topic was a substantial and important part of the Court's ruling. Defendant believes that the

.-'!
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Court was correct on these unchallenged issues, but since such are not being maintained by the
Plaintiffs, this briefing will not make additional, supporting arguments pertaining to such.
D. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO CONFIRM AN ARBITRATION AWARD IS NOT
AN ACTION IN COURT SUFFICIENT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES
UNDER I.C. § 41-1839

Plaintiffs' action before this Comi is allegedly to "confirm the arbitration award."
However, the Plaintiffs' pleadings and motions have obviously focused on pursuing attorney
fees. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a post-arbitration request to confinn an
award does not suffice as a basis to recover attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839.
In Wo?fe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996), the court
explains and rules as follows:
Wolfe argues that he is entitled to attorney fees incurred during
arbitration under his motion to the district court for confirn1ation of
the arbitration award. Wolfe contends that when an insured is
required to enter into arbitration under his insurance contract, due
to his insurance company's failure to pay what is justly due, then
he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 41 1839. Wolfe
cites Emery and Walton v Har(ford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818
P.2d 320 (1991 ), as authority for his argument. We disagree with
Wolfe's assertions. Neither Emery nor Walton is helpful or
instructive to the resolution of the present case.
Idaho Code 41-1839 provides for the award of attorney fees if the
insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the
policy within thirty days after proof of loss. But, before an insured
can recover attorney fees under the statute, an action in court must
be brought to recover under the tenns of the insurance policy. I.C.
§ 41-1839; see Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 89
Idaho 456, 465, 406 P.2d 129, 134 (1965) ("An insurer which fails
for a period of thirty days after proof of loss to pay the person
entitled thereto the amount justly due under the policy, shall in any
action thereafter pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action."). In both Emery and
Walton, suits were filed in court prior to arbitration, which brought
those cases squarely within the purview of I. C. § 41-1839. In the
present case, a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award is
., 4 .;
..;_ ":: "l.
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being used as a vehicle to assert a claim for attorney fees where no
prior court action was filed.
No Idaho Supreme Court case has previously addressed the issue
of whether a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award
constitutes an action in court to recover attorney fees incurred in
arbitration under I.C. § 41-1839 ....

***
On its face Idaho Code § 41-1839 requires that an action in court
be filed. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that "[t]here
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' I.R.C.P.
2; see also Idaho Const. art. V, § I. Rule 3(a) ofthe Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a civil action commence with the
filing of a complaint, petition, or application with the court and
that no dispute may be submitted to the court without the filing of
a complaint, petition, or application. I.R.C.P. 3(a). A confinnation
application is presented to the court through a motion or
application for the purpose of confinning an arbitration award. An
application seeking the confinnation of an arbitration award is not
an action in court to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 411839. Wolfe filed a motion for confirmation of arbitration award,
pursuant to I.C. § 7-911, seeking attorney fees. Because the
confinnation motion is not an action in court pursuant to I.C. § 411839, Wolfe is not entitled to attorney fees.
128 Idaho at 403-04, 405 (underlined emphasis added).
In addition to strengthening the other arguments asserted by the Defendant, Wolfe makes
it clear that the Plaintiffs have no basis to obtain attorney fees via a post-arbitration proceeding
that is only being brought to "confirm" the arbitration award. Since this is exactly what the
Plaintiffs are attempting to do, this Court should sustain its previous ruling and again deny any
award of attorney fees in accordance with Wo{fe.

E. BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY PAID THE ARBITRATION AWARD,
THE PRESENT PROCEEDING IS MOOT
There is another issue that becomes evident in reviewing the cases cited by both parties
and previously relied on by the Court: This proceeding is moot because Progressive Insurance
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acted promptly to pay the arbitration award soon after such was issued. Idaho courts have stated
that confinnation of an arbitration award is only needed if it is necessary to convert such to a
judgment for future collection efforts. See Bingham County Com 'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 108
Idaho 181, 183, 697 P.2d 1195 (Idaho App. 1985) ("Such an award requires the imprimatur of a
court to be enforced."). Here the award is already paid-meaning that a judgment is
unnecessary, confinnation is meaningless, and this proceeding is therefore moot.
Barbee is again instructive:

Here, WMA timely paid the arbitration award [WMA was the
party against whom the arbitration award was issued]. The
Bentleys [the plaintiffs] were not involved in a lawsuit before they
received their damages from WMA. Consequently, to the extent
cases interpreting I. C. § 41-1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys
are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees.
146 P.3d at 661 (bracketed language added to identify the involved entities).
In the present case, Defendant Progressive Insurance acted promptly to pay the full
amount of the arbitration award. Checks were immediately requested, timely processed, and
Defendant's counsel forwarded such on November 19,2010 (only two weeks after the award
was issued). See Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider at~~ 37. Notwithstanding this prompt timing, and with the understanding that checks were being
issued, Plaintiffs submitted their initial filing with this Court on November 16,2010 (such was
not, however, received by Defendant's counsel until November 29, 2010). !d.

at~~

5 and 8.

Because Progressive "timely paid the arbitration award," the Plaintiffs need not have
been "involved in a lawsuit before they received their damages." Barbee, 146 P .3d at 661.
Hence, the Plaintiffs' present suit effectively seeking "solely attorney fees" is unnecessary and
moot. !d.

A

A ,,....,
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F. CONCLUSION
The arguments asserted in Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider have already been
substantially addressed by this Court. Plaintiffs' first argument fails because the rulings from
Unity Light & Power and Diacel Chemical are misapplied. Those cases did not involve
arbitration. Such cases simply assert that the law existing at the commencement of an action
should be controlling throughout the course ofthe proceeding. Plaintiffs' second argument is
invalid because it asks the Court to ignore subsequent Supreme Court rulings (Barbee and
Grease Spot). The Court fully addressed such issues in its initial ruling.
Finally, the Plaintiffs' present motion should be denied because a request for award
confinnation does not suffice as a basis for attorney fees, and because any award confirmation is
unnecessary since the award was paid soon after it was issued. This Court should sustain its
previous ruling on attorney fees, and deny the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

DATED this

~ay ofMay 2011.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thedday of May 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be ;;~ by facsimile transmission upon the following
person(s):
·
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC
FAX: (208) 522-1277
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3386
Gary D. Luke, ISB # 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Defendant
Progressive Insurance Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND D EVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV 10-7051
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

I, John J. Lenna, having been first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state:

Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to
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1.

I am an attorney of record for Defendant Progressive Insurance Company, in the

above-entitled matter, and, as such, I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding
this matter.
2.

The statements contained herein are made of my own personal knowledge and are

true and correct to the best of my belief and infonnation.
3.

I represented the Defendant in the arbitration that occurred on November 4, 2010.

4.

Upon receipt of the arbitration award, I requested that my client issue checks to

the Plaintiffs in the amounts indicated via the award.
5.

During conversations with Plaintiffs' counsel subsequent to the arbitration, I

infonned him that checks had been requested and would be forwarded to him upon receipt.
6.

On November 19,2010, I received the requested checks.

7.

On November 19, 2010, I forwarded the checks, with a cover letter, and a

satisfaction of award document to counsel for the Plaintiffs. True and correct copies of the letter,
the draft satisfaction of award, and the two checks are attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A.
8.

On November 29, 2010, my office received a mailed copy of the Plaintiffs'

Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Award of Costs and Fees.
9.

As of November 29, 2010, it was my understanding that Plaintiffs' counsel had

received the referenced checks made payable to the Plaintiffs.
DATED this 4ctay ofMay 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ,~yday of May 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) via facsimile:
Jacob Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
FAX: (208) 522-1277
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. lemm
Gary D. Luke
Kenley E. Grover

El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
Meridian ID 83642

Repn:sentation Throughout ldnho

Telephone: (208) 288..0608
Facsimik: {208}288..0697
E-mail: intb@;Jcrmalawoffice.com

Mailing Address: PO Box 190719, Boise ID 83719

November 19,2010

JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
RE:

Progressive I Ferrell Brothers Construction
OurFileNo.: 10-00010

Dear Mr. Wesse]:
Enclosed please find the following documents:
1.
2.

3.

Original Satisfaction of A ward;
United Financial Casualty Company's check no. 468298926, m the
amount of$5,357.07, and
United Financial Casualty Company's check no. 468298927, in the
amount of$4,147.27.

By submission of these settlement funds, we believe our client has satisfied the
arbitration award. Please be advised you are not authorized to disburse the proceeds of this
settlement until the original Satisfaction of Award has been signed and returned to our office.
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
Yours very truly,

JJL:tlt
En c.

Exhibit A

In Re:

The Arbitration of Deva Ferrell and
Sam Ferrell,

SATISFACTION OF AWARD

v.
United Financial Casualty
Company, a Progressive Insurance
Company,

For and in consideration ofthe sum of FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTYSEVEN AND 07/100 ($5,357.07), paid to Thomsen Stephens Law Offices in Trust for Deva
Ferrell, and FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN AND 27/100 ($4,147.27),
paid to Thomsen Stephens Law Offices in Trust for Sam Ferrell, by United Financial Casualty
Company, a Progressive Insurance Company, full and complete satisfaction is hereby
acknowledged of that certain Award Decision in the amount of $5,143.44 awarded to Deva
Ferrell and $3,990.80 awarded to San1 Ferrell, together with accrued interest, signed on
November 4, 2010, in the above-entitled action.
This Satisfaction of A ward may be filed with the Clerk of the Court in any action
subsequently filed by either party to this arbitration.
DATED this _ _ day of November 2010.

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES

JacobS. Wessel
Attorney for Deva and Sam Ferrell
Satisfaction of A ward - Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of November 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the
following manner:
John J. Lerma
Lem1a Law Office, P.A.
P.O. Box 190719
Boise, ID 83719

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

JacobS. Wessel

Satisfaction of Award- Page 2

'VED NOV 19 2010 )
VOID lF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 6 MONTHS AFTER DATE OF iSSUE

POliCY if

1nsurea

oate Issued

Area coae

02616845 -009

FERRELL BRO THER

11/16/2010

965

Claim#

Claimant

Date of Loss

State Code

Office Issued At _, PAC

085146644

FERRELL, SAMUEL

12/22/2008

ID

NE-NGPLR-ADM-

!J,ran.

56-389

Number

468298927

412

Dollars $ ******4, 147.27
Pay FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN AND 27/100
In Payment Of

CDS
CODE

FfNAL ARB AWARD FOR WAGE LOSS
Payable through

PNC Bank, N.A.
Ashland, Ohio

05PCL

070

1-877-448-9544

United Financial Casualty Company
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES IN TRUST FOR SAM FERRELL, ONLY
2635 CHANNING WAY
IDAHO FALLS 1D 83404

Pay

To
The
Order
Of

VOID IF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 6 MONTHS AFTER DATE OF ISSUE

· voncy

if

02616845 -009

msurea

I.Jate ISSUed

Area coae

FERRELL BRO THER

ll/16/2010

965

Claim#

Claimant

Date of Loss

State Code

085146644

FERRELL,DEVA

12/22/2008

ID

~~Jiber 468298926
Office Issued At

·I

NE-NGPLR-ADM-

PAC

Dollars $ ******5 ,357.07
Pay FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FH."'TY SEVEN AND 07/100
In Payment of

CDS
CODE

FINAL ARB AWARD FOR WAGE LOSS
Payable through

PNC Bank, N.A.
Ashland, Ohio

Pay

To
The
Order
Of

1-877-448-9544

05PCL

070

United Financial Casualty Company
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES IN TRUST FOR DEY A FERRELL, ONLY
2635 CHANNING WAY
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

56-389

412
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
263 5 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
V.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
Case No. CV-2010-7051
)
)
) PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
)
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S A WARD
)
OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW Plaintiffs Devaand Sam Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and hereby
submit the following memorandum in response and opposition to Defendant's motion to reconsider
the Court's award of costs to Plaintiffs:
In its motion to reconsider, the Defendant makes three arguments in support of their motion
to reconsider. The Court addressed the first arguments in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re:

1-

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS
.. r, ,___

i.J,J

Motion for Fees and Costs the other arguments were not brought up in Defendant's original
objection to fees and costs or within fourteen days of the filing of Plaintiffs memorandum of costs
and fees. Defendant's first argument has no merit as discussed below, and Defendants other two
arguments were not timely submitted and thus were waived.
1.

Defendant objected to an award of costs on the sole basis that Plaintiffs were not the
prevailing party.

In its March 24, 2011 brief, Defendant objected to Plaintiffs' claim for costs as follows,

"COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through counsel of record, and responds in opposition to
Plaintiffs motion for fees and costs." The remainder of its briefing discusses fees, except for a
mention on pages ten through twelve of the briefing where Defendant claims that Plaintiffs should
not be awarded fees and costs because they were not the prevailing party pursuant to IRCP Rule 54.
In its objection, Defendant offered no other reason for denying costs.

In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs, this Court initially
made its finding offact that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in arbitration, responding specifically
to the arguments regarding the prevailing party set forth in Defendant's briefing. This disposed of
Defendant's only argument for the Court to deny costs. The Court then went on to note that
Defendant failed to object to any specific cost set forth in Plaintiffs' affidavits of fees and costs.
In its motion to reconsider, Defendant fails to mention the fact that it argued for a denial of
costs based upon prevailing party analysis and that the Court found that Defendant was not the
prevailing party. It was therefore proper for the court to award costs to Plaintiffs. The rest of the
arguments set forth in Defendant's motion to reconsider are new arguments that Defendant failed
to raise in its briefing and therefore should not be considered by this Court. The very first objection
2-
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to costs made based upon any ground other than Plaintiff not being the prevailing party was made
more than fourteen days after the service of Plaintiffs memorandum of cost on March 11, 2011.
Therefore, pursuant to IRCP Rule 54(d)(6), Defendant waived any other objection to costs.
DATED this _I day of June, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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iJ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _I_ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS to be
served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
[X] Mail
JOHN J LERMA ESQ
GARYDLUKEESQ
[ ] Hand Delivery
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA
[X] Facsimile@208-288-0697
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE
PO BOX 190719
BOISE ID 83719
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

JSW
7083\019 Resp mo reconsider costs award
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,

v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam andDevaFerrell, by and through counsel of record, and hereby
submit the following memorandum in reply to Defendant's memorandum in response to Plaintiffs'
motion to reconsider the Court's order of April 29, 2011 as follows:
1.

1-

Defendant can cite no authority that Unity Light & Power and Diacel Chemical do
not apply to arbitration cases.

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Defendant's entire section A of its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider in not supported by any authority. Defendant cannot and did not cite even one case or
statute to support its contention that the Court should not apply the law as it existed when the
complaint was filed. Therefore, this Court must apply the law as it existed at the time we filed in
the complaint in late 2010. The law at the time of filing the complaint clearly provides for attorneys
fees in arbitration. See IC § 41-1839 as amended in July 2010.
2.

Martin is controlling and not Barbee because a district court must apply the law as
set forth in the statutes and!or by the Supreme Court unless said law is overruled, and
should not apply dictum.

Martin and Barbee seemingly directly contradict each other. Therefore, the question for this
Court is whether to apply the law as set forth by the Supreme Court in a case directly on point
(Martin) or to apply newer dicta (Barbee). Black's Law Dictionary, 81h Ed., Bryan A. Gamer, ed.
(2004) defines "obiter dictum" as follows:
A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opmwn, but one that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may
be considered persuasive). Strictly speaking an 'obiter dictum' is a remark made or opinion
expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, 'by the way' that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any statement of
law enunciated by the judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy,
or suggestion . ..
Jdat 1102 (emphasis added).

The Idaho Supreme Court in Barbee v. VMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657
(2006) applied the law ofi.C. § 41-1839 by analogy to I.C.§ 30-1446(1) in dictum. The Court
stated, "Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I. C.§ 41-1839 apply by analogy, theBentleys
are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." 143 Idaho at 395,246 P.3d at 661.
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In addition, the Barbee court's analogy to I. C. § 41-1839 was unnecessary to its decision in the ISA
case. After discussing the I.C. § 41-1839 cases, the Idaho Supreme Court in Barbee stated three
additional reasons for denying attorney fees under the ISA statute, I. C. § 30-1446:
Furthermore, a fair reading of I.C. § 30-1446 indicates there is no independent cause of
action for attorney fees.
Also, we are not persuaded by the Bentley's equitable arguments they were precluded from
filing a pre-arbitration suit by their contract with VMA.
Moreover, even if Bentley's had filed a suit prior to the arbitration, their request for
attorney fees would have been unavailable once the cause was submitted to arbitration.
143 Idaho at 395-6, 246 P.3d at 661-2 (emphasis added).
The statements in Barbee regarding I. C. § 41-183 9 are clearly dicta because they are applied
by the court only by analogy, and they are not essential to determine the outcome of the case,
therefore they are not precedential. The Idaho Supreme Court cannot apply dicta as binding
precedent. In St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., LTD v. Ed. ofCounty Comm'rs, 149 Idaho
584, 595 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court Stated, "Second, this Court found that Carpenter was
indigent regardless of his employment status, thus, the language from Carpenter that the district
court relies on is dicta because it was not necessary or essential to determine the outcome of
the case. See Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992). Such dicta "cannot
be relied upon as binding precedent." Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338, 346, 421 P.2d 133, 141

(1966)." 149 Idaho at 595. (emphasis addied). See also Idaho Sch.for Equal Educ. Opportunity v.

Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586 (1993); City ofWeippe v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 323, 528 P.2d 201,205
(1974), citing Petersen, 87 Idaho 361,393 P.2d 585 (1964); Longv. State Ins. Fund, 60 Idaho 257,
90 P.2d 973 (1939); and Bashore, 41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925).
3-
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If the Idaho Supreme Court cannot rely on such dicta as binding precedent, it is certainly
inappropriate for the District Court to do so.
3.

A plaintiff may file a motion to confirm an arbitration award even if it has already
been paid, so the present proceeding is not moot.

Idaho Code§ 7-911 provides that "[u]pon application of a party, the court shall confirm an
award ... (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute, the Idaho Supreme Court in Wolfe v. Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. 128 Idaho 3 98, 913 P .2d 1168 (1996) found that the insurer's payment of the

arbitration award did not preclude the insured from seeking confirmation of the award; confirmation
request after payment did not create a moot question between insured and insurer and did not divest
jurisdiction from the court to confirm the award.
In its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider section D, Defendant
quotes the reasoning of the Wolfe decision that has clearly been overruled by Martin v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Isn. Co. 138 Idaho 244,247,61 P3d. 601,657 (2002), and then argues in section E that

the matter is moot. This is in direct contradiction to the ruling in Wolfe that has never been overruled
that paying the award does not make the case moot.
In conclusion, no case in Idaho supports Defendant's contention that the Court should apply

the law at some time before the Court became involved in the lawsuit. In fact the cases expressly
contradict this assertion. See Unity Light & Power Co. v. City ofBurley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720
(1968) and State ex Rei Wasden v. Diacel Chemical Industries, Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428
(2005). In addition, no on-point, current case that has not been overruled by either statute or
subsequent case law supports Defendant's position that one must file a lawsuit before arbitration in
order to recover attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 41-183 9. Defendant is therefore forced to cite dicta
4-

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

and overruled cases in its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. Defendant
relies only on three cases that are not binding law: (1) Barbee v. VMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho
391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006) (not binding because it's dicta), (2) The Greasespot, Inc. v. Hanes, 148
Idaho 582,226 P.3d 524 (201 O)(expressly overruled by the Idaho legislature in its amendment to I. C.
§ 41-1839), and (3) Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168 (1996) Martin v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Isn. Co. 138 Idaho 244, 247, 61 P3d. 601, 657 (2002) expressly overruled
Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755,947 P.2d 1003 which was a case that relied only upon
Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 for the proposition that

compelling the insured to bring suit against the insurer was a requirement under Idaho Code §411839). It would be inappropriate for the Court to rely upon any one of these cases, therefore, even
if the Court does not apply the law as it existed when the parties involved the Court entitling
Plaintiffs to attorney fees under the amended statute, Plaintiff's are still entitled to attorneys fees
pursuant to the holding in Martin.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs request that this Court reconsider those
portions of its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs of April29, 2011
in which the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees.
DATED this

day of June, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

5-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the
day of June, 20 I 1, I caused a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO RECONSIDER to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names
either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by
hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN J LERMA ESQ
GARYDLUKEESQ
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE
PO BOX 190719
BOISE ID 83 719

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] Facsimile@208-288-0697

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

JSW
7083\020 Reply Mo Reconsider
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
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Attorneys for Defendant
Progressive Insurance Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

SAM FERRELL and DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose tme
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,

Case No. CV 10-705 t

DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, and replies in
support of its Motion for Reconsideration. The motion should be granted because Plaintiffs are
not entitled to shift their arbitration costs to the Defendant according to the parties' arbitration
agreement, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and established case law.

Defendant's Reply in Support of
Its Motion to Reconsider- Page l

RECEIVE:

N0.5554

06/06/2011/MON

12:37PM

From:208 288 0697
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Plaintiffs' Response Incorrectly Focuses on Civil Rule 54
Plaintiffs' response asserts that Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is

controlling. However, comis in Idaho and elsewhere have made it clear that such a civil rule
provision will not override the parties' arbitration agreement or the provisions of the Unif01m
Arbitration Act. Because the arbitration agreement and the UAA do not wanant the shifting of
costs, the focus on Civil Rule 54 is unhelpful.
For example, in 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court favorably cited a New Jersey case which
addressed the interaction between arbitration and civil rule cost shifting provisions. The New
Jersey case stated as follows:
This court holds that the provisions of R. 4:42-8 [New Jersey civil
rule] providing for an award of costs in favor of a prevailing party
are not intended to apply to proceedings resolved through the
confirmation of an arbitrator's award arising out of mandatory
non-binding arbitration conducted pursuant to R. 4:21A-1, unless
such a claim is specifically preserved in the arbitrator's award.

See Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 334 N.J. Super. 149, 756 A.2d 1096, 1102
(Law Div. 2000) (underlined emphasis added; bracketed explanatory language added) (cited in

Grease Spot, Inc. v. Hantes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d 524, 529 (2010)). Similarly, the Idaho
comi also cites an Arizona decision to assert that "a general fcc-shifting statute did not control
over the specific UAA provision." !d. (citing Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Canst. Co., 180
Ariz. 148, 882 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1994)). Note: These same cases were cited in Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration, and Plaintiffs do not contest such rulings or provide contrasting case

Jaw.
Pursuant to this case law, the applicable statute is the Unifonn Arbitration Act (I.C. §§
7-901 through 7-922), the controlling document is the parties' arbitration agreement, and Civil
Rule 54 does not preempt these provisions. The UAA simply requires deference to an existing
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arbitration agreement. LC. § 7-910. This Court should therefore recognize and defer to the cost
provision contained in the arbitration agreement. As cited in previous briefing, that provision
provides:
Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator
will be shared equally.
See "UNTNSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT" under
heading "ARBITRATION" (document is attached to the previously submitted Affidavit of
Defendant's Counsel).
Plaintiffs' reliance on Civil Rule 54 is misplaced because of the arbitration-specific UAA
code provisions, the favorable case law, and the explicit language in the arbitration agreement.
Accordingly, there was no "waiver" of any objection pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 because that rule is
not controlling.

Similarly, the discussion of "prevailing party" is unhelpful because of the

explicit contractual arbitration document. Accordingly, this Court should reverse its previous
ruling and disallow any shifting of costs from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant.

II. Defendant Previously Relied on the Arbitration Agreement
Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding to confinn an arbitration award. That award arose
from the pmiies' previously existing agreement to arbitrate.

The underlying arbitration

agreement has been provided to the Court and was relied on by Defendant's counsel at the initial
hearing.

Once again, there was no objection raised by Plaintiffs' counsel when such was

submitted, and this Court indicated that such would be considered in its decision.
Plaintiffs have benefitted from the arbitration agreement: Based on such, they obtained an
award which has been paid. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ought to be subject to all of the provisions
specified in the agreement.

As cited above, this means that costs cannot be shifted to the

Defendant's Reply in Support of
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This Court should reconsider and reverse its previous ruling regarding costs to

accord with the parties' arbitration agreement, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the cited case
law.
/

DATED this

__if!- day of June 2011
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of June 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by Facsimile Transmission upon the following
person(s):
JacobS. Wessel
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC
Fax: (208) 522-1277
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel @thomsenstephenslaw .com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(after April 11 , 20 11)

)
) ss.
)

JacobS. Wessel, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I.

Affiant is a member of the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices which served as
counsel for Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell in the above entitled action.
II.

This affidavit is made on personal knowledge of affiant, except to the extent of allegations
made on information and belief.
1-
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III.
Affiant has reviewed the time and cost records ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices maintained
on the above matter after the filing of their original affidavit of costs and fees of March 11, 2011 and
after filing of the supplemental affidavit of costs and fees of April11, 2011, and represents that the
following items of cost and expense were expended and incurred in the above entitled action and
arbitration after April 11, 2011:
In addition to the costs and fees totaling $24,586.26 as set forth in Plaintiffs' March
11, 2011 affidavit of costs and fees and supplemental affidavit of costs and fees of April 11, 2011,
since April 11, 2011 Thomsen Stephens Law Offices has expended approximately 25 hours in the
above entitled action as follows:
JacobS. Wessel

24.5 hours at $175.00 per hour =$4,287.50

T. Jason Wood

.5 hours at $200.00 per hour= $100.00
TOTAL after April11, 2011: $4,387.50

The sum of$4,387.50 is a reasonable attorneys fee for the services of Thomsen Stephens
Law Offices provided to Sam and Deva Ferrell to enforce the uninsured motorist policy after April
11' 2011.
IV.

With the additional sums set forth in this affidavit, the total costs and attorneys fees incurred
in the defense ofthe above entitled action are $28,973.76.

v.
A true and correct copy of our record of billings from April 11, 2011 until the present in this
matter is attached hereto as exhibit "A."
2-
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VI.
Attorneys fees and costs should be awarded for the reasons cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum
in support of attorneys fees and costs filed March 11, 2011.
VII.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), all items of cost, and expenses, including any attorneys fees
set forth in this memorandum, are to the best of your affiant's knowledge and belief, correct, are
claimed in compliance with said rule, and were reasonably and necessarily expended and incurred
in the above entitled action.
DATED this

B

day of June, 2011.

~IV--~~
~~
J

.

esse!, Esq.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to upon oath before me this

~day of June, 2011.

N{[Frbiic foi) ~aty of·~
Residing at:~
My Commission Expires:~/Z
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the __K_ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by
depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand
delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN J LERMA ESQ
GARY D LUKE ESQ
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS
3045 E COPPER POINT DRlVE
PO BOX 190719
BOISE ID 83719

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By~.wt-A&L
o S. Wessel, Esq.
JSW/jd
7083\021 Second supp aff costs fees
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EXHIBIT "A"

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 522-1230- FAX: {208) 522-1277
Tax ID #20-0493858

Sam & Deva Ferrell
P. 0. Box 1347
Idaho Falls ID 83406

ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

Page: 1
06/08/2011
7083-000C
6

SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
04/28/2011
JSW

Telephone conference with Dave re update and check the
repository

0.30

04/29/2011
JSW

Review Judge Watkins' decision

0.40

05/02/2011
TJW

conf w/ Jake and review case law re: attorney fees

0.50

Research opinions cited in Watkins' decision

3.00

Draft motion to reconsider (start) and call Dave re update

1.50

Telephone conferences with Lerma and Dave resettling for
costs, no answer from Dave

0.20

Review and revise motion to reconsider

2.80

Travel to and from courthouse and attend status conference,
review, revise and finish motion to reconsider, call with Dave re
update

2.30

Telephone conference with Dave re update and future filings

0.20

JSW
05/03/2011
JSW
05/09/2011
JSW

05/12/2011
JSW
05/14/2011
JSW

05/16/2011
JSW

., "1 )

.;;,_

~

'':1

Sam & Deva Ferrell
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

Page:2
06/08/2011
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

HOURS
05/17/2011
JSW

05/25/2011
JSW

05/26/2011
JSW

06/01/2011
JSW

JSW

06/02/2011
JSW

06/03/2011
JSW

06/07/2011
JSW

06/08/2011
JSW

JSW

Begin draft of reply to defendant's motion to reconsider award
of costs

1.50

Review defendant's objection to plaintiffs motion to reconsider
non-award of fees, review cases

0.50

Telephone conference with Lisa at Mr. Lerma's office resetting
his motion to reconsider on same day as ours

0.10

Draft Plaintiff's response to defendant's motion to reconsider
award of costs

1.50

Begin draft of reply to defendant's response to plaintiff's motion
to reconsider denial of fees

2.30

Review and revise plaintiff's reply to defendant's response to
plaintiff's motion to reconsider denial of fees

0.80

Complete draft of reply to defendant's response to plaintiffs'
motion to reconsider denial of fees

3.60

Prepare memo of argument for hearing on plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider denial of fees and defendant's motion to reconsider
award of costs

1.80

Review memorandum and cases and briefing for hearing on
motions to reconsider, travel to and from the Bonneville County
Courthouse, and appear at hearing on motions to reconsider

1.50

Draft second supplemental affidavit of costs and fees

0.20

FOR CURRENT SERVICES RENDERED

TIMEKEEPER
T. Jason Wood
JacobS. Wessel
-~----

TOTAL CURRENT

RECAPITULATION
HOURS
0.50
24.50

25.00

HOURLY RATE
$200.00
175.00

4,387.50

TOTAL
$100.00
4,287.50

4,387.50
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Sam & Deva Ferrell
ACCOUNT NO:
STATEMENT NO:

7083-000C
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins.
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08

PREVIOUS BALANCE

$24,586.26

BALANCE DUE

$28,973.76

Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product privileged information. DO NOT
DISCLOSE. Billings are due and payable 30 days frorn the date of this biiling. Unpaid
billings accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS:fRJ<D'F1Q~ Tft~
'
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-

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONN~iVftl;LEJ
E::Jf'::;-,

SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

~/;_. 1 ~-,:i~~L

Case No. CV-2010-7051

)
)

vs.

)
)

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO
RECONSIDER

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

I.

)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2008, Sam and Deva Ferrell (hereafter, "Ferrells") were struck by an
uninsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Ferrells purchased an uninsured motorist insurance
policy (hereafter, "Policy") from Progressive Insurance Company (hereafter; "Progressive").
In early 2009, Progressive settled with Ferrells regarding property damage, medical
expenses, and general damages. The parties did not reach a settlement agreement regarding
Ferrells' claim for lost wages.
On July 2, 2009, and December 22, 2009, Ferrells sent demand letters and proof of loss to
Progressive regarding lost wages. Ferrells requested $7,000.00 for Sam and $10,000.00 for
Deva. On January 5, 2010, Progressive tendered $855.00 for Sam's lost wages and $862.00 for
Deva's.
On January 22, 2010, Ferrells demanded arbitration pursuant to the Policy. On
November 4, 2010, the parties underwent arbitration. The arbitrators awarded $3,990.80 to Sam
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and $5,134.44 to Deva for lost wages. 1 Prior to arbitrating, Ferrells never filed a law suit to
recover under their Policy.
On November 16,2010, Ferrells filed this Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award
and Award of Costs and Fees. On March 11,2011, Ferrells filed a Motion for Fees and Costs.
On April 29, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees
and Costs (hereafter, "Decision and Order") which awarded costs to Ferrells but denied their
request for attorney's fees.
On May 13, 2011, Progressive filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's award of costs to
Ferrells, and Ferrells filed a Motion to Reconsider the Courts denial of their request for
attorney's fees. On May 27,2011, Progressive filed a brief in opposition to Ferrells' motion to
reconsider. On June 1, 2011, Ferrells filed a brief in opposition to Progressive's motion to
reconsider. On June 3, 2011, Ferrells filed a reply brief in support of their motion to reconsider.
On June 6, 2011, Progressive filed a reply brief in support oftheir motion to reconsider. This
Court heard oral argument on June 8, 2011.
II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

The decision or grant to deny relief pursuant to a motion to reconsider is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and, absent a manifest abuse of discretion, will not ordinarily be
disturbed on appeal. Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yrekd United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d
330,337 (2002); Kirklandv. State, 143 Idaho 544, 547, 149 P.3d 819, 822 (2006).
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb

v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521,526, 148 P.3d 1267, 1272 (2006). The amount of attorney's fees and

1

Progressive paid the full amount ofthe arbitration award on November 19,2010.
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costs awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, 111 P.3d
110, 120 (2005).
III.

DISCUSSION

Ferrells believe they are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1)
and costs pursuant to Rule 54( d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Progressive asserts Ferrells are not entitled to attorney's fees under§ 41-1839 and
Ferre lis are not the prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(l )(B).
This Court's Decision and Order denied Ferrells' request for attorney's fees but granted
their request for costs. Not surprisingly, on reconsideration Ferrells ask this Court to uphold its
decision on costs and reverse its decision on attorney's fees. Progressive asks this Court to
uphold its decision on attorney's fees and reverse its decision on costs.
A.

Attorney's Fees

Ferrells maintain their argument that Progressive is obligated to pay arbitration attorney
fees under Idaho Code§ 41-1839. As previously discussed in the Decision and Order, the Idaho
Legislature amended § 41-1839 in July 2010. Prior to that amendment, subsection (1) provided
as follows:
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery under
the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.
Section 41-1839(1) now provides as follows:
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in
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such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or in any
arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay
such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in
such action or arbitration.
I.C. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis added).
1. Application of§ 41-1839 to This Action
In its Decision and Order, this Court determined the July 2010 amendments to § 411839(1) should not apply retrospectively because the amendment took effect after arbitration
commenced between the parties. Ferrells argue this Court should apply the current version of§
41-1839(1) because the current version was in effect at the time they filed this action in the
district court.
This Court believes the commencement date of this action is irrelevant for purposes of
determining which version of the statute applies to the arbitration proceeding. Section 41-1839
provides for attorney's fees in "any action ... or arbitration for recovery under the terms of the
policy." This action is a petition to confirm the arbitration award (which Progressive already
paid in full) and a request for attorney's fees and costs. This is not an action or arbitration for
recovery under the Policy.
Arbitration for recovery under the Policy commenced more than five months prior to the
amendment of § 41-183 9. Thus, the current version of§ 41-183 9 cannot be applied to that
arbitration proceeding without being applied retrospectively. See Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of

Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009) ("A retrospective or retroactive law is
one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new

obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already past." (emphasis added)).
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2. Retrospective Application of§ 41-1839

Ferrells have not persuaded this Court to change its opinion regarding retrospective
application of§ 41-183 9.
"Unless a contrary legislative intent appears on the face of a statute, retrospective
application is disfavored." Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85,753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988).
"Statutes which do not 'create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights' are
deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive" and "may be applied
retrospectively." !d.
There is nothing on the face of§ 41-183 9(1) to indicate the Idaho Legislature intended
retrospective application of the statute. While § 41-1839(1) is remedial in some respect, this
Court previously concluded entitlement to a mandatory award under § 41-1839(1) resembles a
substantive right. As a result, retrospective application of§ 41-1839(1) is disfavored.
Nevertheless, in an effort to fully explore Ferrells alleged entitlement to attorney's fees, this
Court discussed the possibility of applying § 41-1839(1) retrospectively if Progressive had the
opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before deciding to arbitrate.
In making that determination, this Court looked at § 41-1839(1) and the Idaho Supreme
Court's interpretation of that statute at the time arbitration commenced between the parties. This
Court concluded Progressive was not subject to a mandatory fee provision when arbitration
commenced because Ferrells did not file suit prior to demanding arbitration. In support of that
conclusion, this Court quoted statements from Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391,
146 P.3d 657 (2006). Ferrells assert this Court's reliance on Barbee was improper.
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In Barbee, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether a party could seek attorney's fees
under Idaho Code § 30-1446 through an award confirmation proceeding when no lawsuit was
filed prior to arbitration. Because § 41-1839(1) was "somewhat analogous" to the statute at
issue, the Barbee court relied on cases discussing§ 41-1839(1). Id. at 395, 146 P.3d at 661.
In Barbee, after citing Emery v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,815 P.2d 442
(1991); Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168, (1996); Martin v. State
Farm )Vfutual Automobile Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); and American Foreign
Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004) the court stated "to the extent cases

interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate
lawsuit solely for attorney fees." Id. In each of the cited cases, arbitration attorney fees were
awarded under§ 41-1839, but "[t]he common thread flowing through [those] cases [was] that
attorney fees were awarded where the insured was involved in a lawsuit before he or she
received the amount justly due-their damages-from the insurance company." Id.
While Ferrells correctly point out that arbitration attorney fees were available under§ 411839 when arbitration commenced on January 22, 2010, Ferrells ignore the dispute that existed
at that time regarding the necessity of filing suit prior to arbitration.
Progressive has always argued Ferrells were not entitled to attorney's fees under the preamended § 41-1839 because they did not file suit prior to demanding arbitration.
This Court realizes§ 41-1839 was not at issue in Barbee and the holding in Barbee could
not have changed the interpretation of§ 41-183 9. Acknowledging the dispute over the need to
file suit prior to arbitrating, this Court used relevant statements from Barbee as persuasive
authority on that issue. This Court could have reached the same conclusion based on its own
independent analysis of Emery, Wolfe, Martin, and Reichert.
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In addition to the fact that Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 586, 226 P.3d
524, 528 (2010) came down after arbitration commenced, this Court did not need to rely on

Grease Spot to reach its conclusion. Prior to Grease Spot, arbitration attorney fees were
available under § 41-1839 if the insured filed suit for recovery under the terms of an insurance
policy before receiving the amount justly due. See Emery, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442; Wolfe,
128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168; Martin, 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601; Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94
P.3d 699; see also Barbee, 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657.
3. Conclusion

The analysis up to this point leads to two conclusions. First, the July 2010 amendments
to§ 41-1839(1) should not be applied retrospectively. Second, prior to being amended in July
2010, § 41-1839 did not provide for arbitration attorney's fees if no lawsuit was filed prior to
arbitration.
Ferrells did not file suit for recovery under their Policy prior to arbitrating their dispute
over lost wages. Accordingly, this Court reaffirms its conclusion that Ferrells are not entitled to
arbitration attorney fees under the pre-amended § 41-183 9.
Ferrells' motion to reconsider is denied.
B. Costs

This Court concluded in its Decision and Order that Ferrells were the prevailing party in
the arbitration proceeding. This Court also concluded Progressive had waived any other
argument regarding costs. Thus, this Court awarded costs to Ferrells in the amount of$3,563.76
($1,172.98 as a matter of right and $2,390.78 discretionary).
In footnote 2 of the Decision and Order, this Court acknowledged that Progressive made
additional arguments at the April 6, 2011 hearing in opposition to Ferrells' motion for costs.
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This Court, however, did not entertain those arguments because they were not timely under Rule
54(d)(6).
On reconsideration, Progressive argues each party should bear its own costs as specified
in the Policy. Progressive asserts it did not waive that argument because it submitted the Policy
to the Court on April 6, 2011, and Ferrells did not object to this Court considering it. 2
After reviewing the record, this Court acknowledges Progressive submitted the Policy on
April 6, 2011, and this court indicated it would consider the Policy in its decision. Ferre lis did
not object. This Court, therefore, should not have concluded Progressive waived its argument.
Paragraph three of the "Arbitration" section of the Policy provides as follows: "Each
party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any other expenses it incurs. The Costs and
fees of the third arbitrator will be shared equally."
Idaho Code § 7-910 provides, "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate,
the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees,
incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award."
The arbitration agreement in this case specifies that the parties will bear their own costs.
Furthermore, in Grease Spot, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the Uniform Arbitration Act
(Idaho Code§§ 7-901 through 7-922) and pointed out that a procedural "rule requiring the court
to award costs to the prevailing party does not apply to arbitration confirmation proceedings."

Grease Spot, at 587, 226 P.3d at 529 (citing Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino,
334 N.J.Super. 149, 756 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Law Div.2000)).

2

Progressive filed the Policy with an affidavit of counsel the morning of April 6, 2011. The
hearing on fees and costs also occurred that morning, but the Policy was not in the court file at
the time of the hearing.
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This Court concludes the arbitration agreement of the Policy should control. Pursuant to
that agreement, the parties are to bear their own costs. Progressive's motion for reconsideration,
therefore, should be granted.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Ferrells' motion to reconsider is denied.
Progressive's motion to reconsider is granted. Ferrells are not entitled to recover costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this

J!i_ day of June 2011.

185
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER- 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I~

day of June 2011, I did send a true and correct copy
I hereby certify that on this
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by causing
the same to be hand-delivered.
JacobS. Wessel
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

P.L.L.C.

2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

John J. Lerma
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

ElDorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
P.O. Box 190719
Boise, ID 83 719

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
263 5 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com

.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL,

)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

)

Plaintiffs,
V.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d. b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR
CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATIONAL AWARD
AND FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Sam and Dave Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and prays
this Court for its order, judgment and decree confirming the arbitrational award dated November 4,
2010 and for award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $1,001.90.

This motion for

prejudgment interest is made pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-1 04( 1) and Greenough v. Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.2d 1124 (2006) in the amount of 12% per annum from

1-

MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

the date that proof of loss was provided on December 22, 2009 until the date that the arbitration
award was received by the plaintiffs on November 16, 2010. Based upon the amount of the
judgment, PlaintiffDave Ferrell is entitled to $571.55 in interest and Plaintiff Sam Ferrell is entitled
to $430.35 in interest, for a total of prejudgment interest award of $1,00 1.90.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this ~ day of July, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

2-

MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _2_!_ day of July, 20 I I, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their
names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon
or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN J LERMA ESQ
GARY D LUKE ESQ
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE
PO BOX 190719
BOISEID 83719

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@208-288-0697

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

By:

JSW/jd
7083\022 mot confirm award interest
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MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

PLLC
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@ts-lawoffice.com

;
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'

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

)

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d. b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

STIPULATION FOR
CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATIONAL AWARD AND
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

COME NOW the plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, JacobS. Wessel, Esq.
of the firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, and defendant, by and through its attorney,
John Lerma, Esq. of the firm of Lerma Law Office, P.A., and hereby STIPULATE and AGREE to
the Court entering final judgment, order and decree granting to plaintiffs confirmation of the
arbitrational award entered November 4, 2010, which has previously been satisfied by payment on
1-

STIPULATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATIONAL AWARD AND
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

November 18,2010 and awarding plaintiffs $1,001.90 in prejudgment interest of which $370.10 has
already of been paid, leaving a balance of $631.80 due and owing.
DATED this

day of August, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

B~~~
JacobS. Wessel, Esq.

DATED

this~ day of August, 2011.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA

By:

JSW/jd
7083\024 stipulation confirm award interest
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STIPULATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATIONAL AWARD AND
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
j wessel@ts-lawoffice.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL,
Plaintiffs,
V.

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

JUDGMENT, ORDER
AND DECREE

The Court, having received a Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award and
Prejudgment Interest of the parties herein, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the provisions, terms and
conditions of the Stipulation of the parties be, and the same are, incorporated herein by reference as
the order of this Court, to wit, the Arbitrational Award entered November 4, 2010 is hereby
confirmed and Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiffs the additional amount of $630.80
1-

JUDGMENT, ORDER AND DECREE
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in prejudgment interest. A copy of said Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award and
Prejudgment Interest is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
DATED this ~ay of August, 2011.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I am the duly elected and qualified Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville; that I mailed [or delivered
by courthouse box] a copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, ORDER AND DECREE to the
following attorneys this

fd day of August 2011.

JOHN J LERMA ESQ
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA
P 0 BOX 190719
BOISE ID 83719
JACOB S WESSEL ESQ
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 CHANNING WAY
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

JSW/jd
7083\025 judgment order decree
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COUNTY
20
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@ts-lawoffice.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THEABOVENAMEDRESPONDENTSUNITEDFINANClALCASUALTYCOMPANY,
d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ITS ATTORNEY JOHN J.
LERMA, LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A., AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Appellants, SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL, appeals against
the above named Respondents, UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY, d.b.a.

1-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs entered in the above entitled action on April29,
2011, and the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Reconsider entered in the above
entitled action on June 14, 2011, entered by the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
2.

This appeal is taken on issues of law and fact. It is generally submitted that the

issues on appeal will include the following:
a.

the District Court's decision on April29, 2011 denying Ferrells' Motion for
an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9; and

b.

the District Court's decision on June 14, 2011 denying Ferrells' Motion to
Reconsider and granting Defendant's Motion to Reconsider.

A more specific detailing of the issues on appeal will be supplied upon the briefing of this
matter.
3.

That Appellants are aggrieved parties as a result of a final, appealable Judgment,

Order and Decree entered August 12, 2011 in proceedings before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins,
Jr. and therefore have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.
4.

The judgments and orders described above are appealable pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rules 11(a)(1) and 11(a)(7).
5.

There is no order sealing any portion of the record.

6.

The Appellants request the preparation ofthe reporter's standard transcript, pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 25, from the hearings held on February 4, 2011 (Telephonic Status
Conference), April6, 2011 (Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs), and on June 8, 2011 (Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider) conducted before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
2-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

7.

Appellants request the clerk's standard record to be prepared pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rule 28, with the addition of the following documents:
a.

Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings filed December 30, 2010.

b.

Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion to Stay filed January 8, 2011.

c.

Withdrawal ofMotion to Stay Proceedings filed February 2, 2011.

d.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs (Idaho Code §41-1839 and IRCP
54(d)(l)) filed March 11, 2011.

e.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees and Costs filed
March 11, 2011.

f.

Affidavit of JacobS. Wessel in Support of Motion for Fees and Costs filed
March 11, 2011.

g.

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs filed March
24, 2011.

h.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Response filed April 1,
2011.

1.

Plaintiffs' Objection to the Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel filed April11,
2011.

J.

Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Attorneys Fees (after March 11, 2011)
filed April11, 2011.

k.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed May 12, 2011.

1.

Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs
filed May 13, 2011.

3-
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m.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Award of Costs to Plaintiffs filed May 13, 2011.

n.

Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed
May 24, 2011.

o.

Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed
May 24, 2011.

p.

Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the
Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs filed June 1, 2011.

q.

Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reconsider
filed June 3, 2011.

r.

Defendant's Reply in Support of its Motion to Reconsider filed June 6, 2011.

s.

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Attorneys Fees (after April11,
2011) filed June 8, 2011.

t.

Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Prejudgment Interest filed July
21, 2011.

u.

Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and for Prejudgment
Interest filed August 5, 2011.

8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set forth below:
Karen Konvalinka
Certified Court Reporter
605 N. Capital Avenue
4-
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Idaho Falls, ID 83402
b.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the clerk's record
d.

That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the appellate filing fee.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this JLQ_ day of September, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By~c~
acob S. Wessel, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ;<.. o day of September, 20 II, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the
correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
JOHN J LERMA ESQ
GARY D LUKE ESQ
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE
PO BOX I907I9
BOISE ID 837I9
Karen Konvalinka
Certified Court Reporter
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile@208-288-0697

] Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[X] Courthouse Box
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

By:~p~S:-~
cobS. Wessel, Esq.
JSW
7083\001 Notice of Appeal
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IN THE DISTRI

DISTRICT OF THE

URT OF THE SEVENTH

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true name
is unknown,
Defendant/Respondent,

Appeal from:

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051
Docket No. 39221-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)

Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County

Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding.
Case number from Court:

CV-2010-7051

Order or Judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs,
entered April29, 2011, and the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Reconsider, entered
June 14,2011.
Attorney for Appellant:

Jacob Wessel, 2635 Channing Way,
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Attorney for Respondent:

John Lerma, PO Box 190719,
Boise, ID 83719

Appealed by:

Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell

Appealed against:

United Financial Casualty Company, d.b.a.
Progressive Insurance Company

Notice of Appeal Filed:

September 20, 2011

Appellate Fee Paid:

Yes

Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?

Yes, estimated 150 pages

If so, name of reporter:

Karen Konvalinka

Dated: September 23, 2011

NAL

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
I

OCT -720H
Supreme Court_ Court o

Entered on ATS b

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- I

#383 P,002/003

From:208 288 0697

·ourny
, 'I
LERIVIA LAW OFFICE, P.A.
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886
Kenley E. Grover, ISB# 8287
El Dorado Business Campus
3045 E. Copper Point Drive
PO Box 190719
Boise ID 83719
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697
Attorneys for Respondent United Financial Casualty Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BO:N'NEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. CV 10-7051

RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORDS

vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true
name is unknown,
Defendants/Respondents,

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS SAM FERREL AND DEYA FERRELL AND
THE PARTYS' ATTORNEY JACOBS, WESSEL, THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,
PLLC, AND THE CLERKOF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, That the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby
request pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record
in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. 28 and the notice of appeaL Any
additional transcript is to be provided in hard copy and electronic format.
1.

Respondent requests the clerk's standard record, as requested by Appellants,
include the following additional documents:

Respondent's Request for Additional Records- l

RECEIVE:

N0.0237

10/03/2011/MON 04:02PM

/2011 15:56

From:208 288 0697

#383 P.003/003

a. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Stay filed December 30,
2010.
b. Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel filed on April 6, 2011.
2.

I certify that this request for additional records has been served upon the clerk of
the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this 3_ day of October 2011.
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

.~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3_ day of October 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
JacobS. Wessel
Thomas Stephens Law Office, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Clerk of the Court
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

_2L

_2L

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

Respondent's Request for Additional Records- 2

RECEIVE:

N0.0237

10/03/2011/MON 04:02PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true name
is unknown,
Defendant/Respondent,

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051
Docket No. 39221-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination:
please see attached sheets (0 pages).
NO EXHIBITS
And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this 16111 day of November, 2011.
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICA T!ON OF EXHIBITS- 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true name
is unknown,
Defendant/Respondent,

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-7051
Docket No. 39221-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the above and foregoing Record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I do further certifY that no exhibits were either offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, that
the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, as required by Rule 31 ofthe
Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - I

at Idaho Falls, Idaho, this 16111 day of November, 2011.

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE- 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

Case No. CV-2010-7051

)

vs.

)

Docket No. 39221-2011

)

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true name
is unknown,
Defendant/Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of November, 2011, I served a copy of the Reporter's
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:
Jacob Wessel
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

John Lerma
LERMA LAW OFFICE
PO Box 190719
Boise, ID 83 71 9

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me.

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By: ----------------------Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE- 1

